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Barbara Ann Bond 
MI9’s escape and evasion mapping programme 1939 – 1945. 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the programme of mapping produced on silk, and other fabric, by 
MI9 to facilitate the escape and evasion of British military personnel during World War 
II.  It considers the creation of MI9 in December 1939, the rationale for the new military 
intelligence branch and the context of the history of military mapping on silk.  The map 
production programme is described, together with its progress and the challenges faced.  
The various groups of maps are identified and described, together with the source maps 
on which they were based.  This description is developed in nine appendices produced 
as an integral part of the research to provide a comprehensive carto-bibliography of the 
234 individual maps which have been identified.   Location details of extant copies in 
British map collections are also provided.    
          The ingenious methods of smuggling the maps into the camps, with other escape 
aids, in apparently innocuous leisure items are described.    The maps were then copied 
and reproduced to support the escapes.  Coded correspondence with the camps is 
discussed, and a successful deciphering of some of that correspondence is provided.  
The implications for the escape and evasion programme were considerable, but so too 
were the implications of the passage of intelligence from the camps to aid the war effort, 
a factor apparently largely overlooked in previous studies of the wartime role of the 
intelligence branches.  Three case studies are provided to demonstrate the role and 
importance of the contribution made by the maps to the escape and evasion programme.  
The conclusion assesses the significance of this little known episode in British historical 
cartography of the twentieth century which essentially provides the latest chapter in the 
story of military mapping on silk, and other fabric, through the ages.                                         
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Illustrations .............................................................................................. 8 
List of Figures and Appendices ........................................................................... 9 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ 11 
Author’s Declaration  ....................................................................................... 12 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 1 ......................................................................................................................... 32 
Historical Background and the Creation of MI9 
Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................... 55 
The map production programme and the compilation of a carto-bibliography 
Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 90 
Escape Aids and Communication with the Camps 
Chapter 4 ....................................................................................................................... 121 
Coded Correspondence 
Chapter 5 ....................................................................................................................... 152 
A case study approach: Airey Neave and the Schaffhausen Salient 
Chapter 6 ....................................................................................................................... 175 
Case studies: the Baltic ports and maps produced in the camps 
Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 192 
Appendices .................................................................................................................... 215 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 269 
 
8 
 
List of Illustrations 
Illustration I: Ordnance Survey 1 inch map of the Lake District (Keswick)………42 
 
Illustration II: part of sheet C………………………………………………………67 
 
Illustration III: sheet A4 [Danzig]………………………………………………….67 
 
Illustration IV: cover diagram of GSGS 3982 [Fabric]…………………………….71  
 
Illustration V: GSGS 3982 [Fabric] 1:500,000 part of sheet L32/2 Konstanz…….72 
 
Illustration VI: GSGS 4090 [Fabric] 1:100,000 sheet F31 West…………………..75 
 
Illustration VII: [Series 43] 1:1,000,000 sheet 43B showing part of the large scale  
 
inset at 1:300,000 of the German-Swiss border……………………………………77 
 
Illustration  VIII: games box and playing cards……………………………………97 
 
Illustration IX: artwork of a chess set………………………………………………99 
 
Illustration X: drawing to show layered construction of a gramophone record……101 
 
Illustration XI: map showing location of prisoner of war camps…………………..103 
 
Illustration XII: purse and folded maps……………………………………………108 
 
Illustration XIII: headed notepaper of one of MI9’s cover organisations………….112 
 
Illustration XIV: receipt showing Oflag IVC despatch stamp……………………..113 
 
Illustration XV: sheet Y……………………………………………………………156 
 
Illustration XVI: sheet A1 Schaffhausen Salient (West)…………………………...157 
 
Illustration XVII:  Neave’s successful escape route………………………………..164 
 
Illustration XVIII: Pesant’s sketch map…………………………………………….170 
 
Illustration XIX: manuscript map of route from Biberach to the Swiss frontier……188 
 
Illustration XX: manuscript escape map (left)………………………………………190 
 
Illustration XXI: enhanced image of escape map (right)……………………………190 
 
Illustration XXII: part of sheet A……………………………………………………190  
 
 
 
9 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1 coded letter...................................................................................................... 142 
Figure 2 coded letter with hidden message highlighted ................................................ 143 
 
List of appendices 
Introduction to appendices .............................................................................. 216 
Introduction to Appendix 1 ............................................................................. 217 
Appendix 1 ...................................................................................................... 219 
Introduction to Appendix 2 ............................................................................. 233 
Appendix 2 ...................................................................................................... 234 
Introduction to Appendix 3 ............................................................................. 235 
Appendix 3 ...................................................................................................... 237 
Introduction to Appendix 4  ............................................................................ 245 
Appendix 4 ...................................................................................................... 247 
Introduction to Appendix 5 ............................................................................. 249 
Appendix 5 ...................................................................................................... 251 
Introduction to Appendix 6 ............................................................................. 253 
Appendix 6 ...................................................................................................... 255 
Introduction to Appendix 7 ............................................................................. 257 
Appendix 7 ...................................................................................................... 259 
Introduction to Appendix 8 ............................................................................. 261 
Appendix 8 ...................................................................................................... 263 
Introduction to Appendix 9 ............................................................................. 266 
Appendix 9 ...................................................................................................... 267 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to many people for the realisation of this long held ambition.  To 
Professor Wendy Purcell, Vice-Chancellor of this inspirational University, for her belief 
and confidence; to Associate Professor Harry Bennett,  Professors Mark Brayshay and 
Kevin Jefferys for their outstanding scholarship, support and encouragement; to 
Professor David McMullan for sharing his knowledge of cryptography; to Peter Clark, 
long-time professional colleague, mentor and friend, whose cartographic knowledge and 
expertise, and willingness to share them,  remains undiminished; to Paul Hancock, 
Brian Garvan and Jim Caruth, former colleagues in the Defence Geographic Centre 
(formerly the Directorate of Military Survey); to the custodians of the many map 
collections, record repositories and museums I have visited and talked to in my pursuit 
of the pieces of the jig saw puzzle, not least The National Archives, British Library, 
National Library of Scotland, Macclesfield Silk Museum, University of Glasgow, Royal 
Air Force Museum, and the Intelligence Corps Museum; to the families of the late John 
C. Bartholomew and the late Commander John Pryor RN; to the late Professor M.R.D. 
Foot for sharing his experiences and knowledge.  
My deepest thanks go to them all.  
 
This work is dedicated to my family, Roger, Abi and Adam, for their love and support.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author 
been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate 
Committee. 
Work submitted for this research degree at Plymouth University has not formed part of 
any other degree either at Plymouth University or at another establishment. 
 
Word count of the body of the thesis (excluding appendices and bibliography) 62,349. 
 
 
Signed................................................ 
Date        28th October 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Introduction 
 
‘It is the intelligent use of geographical knowledge that outwits the enemy and wins 
wars.’ (W.G.V.Balchin).1 
The principal aim of this thesis is to reconstruct, document and analyse the programme 
of escape and evasion mapping on which MI9, a newly established branch of British 
intelligence, embarked in World War II.  Such an exercise has never previously been 
attempted.  The thesis charts for the first time the origins, scope, nature, character and 
impact of MI9’s escape and evasion mapping programme in the period 1939-1945.  It 
traces the development of the mapping programme in the face of the many challenges 
faced and describes the ways in which MI9 sought to overcome those challenges with 
the considerable assistance of both individuals and commercial companies.  In a 
detailed carto-bibliography, the individual maps are identified and described; production 
details are provided and location information on those extant copies which have been 
identified is provided.  Through a number of case studies, the extent to which the 
mapping programme was the key to the success of the whole of MI9’s escape 
programme is assessed.     
          The new intelligence branch was born in December 1939 and was charged with 
escape and evasion activities to support those who, it was anticipated, would either be 
shot down in enemy-held territory or would be captured.  Its gestation had been lengthy.  
From the view certainly held prior to World War I that there was something 
ignominious about capture, the military philosophy had evolved sufficiently in the inter-
war period for escape activity to be regarded as a priority in the greater scheme of 
warfare.  And so MI9 was born, arguably not soon enough as, less than six months after 
its creation, thousands of British Service personnel found themselves captured on the 
beaches at Dunkirk.  The newly formed military intelligence branch tried to tackle the 
                                                             
1
 Balchin, W.G.V. ‘United Kingdom Geographers in the Second World War: a Report.’ 
The Geographical Journal, Volume 153, Number 2 (July 1987), p.160. 
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aftermath of the disaster which befell the Expeditionary Force in May 1940, but it took 
time and resources to mount the sort of organisation which was needed. By May 1940, 
it was also the case that the nation had acquired a Prime Minister who had had personal 
experience of escaping from captivity in a war situation and was, undoubtedly, a natural 
ambassador for the changed philosophy.
2
 
          The story of the mapping programme which became such an important part of 
MI9’s escape programme has been difficult to piece together.  No single, 
comprehensive record of the production programme has ever been found and no record 
set of the maps has yet been deposited in The National Archives by the Ministry of 
Defence.  Extant copies of the maps have been found in many collections, both public 
and private, throughout the country.  There is, however, very little mention of the maps 
in the published literature and some of the possibly relevant MI9 files in The National 
Archives are still closed.  Reconstructing the story has proved to be like the reassembly 
of a jigsaw puzzle where some pieces are still missing, possibly lost for all time.  
Nevertheless, careful enquiry has yielded enough evidence to enable the narrative to be 
recovered.  What emerges is a story of quite amazing inspiration and ingenuity in a 
country at war, fighting for the survival of its core democratic values and standards.    
          A presentation of the factual history of the mapping programme cannot, however, 
stand alone.  It has had to be set in the climate of the times.  The young men, and 
especially the officers, most of whom had been educated in the British public school 
system during the inter-war period,   had been raised on a culture of escape stories from 
the Great War.  They had read many of the books which had been written by the great 
                                                             
2
 Winston Churchill was a war correspondent for the Morning Post during the Boer 
War.  He was captured in November 1899 and escaped on 12
th
 December.  Travelling 
on foot and by train, he successfully made it across the border to Mozambique and 
freedom.  
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escapers from the First War, people like Durnford, Evans and others.
3
  They had also 
been made more aware of the relevance of geography in their curriculum, of map 
reading and navigational skills. Their education had also sought to instil the standard 
British public school behaviour of team, country and King before self.  They were avid 
readers of Boys Own and many had belonged to Baden-Powell’s Boy Scout movement.  
All these traits combined to produce an expectant and openly receptive audience for the 
training and philosophy which MI9 set out to instil, principally that of ‘escape-
mindedness’.4     
          The intelligence world of the time also needs to be considered.  MI9 was a new 
player in a world where others had already carved out for themselves a sizable role and 
niche.  It will be shown that the part played by MI6, more commonly referred to as SIS,   
proved to be unhelpful and unsupportive to the newly created Branch.  The key staff 
recruited to MI9, especially the individual who was ultimately responsible for the 
mapping programme, had some of the skills they needed, but arguably absolutely no 
cartographic awareness.  Research has revealed that the dark fog which often 
surrounded the world of security and espionage meant that key contacts were not made 
at critical times and there was often a lack of awareness of where the experience and 
expertise which they so badly needed actually lay.    
          Whilst the research has concentrated primarily on the mapping programme, 
considerable work has been undertaken to unravel in full the details of MI9’s escape 
programme.  Producing the maps was one thing, getting them to the prisoners of war 
was quite another.  Just how they were smuggled into the camps, how MI9 
                                                             
3
 Durnford, H.G. The Tunnellers of Holzminden.  Cambridge University Press. 1
st
 
edition 1920. 2
nd
 edition 1930; Evans, A.J. The Escaping Club.  The Bodley Head.  
London.  1921. 
4
 This was the phrase coined by the Head of MI9 to describe the philosophy of escape.  
It is described in Chapter 1. 
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communicated with the camps, and how the whole escape programme took shape has 
been part of the unfolding investigation.   The art of smuggling proscribed items inside 
hollowed out containers was used extensively by MI9 who persuaded the manufacturers 
of board games and other leisure aids to assist them in their endeavours.  The ‘industry’ 
created to support MI9’s activity will be explored and documented.  Coded 
communication with the camps proved to be the vital link in the chain and deciphering a 
number of extant coded letters provided the proof of the importance of that system of 
communication.  The prisoners of war themselves also rose to the challenge.  Having 
been trained that it was their duty to attempt to escape, they set up escape committees in 
many of the camps, certainly in the oflags.  The many hours of the potentially 
excruciating boredom of captivity were funnelled into escape activity.  Escapes were 
managed as military operations in both the planning and execution.  Men used their 
talents and, in many cases, their professional expertise, to copy maps, to produce 
compasses and clothing, and to forge papers and passes to aid the escapers on their 
journey to freedom.  Lessons were learned from both the successes and failures, and key 
experiences were either brought back to the camps by the failed escapers or relayed 
back to the camps by the successful escapers, for use in future attempts. 
Literature Review 
Exploring the published literature on MI9’s escape and evasion mapping programme 
1939-1945 has proved to be a considerable challenge as there is a very real paucity of 
published sources on the subject.  Whilst there is a vast array of published sources 
relating to the activity of escape and evasion, very little of it mentions maps and, even 
those that do, make only passing mention of the subject.  There may well be good 
reason for this and that aspect will be addressed later in this section.  Meantime, a 
review of the limited literature available helps to introduce key personalities and 
17 
 
concepts, and allows us to situate what follows in the context of the wider 
historiography of wartime intelligence and escape activity. 
                    Some of the primary sources providing any information about the mapping 
programme are also published sources and proved to be of such crucial importance that 
they are considered in this review.  The key one amongst these is undoubtedly that 
written by Christopher William Clayton Hutton.
5
  Hutton had been appointed to the post 
of MI9’s Technical Officer with the rank of lieutenant, tasked with the invention and 
design of escape aids.  In his engaging and often amusing narrative, he reveals just what 
an ingenious and innovative individual he was.  Some of Hutton’s inter-war 
employment experience was in journalism and later in publicity for the film industry.  
He was fascinated by show business, particularly magicians. Whilst working in his 
uncle’s timber business in Park Saw Mills, Birmingham prior to WWI, he had 
challenged Harry Houdini to escape from a packing case constructed on the stage of the 
Birmingham Empire Theatre.  It was this experience which was seen to qualify him for 
the post he was given as the escape boffin in MI9.  
          Hutton’s book was originally published on 27th June 1960 and articles noting the 
publication appeared that day in both the Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post.  
Whilst Hutton’s book is very informative and appears to cover the full range of the 
work in which he was involved, it is also clear that much detail is omitted.  The reason 
for this slowly becomes clear in the later pages of the book.  He describes how he 
approached the War Office in 1950, almost a decade earlier, for permission to lecture 
and write a book about his experiences, at the same time providing proof that there was 
already information about the escape aids in the public domain.  Indeed, some of the 
surplus maps had been sold off soon after the war, an undertaking which had been 
                                                             
5
 Hutton, Christopher Clayton.  Official Secret.  The New English Library Ltd.  London  
1962. 
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openly described and discussed in the press
 
at the time.
6
  He completed a first draft of 
the book under the title A Journey Has Been Arranged and invited Air Marshall Sir 
Basil Embry to read and comment on it.  Sir Basil offered to write the preface and in it 
he indicated not just his personal indebtedness to Hutton, but he also commented ‘Some 
people may think he is eccentric; I think he is a genius.’7  That completed draft was sent 
to the publisher, before being sent to the War Office for permission to publish.   
          There had been a strange twist to the story in the mid-1950s with the publication 
of Charles Connell’s book The Hidden Catch.8   It was submitted by the publisher, Elek 
Books, to the Air Ministry for clearance to publish on 11
th
 August 1955.  It is clear from 
the files that this was the same book in essence as that which had been stopped in 1951.  
It is very obviously Hutton’s story, although he is described throughout the book as Mr. 
X.  Permission to publish was initially refused and Hutton was warned that to ignore the 
decision would make him liable to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.  
However, the publisher agreed to make changes to the text made at the request of the 
Air Ministry, and this resulted in permission to publish.  The book was published in 
1955.  For unexplained reasons, Hutton did not realise that one of the textual changes 
was to prove, in his opinion, to be defamatory of himself and resulted in him pursuing a 
claim for libel against his own publisher.  The libel action was apparently settled out of 
court.  During the discussions which took place at the time and which were documented 
in the files of the Office of the Treasury Solicitor, it became clear that Hutton had 
apparently been treated for mental illness during the war and had  left MI9 before the 
                                                             
6
 Article in Yorkshire Post and Leeds Mercury. 1
st
 December 1945. 
7
 Hutton. Official Secret, p.141. 
8
 Connell, Charles.  The Hidden Catch.  Elek Books Limited.  London. 1955 
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end of the war.
9
  The publisher eventually agreed to some revised wording and the book 
was published in 1955.    
          The fractious relationship between the faceless men in the War Office, Hutton 
and publishers both in the UK and the USA appeared to continue and the situation was 
not apparently resolved to Hutton’s satisfaction until the eventual publication of Official 
Secret in 1960 which appears to be a condensed form of the original draft which Hutton 
had written some ten years previously.  It is not clear just how much of Hutton’s 
reticence to include much detail about the mapping programme in his own finally 
published book results from the security vetting process or from an understandable 
reluctance, in the light of his previous experience, to continue battling with the War 
Office Committee responsible for vetting  publications.  Some four years later in 1964, 
however, he did author a short article for the American journal Popular Science which 
served to highlight some of the detail of the escape gadgetry, compasses, clothing, 
currency, and included a section on the maps.
10
  It added nothing to the minimal detail 
about the maps which he had included in the final published version of his own book. 
          Airey Neave was destined to play a significant role in MI9, as an escaper of some 
renown and as an officer posted to the Branch after his repatriation to London.  His role 
will be considered in detail later in the thesis, especially in Chapter 5.   It is, however, 
appropriate to consider at this point, as primary sources, both of his published 
reminiscences of his wartime experiences.  Neave’s first book covered his experiences 
in the field on the frontline, his capture and initial, unsuccessful attempts at escape 
which earned him the unenviable distinction of incarceration in Oflag IVC, the 
                                                             
9
 TNA: TS 28/581 Air Ministry minute 1/17380 dated 21/5/51. 
10
 Hutton, Christopher Clayton.  ‘Escape Secrets of World War II.’  Popular Science.  
Volume 184, Number 1, pp.69-73 and p.200. 
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mediaeval castle built by the Elector of Saxony above the village of Colditz.
11
  Despite 
describing the activities which characterised the work of the escape committee and the 
fact that those of a less technical bent ‘copied maps’, there is no indication in his book 
that any maps produced by MI9 were available in the camp.
12
  Intriguingly, 
acknowledging that maps were needed as an invaluable tool to the successful escaper, 
he indicated that he ‘slowly traced in Indian ink the neighbourhood of the Swiss frontier 
from a stolen map’ but does not reveal the actual source or nature of the map.13  
Together with his Dutch colleague, Toni Luteyn, Neave escaped from Colditz on 5
th
 
January 1942, the first British Officer to escape successfully from that infamous camp.  
The only other mention of their use of a map is that Luteyn was able to buy a map ‘of 
the surrounding country’ in Ulm on their way to escaping successfully across the Swiss 
border.
14
  It appears quite remarkable that such was apparently possible in a country at 
war where security issues were ever present.   
          In 1969, some ten years before Foot and Langley were allowed to publish the 
definitive history of MI9 based on authorised research (see following paragraph), Neave 
published his second book, the title of which reflected his own codename (Saturday) in 
MI9, which he joined after his successful repatriation to the UK.
15
  Neave 
acknowledged in the preface to his book that it was not possible at that stage to write an 
official history of MI9, that he was writing rather about his personal experiences 
working in MI9 and that his was the first to be written ‘from the inside’, a somewhat 
curious statement since Hutton’s own book had been published some nine years earlier.  
Neave mentioned in private correspondence the need to clear the content of the book 
                                                             
11
Neave, Airey. They Have Their Exits. Hodder & Stoughton. 1953. Subsequently 
published in paperback.  Coronet Books.  1970. 
12
 Neave. They Have Their Exits, p.64. 
13
 Neave. They Have Their Exits, p.74. 
14
 Neave. They Have Their Exits, p.102. 
15
 Neave, Airey.  Saturday at MI9.  Hodder & Stoughton.  1969. 
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prior to publication: in these circumstances, it seems inconceivable that he was unaware 
of Hutton’s book or of the heated exchanges and protracted negotiations prior to its 
publication.
16
  However, there is no mention in Neave’s book of Hutton or of any aspect 
of the escape aids programme on which he worked.  Neave concentrated rather on the 
work done in support of the escape lines and their organisation.  Whilst the book is of 
general interest and describes, albeit in a limited way, some of the educational and 
training aspects of MI9’s work, it is largely not germane to the purpose of this research.  
          The single most comprehensive published secondary source which describes the 
whole story of the creation and operation of MI9 is undoubtedly Foot and Langley’s 
opus magnum first published in 1979 and, in paperback edition, by Biteback as recently 
as 2011.
17
  Interestingly neither edition was published with footnotes.   This omission 
apparently resulted from prohibitive costs, a fact noted in the book and subsequently 
confirmed verbally by Professor Foot.
18
  The authors did, however, have the foresight to 
deposit the final typescript of the book, including their comprehensive footnotes, in the 
Imperial War Museum collection, recognising its potential value for future 
researchers.
19
  Maps are certainly mentioned in the book, particularly in relation to 
Hutton’s escape aids, and the authors highlight the extent to which he quickly realised 
that maps were an indispensable aid to successful escape.   Brief mention is made of his 
early contact with commercial map publishers in London and Edinburgh to enlist their 
help and support, and with his search for noiseless paper.  However, it is clear that their 
source for this information was Hutton’s own book and not a primary source such as the 
War Office (WO) files relating to MI9’s activity.  Indeed, they highlight the fact that 
                                                             
16
 Private papers of Airey Neave.  Parliamentary Archives, AN 659. 
17
 Foot, M.R.D. & Langley, J.M.  MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945.  Bodley Head. 
London. 1979. 
18
 Interview with Professor M.R.D. Foot at the Savile Club, London, on 31
st
 January 
2012. 
19
 Imperial War Museum, Miscellaneous Document 2744. 
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many WO files were withheld from them, estimating the number at some 250 in all, and 
emphasised the likelihood that there may well have been genuine operational reasons 
for not making such files publicly available until 2010 since there is no point in 
advertising clandestine methods that might be used to national advantage another time.  
The point was well made, certainly in relation to Hutton’s escape devices, since fabric 
maps are known to have been produced in significant numbers in the 1950s and 1960s 
by both the UK and the US military mapping organisations.   These do, however, fall 
outside the scope of this particular research topic.      
          None of the published sources which can be ascribed to Hutton for their 
information explores the mapping programme in any detail in spite of the fact that it 
was clearly an early priority for the newly established MI9.  There are many other books 
which recount the detail of escape and evasion, though none appears to include detail of 
the maps.
20
  The escapes described in the literature range from the truly ingenious and 
inspirational to the bizarre and sometimes opportunistic.  However, even those which 
describe the escape route in minute detail fail to describe the maps used or their source.  
Most mention maps in passing and highlight the extent to which they figured on the 
‘must-have’ list of most successful escapes.  Time and again, escapers include mention 
of the provision of money and maps by the escape committees in the oflags and stalags 
as part of their aids to escape but offer little or no supporting detail. Why should that 
be?  In discussion with Professor Foot in January 2012, over 65 years after the end of 
World War II, he was surprisingly still unwilling to explain how he had managed to 
                                                             
20
 Of the plethora of such books published, and sometimes republished, over the past 70 
years, three examples will suffice.   
Cooper, Alan W.  Free to Fight again-RAF Escapes and Evasions 1940-45. William 
Kimber.  1988; Bickers, R. Townshend.  Home Run-Great RAF escapes of the Second 
World War.  Leo  Cooper.  1992; Clutton-Brock, Oliver.  RAF Evaders: The Complete 
Story of RAF Escapees and Their Escape Lines, Western Europe, 1940-45.  Grub Street.  
2009. 
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keep hidden the MI9 map of France and Spain with which he had been issued prior to 
being dropped as an SAS officer in occupied France in 1944.  When prompted, he 
explained that all MI9’s pre-operational briefings had always included the warning that 
the maps should never be discussed, and he insisted that he had always abided by that, 
although he did imply that he had succeeded in keeping his map from the Germans even 
when he had been captured, by hiding it inside the lining of his jacket.  The map had 
remained in his possession and he produced it in the interview.  In offering support for 
the pursuit of this research into the mapping programme, he highlighted the fact that, at 
the point he and Langley had been writing the history of MI9 with the support of 
Government, much about the mapping programme was un-publishable for 50 years.  
Certainly many relevant MI9 files in the Public Record Office, later The National 
Archives, were not open at that point and remained closed for many years thereafter.  
          Whilst MI9, and certainly Hutton, may well have believed that they were the first 
to realise the considerable value of producing military maps on silk, not least their 
flexibility and durability, such proves not to be the case: this is reflected in the 
literature.  Yee’s expert treatise highlights the fact that the oldest extant military map to 
be discovered was in fact drawn on silk in the second century BC.
21
  The map, which 
subsequently came to be known as the Garrison Map, was excavated in 1973 from a 
Han dynasty tomb in Mawangdui, Changsha, China.  Yee highlights the fact that the 
map was thought to have military applications because of the inclusion of military 
related features highlighted by the use of colour.  The flexibility and durability of silk as 
a medium for military maps had apparently long been recognised, a fact that was much 
                                                             
21
 Yee, Cordell D. K.  Reinterpreting Traditional Chinese Geographical Maps.  History 
of Cartography 2.2, pp.35–70.  Chicago University Press.  1994. 
24 
 
later reflected in the report of the War Office Committee tasked in the closing decade of 
the nineteenth century to consider the precise form of the military map of the UK.
22
   
 
          Exploration of the literature also serves to highlight the extent to which advances 
in printing technology, especially on media such as silk, served MI9’s map programme 
well.  The relationship which the Ministry of Supply was able to establish with the silk 
manufacturers of Macclesfield appeared to ensure the continuing supply of raw silk 
from the Middle East, initially for parachute production and later for the production of 
the escape maps.
23
  The expertise of the leading silk manufacturers was apparently 
readily shared with Government departments in the interests of the national war effort.  
It is reassuring to discover that such covert involvement of private sector companies not 
just in Macclesfield but throughout the UK was apparently never compromised and 
remained hidden from public awareness for many decades after the end of the war.  
Certainly in the field of specialised printing, the John Waddington Company, located in 
Leeds, Yorkshire, manufacturer of board games, was involved in printing maps for MI9.  
‘Some of these maps were printed on large silk squares for which special treatments 
were necessary to ensure that the material would not stretch nor the design be otherwise 
affected by extraordinary physical or climatic conditions’.24  
 
          The foregoing sections of this review highlight the principal published sources 
available.  During the 1980s and 1990s a number of relevant, illustrated articles 
appeared in professional publications and the national press.  The most notable ones 
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were those produced by Bond as a result of her early interest in the subject when 
working in the Ministry of Defence.  The first of these appeared in 1983 and stirred 
some considerable interest in professional cartographic circles.
25
  This was followed a 
year later by a much more detailed article resulting from a lecture invited by the British 
Cartographic Society.
26
  These have been widely used, quoted and referenced in other 
articles on the subject.  In 1988 Doll quoted in detail from Bond’s published work, as 
did Hall writing over ten years later in 1999.
27
  Additionally, there were some short 
articles in the press, often recounting the escape stories of (by now) elderly men, who 
had been prisoners of war.
28
    
          As mentioned earlier, there is a plethora of literature which serves to set the 
general context of escape in World War II and the background against which MI9 was 
operating.  Many tell the tales of heroic exploits and derring-do but sadly do not 
contribute to the story of the escape maps.  Not even the engagingly titled Silk and 
Barbed Wire proved to be directly relevant since it is a collection of personal 
reminiscences of captured members of Bomber Command, who had fallen into enemy 
hands after parachuting from doomed aircraft: the ‘silk’ of the title related rather to their 
parachutes and not escape maps, which received no mention at all.
29
  There is, however, 
one book which opened up an intriguing aspect of MI9’s mapping programme and that 
is Green’s fascinating insight into the codes operating between the potential escapers in 
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the camps and MI9 in London.
30
  It was Foot and Langley who highlighted the 
existence of the coded contact and they used extracts from Green’s book to illustrate the 
practice.   
 
          This review would be incomplete without at least a brief mention of a book 
published in 1921.
31
  A.J.Evans’s book describes his personal experience of capture and 
subsequent escape during World War I, providing both an insight into the changing 
military philosophy with regard to prisoners of war and also the personal ingenuity and 
forward planning of professional soldiers, and their families, should they fall into 
enemy hands.  It is a remarkable book in that it provides the background and 
explanation for the role which Evans subsequently played in World War II as a member 
of the staff of MI9, and their choice of escape routes, a role which will receive more 
detailed consideration later in this thesis (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
 
           Only recently has there appeared any kind of detailed review of the mapping of 
the First World War.  Chasseaud’s timely and masterly publication Mapping the First 
World War was published in November 2013.
32
  In it he plots the course of British 
military mapping through the passage of the war years and shows that maps went far 
beyond the simple visual image and, together with the increasing use of aerial 
photography, allowed for the development of sophisticated artillery target plans. They 
were designed for a clear military purpose.  The only equivalent publication for World 
War II was the War Office’s own authorised publication Maps and Survey.33   However, 
published in 1952, it was clearly intended to serve as the official historical record for 
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internal departmental use since it was classified RESTRICTED.  It was not declassified 
until some twenty years later and there are, therefore, very few copies in the public 
domain.  It was one of a series of volumes, compiled by authority of the Army Council, 
the object of which was to preserve the experience gained during World War II in 
selected fields of military staff work and administration.  It covers just about every 
aspect of the operational mapping produced by the Geographical Section General Staff 
(GSGS), with the single notable exception of MI9’s escape and evasion mapping 
programme.  It is not surprising to discover this omission since, as this research will 
reveal, MI9 did not involve the military mapping authority in their work until very late 
in the proceedings.   
 
          After an exhaustive trawl of the literature published since the end of World War 
II, it appears conclusive that there is very little mention of MI9’s escape and evasion 
mapping programme and certainly, with the exception of Hutton’s book, the short 
mentions that exist contribute very little to an in-depth study of the topic.  There is one 
inevitable conclusion to be drawn and that is that it has been a prohibited area of 
research and publication.  Certainly Foot confirmed that there was nothing further to be 
found because nothing detailed had been published and that was entirely in line with the 
prohibited disclosure of anything which might prejudice the future deployment 
operationally of the tools which had been created by Crockatt and his innovative team 
in MI9 charged with facilitating the escape of British and Allied prisoners of war.  
Amongst the escape tools they devised, the fabric maps, printed initially on silk and 
later on man-made fibre, clearly figured high on the list of proscribed topics for 
publication.  The inevitable conclusion is that this research thesis will add considerably 
to the scholarship of British military and cartographic history of the twentieth century 
and serve to plug the considerable historiographic gap which presently exists. 
28 
 
Methodology and Structure 
The first stage in this research programme was to identify the principal record 
repositories in which the maps were to be found.  The nation’s record set of these maps 
will eventually be deposited in The National Archives (TNA), but it is presently still 
held in the Defence Geographic Centre (DGC).  Access was granted on the basis of a 
Freedom of Information request.   This record set of the maps proved to be the most 
comprehensive set available anywhere, and yet is incomplete.    This collection does, 
however, form the core of the subsequent compilation of the detailed carto-bibliography 
to be found in the nine appendices at the end of this thesis.   It was always the intention 
to produce such a carto-bibliography as one significant output of the research, since 
nothing of that nature, scale and complexity has been produced to date.  This initial 
compilation was then supplemented by visits to further, smaller, collections.   
 
          The next most significant collection in terms of its size is that to be found in the 
Royal Air Force Museum at Hendon.  Thereafter, it was discovered that the British 
Library Map Library holds part of the Waddington Company archive.  It was that 
company which was to play a very important part in the unfolding story of MI9’s 
mapping programme since they were enlisted by MI9 as the first producers  of the silk 
maps and the company also manufactured many of the items (board games) used to 
smuggle the maps into the prisoner of war camps.  The story of their involvement will 
unfold in the later chapters of this thesis.  Smaller, but no less important, collections of 
the maps were found in the National Library of Scotland, the Intelligence Corps 
Museum, the Macclesfield Silk Museum, the Cumberland Pencil Company Museum 
and in a number of private collections.  Sadly the collection housed in the Imperial War 
Museum was not available for public access due to a lengthy re-cataloguing and 
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refurbishment programme.   However, an online check of their holdings revealed no 
map which was not held elsewhere.   
  
          Primary unpublished sources used to reconstruct the detail of the map production 
programme were found largely in the War Office files held in The National Archives 
(TNA) and the Defence Geographic Centre (DGC) (yet to be deposited).   An invaluable 
find proved to be the extant war-time print record of the maps housed as a card index in 
the India Office Library and Records. The story of how it came to be there, rather than 
in either TNA or DGC, will unfold in Chapter 1.  Contemporary correspondence of two 
commercial companies who were to play a significant role in the mapping programme, 
namely John Bartholomew & Son of Edinburgh, and the already mentioned 
Waddington Company of Leeds were found in the National Library of Scotland and the 
British Library respectively. The role of Airey Neave as the first British officer to 
escape from Colditz took on particular significance as the research programme 
developed.  Neave’s personal papers are to be found in the Parliamentary Archives.   
Access to the personal memoirs of John Pryor, afforded by his son, a colleague at 
Plymouth University, provided the gateway to deciphering some of the coded 
correspondence between MI9 and the prisoner of war camps.  Finally, the recollections 
of Professor Michael Foot, in an interview with the author shortly before his death in 
2012, provided two priceless pieces of information, namely the existence and location 
of the unpublished footnotes of his co-authored history of MI9, and the significance of 
the coded correspondence traffic.  Without his timely help, this thesis would have been 
the poorer.        
 
          The structure of the thesis which follows reflects very much the passage of the 
story of the mapping programme as it unfolded in the research.  Chapter 1 shows that 
30 
 
MI9 was essentially a creation of World War II and it reflected a markedly changed 
military attitude to capture, escape and evasion.  It was staffed with people who had 
been carefully selected by the Head of the fledgling organisation.  The skills and 
experiences which they each brought to the task are described and acknowledged, and 
the development of the organisation itself is traced, together with the background of the 
development of the mapping programme.  Some context on military mapping on silk is 
provided since such has had a long history and was most certainly not prompted simply 
by a twentieth century wartime scenario.  Chapter 2 describes in detail the whole map 
production programme from the individual series, through the printing process to the 
sourcing of silk, and later, of man-made fibre.  The covert nature of the programme and 
the compartmentalised way in which it was managed by MI9 resulted in their own 
unique, and arguably unnecessary, challenges.  Having documented and analysed both 
the production programme and the maps themselves, the thesis continues in Chapter 3 
by addressing the whole escape aids programme.   The sheer ingenuity and originality 
of the smuggling programme which MI9 mounted in order to ensure that the maps 
reached their destinations is addressed.  The whole of Chapter 4 is given over to a 
detailed discussion of the coded correspondence, augmented by the first deciphering of 
some of the original coded correspondence from a private family archive.    
 
          A number of cases studies were selected to try to prove the value of the maps 
produced.  The first of these, considered in Chapter 5, was based on one of the most 
successful escape routes which MI9 planned from occupied Europe to the safe haven of 
the neutral country of Switzerland.  The second and third studies are examined in 
Chapter 6.  These are based respectively on escape via Sweden, an even more successful 
route to freedom, and the survival of two maps apparently drawn in prisoner of war 
camps which remain extant in one British map collection.  Finally, the Conclusion seeks 
31 
 
to offer an objective assessment of the real success of the mapping programme in the 
light of the many obstacles and challenges which MI9 faced.  Without question, the 
mapping programme proved to be the key to successful escape: without it many, 
perhaps most, of the thousands of men who successfully escaped and made it back to 
these shores before the end of the war would have failed in that endeavour.      
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Chapter 1 
Historical Background and the Creation of MI9 
‘Escaping and evading are ancient arts of war.’(Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templar, 
KG).
34
 
Creation of MI9      
Before considering the mapping programme in any detail, it is useful to consider the 
background to the creation of MI9, the task it was given, the way in which it was 
organised, the personalities recruited to staff the new unit and the all-pervading 
philosophy of its approach to escape and evasion.  Each of these aspects contributed to 
the way in which the mapping programme was conceived, each influenced the way in 
which the programme developed and each played a significant part in the impact which 
the programme had throughout the war years.  The historical background of military 
mapping produced on fabric, whether silk or linen, is also considered.  
          The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) came into existence in 1939 when, 
with the Directorate of Military Operations, it superseded a previously combined 
Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I).  Five of the Military 
Intelligence sections, namely MI I to MI 5, continued their work within the new 
Directorate, dealing, as before, with organisation, geographic, topographic and security 
matters.
35 
 MI9 was created within the DMI on 23
rd
 December 1939.
36
  Its creation 
stemmed from the experience of many during World War I when military philosophy 
about prisoners of war had apparently undergone a sea-change.  From regarding capture 
and captivity in enemy hands as a somewhat ignominious, even shameful and 
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disgraceful fate, the value which escaping prisoners of war might potentially contribute 
to the success of the war effort came gradually to be recognised.
37
  Men who escaped or 
evaded capture and returned to Britain  brought back vital intelligence; the considerable 
effort required to prevent escapes from the camps deflected the enemy’s resources from 
front-line combat action; the boost to the morale of the Armed Services and, not least, 
their own families when evaders or former captives successfully returned to these shores 
was considerable.   
 
          In the late 1930s, as the prospect of war became increasingly likely, proposals for 
the creation of a section tasked to look after the interests of British prisoners of war 
came from many quarters, not least from Lieutenant Colonel, later to become Field 
Marshall Sir, Gerald Templar who had written to the Director of Military Intelligence 
earlier in 1939.
38 
  A number of conferences with those who had experience of being a 
prisoner of war during World War I had also been arranged by MI 1, seeking to benefit 
from their collective experiences.
39
  The actual proposal to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) came from Sir Campbell Stuart who chaired a War Office (WO) 
Committee looking at the coordination of political intelligence and military 
operations.
40
  There had clearly been some robust discussions prior to that since 
Viscount Halifax, appointed Foreign Secretary by the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, in February 1938, had indicated in a letter dated 5
th
 December to Sir 
Campbell that his preference was for the section to be under Foreign Office control, 
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with direct Treasury funding, presumably to ensure joint control and coordination with 
MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
41
  Notwithstanding this high level 
opposition, the creation of MI9 went ahead in the WO and it was made responsible to 
the Deputy Director for Military Intelligence (DDMI), initially working closely with the 
Admiralty and the Air Ministry.  With hindsight, it is worth noting that later animosity 
and conflict between MI9 and SIS might well have had its roots in the initial difference 
of opinion as to where the newly formed section should sit in the governmental 
hierarchy.
42
  The extent to which this aspect may have impacted MI9’s work will be 
considered in more depth in the Conclusion.      
          MI9’s objectives and methods were described as:- 
i) To facilitate the escape of British prisoners of war, their repatriation to the 
United Kingdom (UK) and also to contain enemy manpower and resources 
in guarding  the British prisoners of war and seeking to prevent their escape.  
ii) To facilitate the return to the UK of those who evaded capture in enemy 
occupied territory. 
iii) To collect and distribute information on escape and evasion, including 
research into, and the provision of, escape aids either prior to deployment or 
by covert despatch to prisoners of war.  
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iv) To instruct service personnel in escape and evasion techniques through 
preliminary training, the provision of lecturers and Bulletins and to train 
selected individuals in the use of coded communication through  letters. 
v) To maintain the morale of British prisoners of war by maintaining contact 
through correspondence and other means and to engage in the specific 
planning and execution of evasion and escape. 
vi) To collect information from British prisoners of war through maintaining 
contact with them during captivity and after successful repatriation and 
disseminate the intelligence obtained to all three Services and appropriate 
Government Departments. 
vii) To advise on counter-escape measures for German prisoners of war in Great 
Britain. 
viii) To deny related information to the enemy.43 
The responsibilities thus included a mixture of operations, intelligence, transport and 
supply.  The newly formed section was initially located in Room 424 of the Metropole 
Hotel in Northumberland Avenue, London, close to the WO’s Main Building.  The 
newly appointed Head was Major, later promoted to Colonel and eventually to 
Brigadier, Norman Richard Crockatt, a retired infantry officer who had seen active 
service in World War I in the Royal Scots Guards.
44
  Crockatt had left the Army in 
                                                             
43
 Appendix C of TNA: WO 165/39 lists the Objectives and Methods of MI9 in rather 
more detail than they are set out in the original Conduct of Work note Number 48 which 
was drawn up in DMI and issued to MI 5 and 6, as well as being circulated within DMI, 
on 23
rd
 December 1939.  A copy of this latter document is included in TNA: WO 
208/3242, Appendix A, p.15.    
44 
There appears to be no published biography of Crockatt.  However, in the 
introduction to Langley’s book, Airey Neave highlighted Crockatt’s  key role.  Langley 
responded by writing to ask him if he planned a book on Crockatt and MI9.  The telling 
exchange of correspondence in December 1974 is to be found in Neave’s private papers 
36 
 
1927, worked in the City and was in his mid-forties at the outbreak of World War II.  
Whilst he had been decorated in World War I (DSO, MC), he had never been captured 
and, therefore, had no experience of being a prisoner of war.  He proved, however, to be 
an admirable choice to ensure the fledgling section made good progress in its infancy 
and throughout the continuing war, being ‘clear-headed, quick witted, a good organiser, 
a good judge of men, and no respecter of red tape’, qualities which were to stand him in 
good stead for the work he tackled in the next six years.
45
  He also proved able to 
recognise the importance of keeping his section small, concentrated in its activities and 
low profile amongst other intelligence sections, attributes which appeared to ensure that 
when the time came to expand its activities, it received little opposition from those 
competing for military priorities and budgets.  Crockatt realised the value of having the 
experience of former prisoners of war, especially those who had successfully escaped, 
and appointed many with that experience to the small cadre of lecturing staff based in 
the Training School.
46
  The initial budget given to Crockatt to run the entire section was 
£2000.
47
  In present day terms, this equates to a sum of approximately £90,000.
48
  He 
embarked on a recruitment campaign and, by the end of July 1940, the complement of 
officers in the whole of the MI9 organisation had risen to fifty.  By that time, Crockatt 
was looking to move his organisation out of London and by September 1940, he had 
selected Wilton Park, near Beaconsfield as an appropriate location.  After necessary 
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refurbishment and the installation of telephones, most of the MI9 staff moved there 
from 14
th
 to 18
th
 October and occupied Number 20 Camp at Wilton Park.
49
   
Organisation 
The section was initially organised into two parts: MI9a was responsible for matters 
relating to enemy prisoners of war and MI9b was responsible for British prisoners of 
war.  The former eventually became a separate department, MI 19.
50
  On separation, the 
remaining MI9b was re-organised into separate sections with section D responsible for 
training, and specifically for the Training School which was established in Highgate 
School, from which staff and pupils had been evacuated.  Intelligence School 9 (IS9) 
was created in January 1942.     This led to additional sections being created, the staff 
complement being significantly increased, and much of the work of the former MI9b 
was assumed by these new sections.  Section W was responsible for the interrogation of 
returning escapers and evaders, including the initial preparation of the questionnaires 
which the interviewees were required to complete.  The principal aim of the 
questionnaires was to identify information for use in the lectures and the Bulletin (the 
lectures are discussed in a later section of this chapter and the Bulletin is discussed in 
Chapter 3).  The section was also responsible for the preparation and distribution of 
reports and for writing the daily, later to become monthly, War Diary entry.  Section X 
was responsible for the planning and organisation of escapes, including the selection, 
research, coordination and despatch of escape and evasion materials. Because of the 
small numbers of staff, the section was unable to spend much time on this activity until 
January 1942 when its establishment was boosted.  At that point, they were also able to 
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increase the volume of information to Section Y for transmission to the camps.  Section 
Y was responsible for codes and secret communication with the camps.  Section Z was 
responsible for the production and supply of escape tools, including all related 
experimental work.  It was primarily these last three sections whose activities will prove 
of most interest and on which this research will largely, but not exclusively, focus.  
51 
 
          Christopher William Clayton Hutton was appointed on 22
nd
 February 1940 as the 
Intelligence Officer to lead section Z.  He was the boffin, the inventor of gadgetry.   It 
has already been explained that he revealed the extent of his remarkable ingenuity and 
innovation in the published narrative of his wartime experiences.
52
    His fascination for 
show business, particularly magicians, and his experience as a teenager of challenging 
Harry Houdini to escape from a packing case, were apparently regarded as sufficient 
qualifications for the post he was given as the escape aids expert in MI9.  It was his 
innate interest in escapology and illusion which was to prove the source of his 
imagination and ingenuity.    
          The review of the available literature about escape in World War I on which 
Hutton embarked has already been described.  Identifying a number of relevant books 
and purchasing second-hand copies, he enlisted the support of the Headmaster at Rugby 
School, his alma mater, who allowed the sixth form to carry out a review of the books: 
the review was completed in four days.  The results of the review had led directly to 
Hutton’s decision to make maps a priority.  In the foreword to Foot and Langley’s book, 
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Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templar described escaping and evading as ‘ancient arts of 
war’ and it would appear difficult, if not impossible, to escape from enemy occupied 
territory without a map.
53
  It was this simple fact which appeared to be the catalyst for 
Hutton’s visit to the War Office Map Room.  The staff there could not apparently help 
in meeting his initial request for a small scale map of Germany.   
          The section responsible for operational maps and geographic matters, namely 
MI4, was by that time located in Cheltenham.  It had been removed from London in 
September 1939, apparently to make space to accommodate those branches whose 
presence in Whitehall was deemed to be essential and also to afford protection from 
possible air attacks to the sizable map collection which was also relocated to 
Cheltenham.  Clough made clear in his 1952 published history of the military survey 
organisations during World War II that the absence of MI4 from London ‘had the 
serious effect of putting it out of daily touch with the General Staff at a critical 
period’.54  MI4 remained physically distanced from all WO operations, intelligence and 
planning staff and also from the Air Ministry Map Section which had been moved to 
Harrow.  It is, therefore, likely that the War Office Map Room visited by Hutton was 
simply a small reference collection and not the main operational map collection of MI4 
which would certainly have held the maps he sought.  Hutton’s lack of contact with the 
military map makers will be commented upon further in Chapter 2 and the Conclusion 
since it is likely to have been a factor which played out to the longer term detriment of 
the escape and evasion mapping programme.   
          It was during a visit to Geographia Limited in Fleet Street that he discovered the 
existence of ‘a famous Scottish firm’ which proved to be John Bartholomew & Sons of 
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Edinburgh.  This renowned cartographic company had been established in 1826, 
although the family had experience of being apprentice engravers to the Lizars company 
from the later years of the eighteenth century, and it had acquired a world-wide 
reputation for its maps.
55
  Hutton was also fortunate that the firm was headed at the time 
by John (known as Ian) Bartholomew who had had a distinguished military career in 
World War I, serving as an officer in the First Battalion, Gordon Highlanders, 
experiencing the worst of trench warfare and winning the Military Cross at Ypres in 
1915.  Ian Bartholomew was only too ready to hand over copies of his Company’s 
maps, waiving all copyright and insisting ‘it was a privilege to contribute to the war 
effort’.56  This was to prove the critical ingredient to MI9’s wartime escape and evasion 
mapping programme.  It was this collection of small scale maps of Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa which provided the backbone of the escape and evasion mapping which 
MI9 subsequently produced.
57
  (The maps are described in Chapter 2 and Appendix 1).    
          MI9’s War Diary entry for 31st March 1940 reflects just how quickly Hutton got 
to grips with the task he faced: the entry indicates that available escape devices already 
included ‘maps on fabrics and silk, maps concealed in games, pencils, articles of 
clothing.’58  Hutton also tried to find a paper which was thin, resistant to the elements 
and soundless when hidden inside Service uniforms, which was what he was planning 
to do.  After talking to contacts in the trade, he became convinced that such a paper did 
not exist and so turned his attention to fabric, and to silk in particular.
59
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Historical context of military maps on silk 
 The flexibility and durability of fabric, both silk and linen, as a medium for military 
maps had clearly long been recognised, a fact that had been reflected in the UK 
Government’s report of the War Office Committee tasked in the closing decade of the 
nineteenth century to consider the precise form of the military map of the UK.
60
  The 
Committee made frequent mention in its Report, and throughout the minutes of 
evidence, to the superior durability of linen over paper as a material on which maps 
could be printed for use in the field.  Almost certainly related to the Committee’s work, 
although not acknowledged as such, the Ordnance Survey was simultaneously printing 
some of its one inch series of the Lake District on silk.  Extant copies of two sheets, 
Ambleside and Keswick (see Illustration I), are known to exist in a private collection 
and they are dated 1891.
61
   Ordnance Survey was still, at that time, staffed at senior 
levels by sapper officers from the Corps of Royal Engineers, so it is more than likely 
that they would have been called on by the War Office to do prototype printing 
experiments for military purposes.  It is, however, notable that no mention of this work 
appears in the definitive history of the Ordnance Survey which concentrates rather on 
the work of the Dorrington Committee which was taking place at the same time, 
charged with looking at the state of Ordnance Survey mapping after considerable public 
disquiet had been expressed.
62 
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Illustration I: Ordnance Survey 1 inch map of the Lake District (Keswick), 
 
 (Illustration provided by, and reproduced with the permission of, the owner). 
 
          Whilst it has no direct relevance to maps, it is appropriate to note the most recent 
and impressive historical example of the outstanding durability and virtual 
indestructability of silk.  Amongst the many artefacts discovered and identified during 
the excavation of the Mary Rose, Henry VIII’s battleship, was the silk lining of a cap 
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and some silk ribbons.  They had survived relatively intact and were still identifiable as 
silk after over 400 years submerged under the waters of Portsmouth Harbour.   
 
          With hindsight, it becomes very clear that the knowledge and capability to print 
maps on silk existed in the UK at the time of World War II and that the military had for 
centuries recognised the value of fabric maps, whether silk or linen, in terms of their 
durability and flexibility.  It is not unknown throughout history for knowledge to be 
acquired and technical strides to be made, only to be lost to posterity, and then re-
discovered often centuries later.  In this case, however, Hutton’s search and ultimate 
decision to produce maps on silk might have been made more promptly and with far 
less effort and cost had he spoken to the military map-makers.  Certainly both the 
Directorate of Military Survey (D.Survey) and the Ordnance Survey (OS) doubtless had 
the expertise but, for unknown reasons, they were apparently never consulted by Hutton 
who preferred rather to approach commercial printers, paper manufacturers and silk 
processors.    This is a rather surprising discovery, bearing in mind the covert nature of 
MI9’s activities and the secrecy which surrounded every aspect of their work, not least 
the mapping programme. It does, however, largely explain why MI9 paid little attention 
in their map production programme to the finer points of cartography and the standard 
techniques of identifying the maps they produced.  Much more about this aspect of their 
work is covered in Chapter 2.   
 
The key personalities  
The extent to which Norman Crockatt, the newly appointed Head of MI9, had the 
personality, experience and skills which made him ideally suited to his wartime post has 
already been mentioned.  One of his first actions in his fledgling Branch was to appoint 
Christopher William Clayton Hutton as the Technical Officer.  Hutton had been born in 
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1893.  He had served in the Yeomanry, the Yorkshire Regiment and as a pilot in the 
Royal Flying Corps during World War I.
63
  Realising that another war with Germany 
was imminent, he tried to volunteer for the Royal Air Force and, subsequently, for the 
Army.  When these approaches did not receive the encouragement he sought, he wrote a 
number of times to the War Office seeking an opening in an Intelligence Branch, an 
approach which eventually resulted in his appointment to the newly formed Military 
Intelligence section 9 (MI9) under Crockatt’s leadership.  ‘Clutty’, as he became known 
by all who worked with him, was regarded as both enthusiastic and original in his 
approach to the task to which he was appointed.   
          Both Crockatt and Hutton appeared to be ideally suited to their posts.  It is worth 
saying a little more about the kind of people Crockatt included in his team since it 
provides an insight into what he regarded as the key skills and expertise which he 
needed to meet the challenges faced.  He very quickly recognised the value of having 
those who had experienced the reality of escape and was also conscious of the need to 
have representatives of all three Services in his organisation.  To this end, he appointed 
two Liaison Officers from the Royal Navy (RN) and the RAF.  From the latter he 
appointed Squadron Leader A. J. Evans (1889-1960).  Johnny Evans, as he was always 
called, was arguably an inspired choice.    He had been an Intelligence Officer on the 
Western Front in World War 1 and had then been commissioned as a Major into the 
fledgling Royal Flying Corps (RFC).
64
  Shot down behind German lines over the 
Somme in 1916 and captured, he was eventually sent to the prisoner of war camp at 
Clausthal in the Harz Mountains.   
                                                             
63
 TNA: AIR 76/247/127 contains Hutton’s Officer Service Record from World War I. 
64
 TNA: WO 165/39.  The War Diary entry for January 1940 indicates that Evans had 
already been appointed as a lecturer;  Foot & Langley.  MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-
1945, p.37. 
45 
 
          For Evans, remaining in captivity was apparently never an option.  Whether this 
in any way reflected his upbringing and education at Winchester is unclear but it 
certainly did not reflect military training at the time.  He escaped, only to be recaptured.  
On recapture he had been sent to the infamous Fort 9 at Ingolstadt, north of Nuremburg, 
the World War I equivalent of Colditz in World War II, since it was the camp to which 
all prisoners of war who had attempted to escape were sent and was located over one 
hundred miles from the Swiss frontier.  Evans described in considerable detail both his 
failed escape and his eventual successful escape in a book published in August 1921, a 
book which was clearly very popular as it was printed no less than five times by the end 
of that year.
65
  It took him and his companion almost three weeks to walk, largely at 
night, to the Swiss frontier which they crossed at Schaffhausen, west of Lake 
Constance.  Evans described the attitude of the men in Fort 9 and the extent to which 
they spent their time in the all-consuming occupation of plotting to escape.  It really was 
a veritable ‘Escaping Club’ where failed escapers were only too ready to share the 
knowledge of their experiences outside the camp with their fellow inmates.  Evans 
described the receipt of clothes and food parcels from family and friends in which maps 
and compasses were also hidden.  This was apparently accomplished by the prior 
personal arrangement of using a simple code in correspondence detailing the specific 
needs, maps, compasses, saws, civilian clothing and the like.  The maps arrived in the 
camp secreted inside cakes baked by his mother or in bags of flour, and compasses 
arrived secreted inside bottles of prunes and jars of anchovy paste.
66
  The maps were 
copied in the camp so others could also use them and were then sewn into the linings of 
jackets.    
          It is fascinating to consider the extent to which Evans brought these experiences 
to bear in his work for MI9 and understandable that his book was dedicated: 
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 To MY MOTHER who, by encouragement and direct 
assistance, was largely responsible for my escape from 
Germany, I dedicate this book which was written at her 
request.
67
  
  
He went further, however, spending time prior to the outbreak of World War II visiting 
the Schaffhausen area of the German-Swiss border, across which he had made his own 
successful bid for liberty in World War I, photographing the border area and making 
copious notes.  It cannot be coincidence that the MI9 Bulletin contained two large scale 
maps of the Schaffhausen Salient, together with ground photographs of the local 
topography.
68
  MI9’s production programme also included sheet Y, a large scale map of 
the Schaffhausen Salient which also carried very detailed notes of the topography and 
landscape features to help escaping prisoners of war (refer to Appendix 1 for details of 
sheet Y and to Chapter 5, the Schaffhausen Salient and first case study on Airey Neave, 
for the significance which attached to the production of this map in the MI9 
programme).  Evans very rapidly became a most valuable member of the MI9 team, 
becoming one of their star performers as a lecturer at the Highgate School.   
          Lieutenant Colonel James Maydon Langley, referred to as ‘Jimmy’ by friends and 
colleagues, had been born in Wolverhampton in 1916, educated at Uppingham and 
Trinity Hall, Cambridge.   As a young subaltern in the 2
nd
 Battalion Coldstream Guards, 
he was badly injured in the head and arm and left behind at Dunkirk: on a stretcher he 
would have taken up space which four fitter men could have occupied.  He was taken 
prisoner, hospitalised in Lille and had his injured left arm amputated by medical staff.  
He subsequently escaped, in October 1940, by climbing through a hospital window and 
managed to navigate himself, with a still suppurating wound and with help from French 
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families who befriended him, to Marseilles from where he was repatriated, with help, 
through Spain to London.
69
  According to Foot, Langley successfully navigated himself 
by using the maps of the various French departments which appeared in every public 
telephone kiosk in France.
70
  The couple of times he travelled in the wrong direction 
resulted from the maps being oriented in a non-standard fashion i.e. with East at the top.  
So Langley too knew the value of maps as an escape tool.    He arrived back in the UK 
in the spring of 1941 and initially joined SIS.  He soon transferred to MI9 but remained 
on the payroll, and therefore technically under the command, of SIS.  In practice he 
became the liaison point between the two organisations and was responsible for the 
work of the escape lines in NW Europe. He remained in post for the duration of the war, 
subsequently married Peggy van Lier, a young Belgian woman who had been a guide on 
the Comet line and, over thirty years later, co-authored with Foot the book which came 
to be regarded as the definitive history of MI9.   
          There were others in Crockatt’s team, of which perhaps Airey Middleton 
Sheffield Neave is the most famous.  As a young lieutenant, he had been a troop 
commander in the 1
st
 Searchlight Regiment of the Royal Artillery, wounded and 
captured in Calais Hospital in May 1940 as the Germans over-ran northern France.
71
  
Neave had joined MI9 after his successful escape from Colditz, with a Dutch Lieutenant 
Toni Luteyn, and repatriation back from Switzerland through Marseilles, the Pat line 
and Spain.
72
  After a short period of leave, he joined MI9 in May 1942 under the 
pseudonym (code-name) of Saturday.  It is clear that his name had been on an MI9 list 
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of targeted officers who had been specifically helped to escape, and his experience was 
to prove invaluable.  His escape and the extent to which it reflected the value of MI9’s 
mapping programme are issues considered in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
The Training School at Highgate 
MI9D was, as previously indicated, the section responsible for training and briefing the 
Intelligence Officers who attended the courses at the IS9 School in Highgate and then 
returned to their individual units to cascade the training down through the operational 
crews.  Certainly in the early years, these training courses concentrated on the RAF 
whose crews were constantly over-flying occupied Europe.  The lecturers engaged were 
largely those who had personal experience of escape in World War I.  Their 
remuneration was set at two guineas (£2 -2s- 0), which is the equivalent of £82-19 in 
present day terms, for each lecture they delivered and they were also provided with 
travel and overnight hotel expenses when they travelled to deliver lectures at operational 
units.
73
  As early as January 1940, a conference was organised in Room 660 of the 
Metropole Building to hear a lecture delivered by the previously mentioned Squadron 
Leader Johnny Evans MC, formerly with the RFC and RAF.
74
  By the end of February 
1940, lecturers from the Highgate School had delivered their training lectures to seven 
Army Divisions, five RAF Groups and were undertaking a tour of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF).  
 
          The content of the general lecture given to officers and senior non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) included emphasis on the undesirability of capture, instructions on 
evasion, conduct on capture and a demonstration of some of the aids to escape which 
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were issued to units prior to deployment.
75
  The lecture emphasised that the job was to 
fight and avoid capture.  If captured, it was their first and principal duty to escape at the 
earliest opportunity.  Later on in the war, with the increasing numbers of prisoners of 
war and the increasing organisation of Escape Committees in the camps, the lectures 
were updated to include mention of the Escape Committees, which were the 
responsibility of the Senior British Officer (SBO) in each of the camps.  Those 
attending the training courses were told that money, maps, identity papers, provisions 
and many other escape aids would be made available through this source.
76
  The officers 
and NCOs who attended the lectures were then responsible for cascading the briefing 
down through the ranks, but they were, initially at least, specifically directed not to 
mention the aids to escape as they were only available for issue in limited numbers.  It 
was recommended that they deliver the lecture as an informal, SECRET talk and to 
audiences which should not exceed 200 at any one time.  Later on, and certainly by 
early 1942, a supply of aids for demonstration purposes was provided to local 
commands.  There was also a classified TOP SECRET lecture on codes which was 
delivered under the title of ‘Camp Conditions’ to very limited audiences, never more 
than 10 at a time, all of whom had been carefully selected.  Those selected for this 
special briefing were required to practise the use of letter codes and their work was 
carefully checked before they were formally registered as authorised code users.
77
  
Codes are mentioned briefly in the following section of this chapter and more fully in 
Chapter 4.   
          The staff in the Highgate School steadily compiled a training manual which 
became known as the Bulletin.  The nature of the Bulletin and its important role as a 
tool in educating potential prisoners of war about possible escape routes and the nature 
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of escape aids, including maps, which were being produced is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.   
          The pressures on the lecturing staff were considerable and continually increased 
as the war progressed.  Initially both the Royal Navy and the Army had appeared 
uninterested in the training courses offered and, certainly in the first year or so of its 
existence, MI9 staff worked hard to stimulate interest and used many personal contacts 
to raise awareness of their work.
78
  They appeared to overcome some initial opposition 
from the Royal Navy and some Army commands, and by May 1944 the record shows 
that very significant numbers in all three services had been briefed: 110,000 in the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, 346,000 in the Army and 290,000 in the Royal Air 
Force, and a total of 3250 lectures had been delivered.
79
  
Codes          
Section Y was responsible for codes.  The development of letter codes as a means of 
communication with the camps was also regarded as a priority from the start and the 
role which coded communication played in the escape programme developed apace.  
This aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Escape-mindedness     
Escape-mindedness was the term which Norman Crockatt, the Head of MI9, coined to 
describe the philosophy which he sought to instil into the frontline forces which his staff 
regularly briefed and trained.
80
  Inculcating and fostering this philosophy was the 
primary aim of the training and the rest of the MI9 team was working to ensure that the 
approach was supported in a very practical way.  They stressed that, if captured, it was 
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an officer’s duty to attempt to escape and, not only officers, it was a duty which 
extended to all ranks. When John Pryor came to write down his memoirs of the years he 
spent as a prisoner of war during World War II, many years after the end of the war, it is 
not surprising that he recalled that ‘escaping was the duty of a PoW but with the whole 
of NW Europe under German control and with no maps or compass it seemed a pretty 
hopeless task’.81  The briefings and training which MI9 provided alerted them to every 
aspect of potential evasion and escape.  The emphasis was on evading capture whenever 
possible or, if captured, to attempt to escape at the earliest opportunity and certainly 
before being imprisoned behind barbed wire in the many prisoner of war camps.  It was 
standard practice for captured officers to be separated from the other ranks.  Officers 
were, therefore, made responsible for ensuring that their men were appropriately briefed 
in captivity and the organisation of escape committees became one of their principal 
priorities.  It is perhaps a reflection of the extent to which the philosophy permeated the 
camps that by the time the Allies were landing in occupied Europe and slowly 
advancing east, it was felt necessary to issue a ‘stay-put’ order to prisoners of war to 
ensure they did not get caught up in the frontline whilst trying to flee captivity.  The 
order was sent by MI9 on 18
th
 February 1944 in a coded message: it directed that ‘on 
German surrender or collapse, all p/w all services including Dominion & Colonial & 
Indian must stay put & await orders’.82  Many families also wrote to their sons in the 
camps strongly discouraging them from any escape attempts, as a result of the Stalag 
Luft III Sagan experience when 50 of the men who had taken part in the ‘Great Escape’ 
in March 1944 had been executed on being recaptured.
83   
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          The MI9 staff who subsequently wrote about their escapes, notably Neave and 
Langley, and even Evans who had escaped during World War I, all highlighted the 
importance of an escape philosophy.  Neave described the way in which they had ‘to 
think of imprisonment as a new phase of living, not as the end of life’ and the extent to 
which the real purpose of the escaper was ‘to overcome by every means the towering 
obstacles in his way.’84  It was a state of mind which MI9 encouraged. It was 
understandable that some might prefer the relative safety of the camp rather than life on 
the run.  Even for these men there were jobs to be done to support the escapes of others.  
It was strength of mind and purpose which was needed rather than physical health and 
strength, a point epitomised by both Jimmy Langley escaping with a still suppurating 
amputation wound and Douglas Bader escaping with two artificial legs.  Initiative, 
foresight, courage were needed and luck also came into it: as Evans stressed ‘however 
hard you try, however skilful you are, luck is an essential element in a successful 
escape’.85  ‘Luck is the most essential part in an escape .... for every man out, there were 
at least ten better men who would have got clear but who did not have the good fortune 
they deserved.’86  Teamwork is the one competence which comes through all the stories 
and plans relating to escape.  This almost certainly reflected the public school 
philosophy where your efforts were for school, house and team rather than for self.  As 
an Old Wykehamist, Evans personified this approach and it is not surprising to learn 
that between the wars he captained the Kent county cricket team.  To some extent it 
could be argued that MI9 was pushing at an open door in seeking to inculcate Crockatt’s 
philosophy into a new generation of young men.  Many of them had been educated at 
preparatory and public schools and apparently raised on a diet of escape classics of the 
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last war.  Some of them acknowledged this when they came to write their own accounts 
of their escape experience during World War II: 
In my prep-school days at Summerfields, I had read all the 
escape classics of the last war – such books as The 
Tunnellers of Holzminden, Within Four Walls, I Escape, 
and The Escapers’ Club – and as a proposition the 
business of escaping fascinated me.
87
 
It is clear from the post-war literature of escape that many of them spent every waking 
moment of captivity plotting their escape.  Some identified the very human traits which 
they believed could most aid them.  Gullibility (of the captor) and audacity (of the 
escaper) were high on the list, as was luck.  There was a psychology attached to 
escaping.  ‘I came to the conclusion that escaping was essentially a psychological 
problem, depending on the inobservance of mankind, coupled with a ready acceptance 
of the everyday at its face value.’88       
          The Germans were apparently well aware of this philosophy and the extent to 
which it sustained British prisoners of war and constrained their own resources in 
guarding those captured and seeking to prevent their escape.  Once the Allies had 
landed in mainland Europe and started to advance east, they captured not simply 
German troops but also a number of key German documents amongst which was a 
document identified as GR-107.
89
  It must have made fascinating reading for MI9 as it 
revealed the extent to which the Germans were well aware of their work.  It is a lengthy 
document and relates entirely to the escape methods employed by Allied Flying 
Personnel.  It was dated 29
th
 December 1944 and described the escape philosophy, the 
duty to escape, and the maps provided on silk and thin tissue.  It goes so far as to list 
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nine maps which they knew had been produced.  Whilst it reflected the extent to which 
the Germans were aware of what they were up against, it also indicated that, if they 
were aware of only nine escape maps when MI9 had by that time produced over 200 
individual items and in excess of two million copies, they had arguably only discovered 
the proverbial tip of the iceberg.   
Conclusion            
The creation of MI9 should arguably have taken place earlier in the timeframe as the 
new organisation was rapidly confronted by the withdrawal of British forces from 
Dunkirk and the reality of thousands of men who were captured and imprisoned by the 
Germans.   These were the very men that MI9 had been created to assist.  It is a credit to 
the organisation’s resilience that they tackled their work with enthusiasm, though 
perhaps not always in the most efficient way, and did not appear to be overwhelmed by 
the size of the task which faced them.  The absence of MI4 (the branch responsible for 
the production of military maps) from London arguably set them off down the route 
they took and the embryonic section had to face considerable hurdles to get their escape 
programme, and specifically their mapping programme, off the ground.  The manner in 
which they tackled the considerable challenge posed by the size and nature of the map 
production programme which faced them, and the remarkable extent to which they were 
aided and supported by the commercial companies they approached to enlist their help 
and expertise in the war effort, is addressed in Chapter 2.        
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Chapter 2 
The map production programme and the compilation of a carto-bibliography 
                        ‘Geography is about maps’.  (Edmund Clerihew Bentley)90 
It was made clear in the previous chapter that the production of escape and evasion 
maps became a priority for MI9 from the beginning of its existence.  Hutton’s driving 
role in this has already been described and the extent to which he felt he was carving a 
new path in printing maps on silk apparently led him to approach commercial 
companies rather than the military mappers.  The importance of the maps was clearly 
key to the whole of MI9’s escape programme: without maps it was at best difficult and 
at worst impossible for the escaper or evader to find his way to freedom.  Given their 
critical role in the war effort, it is now germane to reconstruct and explain the nature of 
the map production programme that was undertaken.  It is also highly relevant to codify 
and catalogue the maps generated by that programme as a carto-bibliography, not only 
because of its use in revealing the unfolding work of making maps for escape and 
evasion purposes, but also because of its potential as a research resource for researchers 
and map librarians/archivists  in the future.  Consideration of the means employed to 
make the maps and the challenges faced and overcome are crucially relevant, and the 
final part of this chapter discusses both the companies and organisations involved, and 
the techniques and materials that were used.     
The map production programme 
A central task in the research has been to reconstruct the evolving programme of map 
production undertaken by MI9. In doing so, light can be shed on the imperatives that 
influenced the decisions that were taken as well as the constraints that imposed limits on 
what could be achieved and the quality and utility of the products. However, it should 
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be noted that the challenges posed in seeking to understand the production programme 
are formidable.  It is likely that MI9 kept a card index of the individual maps in the 
programme in the same way as they are known to have kept a card index to maintain a 
record of other aspects of their work.
91
  Sadly, none of the card indexes appear to have 
survived and there is, therefore, no extant comprehensive record of MI9’s escape and 
evasion map production programme available to the present-day researcher.  The 
programme has had to be pieced together from, sometimes, fragmentary information.  
The single most comprehensive record is undoubtedly the D. Survey war-time print 
record which was created, managed and kept up-to-date by Survey 2, that part of D. 
Survey responsible for the management of all operational map production programmes.  
The card index was originally found as an un-catalogued item in the India Office 
Library and Records, housed in the British Library.
92
  How it came to be held there, 
rather than in The National Archives where one might reasonably anticipate finding it, 
is an apparent enigma, but it is clear that its survival owes much to the prescient 
awareness of two far-sighted individuals who recognised its importance and ensured it 
was given a safe haven.
93
   
          The second source is a typed list held in one of the War Office (WO) files.
94
  
There is also a third source, namely the list deposited in the British Library by the 
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archivist of the Waddington Company.
95 
 The contents of the three sources are similar 
but by no means identical.  Some of the differences can be explained by apparent human 
error (misreading of sheet numbers and typographic errors, for example).  However, the 
WO typed list contains other differences which are less understandable: for example, it 
states that 29 sheets of Norway GSGS 4090 were produced, whereas the print card 
index indicates 33 sheets, which proved to be correct since extant copies of all 33 sheets 
have been identified.  Some of the differences between the D.Survey card index and the 
Waddington list relate to the print dates ascribed to the maps.  This was potentially a 
significant research issue since it was important to construct a carto-bibliography which 
contained print volume figures which are as accurate as possible.  Where the dates 
ascribed to print dates are only days apart, these have been regarded as the same task, 
with the Waddington date probably representing the placing of the order by the Ministry 
of Supply, on behalf of MI9, and the WO date probably representing the receipt of the 
stock from the Waddington company.  Where the dates ascribed are months apart, these 
have been regarded as separate tasks and the print volumes are listed as separate tasks.  
Whilst every effort has been made to resolve the differences, this has not proved 
possible in all cases.  Intriguingly, the typed WO list refers to the maps as ‘pictures’, the 
same word used by Waddington in their correspondence with the Ministry of Supply 
(see page 84 later in this chapter) and the word used on the Waddington file list.  It is, 
therefore, likely that the typed WO list had its origins in either the Waddington 
Company or the Ministry of Supply. 
          Whilst the print records were originally classified SECRET, some of the detail of 
the programme was apparently regarded as so sensitive that it was not declared openly 
even on that classified record.  For example, it took some time to confirm, through 
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sighting extant copies, that the description of one map as D - - - - G was a large-scale 
plan of the port of Danzig and that Dutch Girl in four sheets referred to Arnhem.  Other 
entries on the record remain a mystery: for example, Double Eagle, although it might 
reasonably be conjectured that it was a map of Germany and Austria.  Indeed, one of the 
earliest maps produced by MI9 was a small-scale map of Germany, Austria and adjacent 
frontier areas: it carried the sheet number A, probably indicating that it was the first 
sheet to be produced.  No direct evidence has yet been unearthed, however, to confirm 
that this is the map which the record describes as Double Eagle.   A General Map of 
Ireland was produced in two sheets, printed back-to-back.  This was almost certainly the 
map mentioned in the records as ‘Shamrock’, 500 copies being printed double-sided on 
fabric on 16
th
 February 1942.
96
  There was apparently some discussion about the 
position of internees in the Republic of Ireland since, under the Geneva Convention, 
internees were held until the end of the conflict. On 5
th
 March 1943, in a MOST 
SECRET internal minute from MI9 to the Director of Intelligence, a discussion between 
Sir John Maffey, the British representative in Eire, and the Irish Government was 
reported.  It concerned the possibility of faking the escape of British prisoners of war 
interned in the Curragh.
97
  The deal fell through, apparently because the Irish 
Government wanted fighter aircraft in exchange.  Whether the internees might be 
encouraged to escape anyway was a moot point since there was the distinct possibility 
of political embarrassment.  The fact that the General Map of Ireland was produced at 
all appears to bear testimony to the fact that MI9 prepared for the possibility of escape 
and it was certainly recorded in the War Diary that nine RAF officers escaped from the 
Curragh Camp in Eire on 25
th
 June 1941.  Three were recaptured and six reached 
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England.  MI 9 apparently wrote a special SECRET report on the escape, but this has 
not been identified.
98
  
          Where copies of individual sheets (either singly or in combination) remain extant, 
it has proved possible to identify the particular print medium, i.e. tissue (a very fine 
paper), silk or man-made fibre (MMF).  This information has been incorporated into the 
carto-bibliographies which have been compiled and appears in the column headed: print 
medium.  The entry (paper or fabric) reflects the entry on one or other (or all) of the 
three extant print record sources.  In some cases it has proved possible to identify the 
print medium rather more precisely.  The Waddington list, for example, indicates that 
some of the maps were printed on Mulberry Leaf (ML) paper or Mulberry Leaf 
Substitute (MLS).   
          MI9 may have been the initiators of the escape and evasion mapping programme 
but they were apparently not well versed in cartographic techniques, processes and 
procedures.  Very many of the maps lack even basic identification.  Many carry no title, 
series identification, date or edition number, and some carry no scale indicator.  Even 
when cartographic referencing information is shown, it can prove to be very misleading.  
The most obvious examples of this are the sheets of GSGS Series 3982.  The original 
operational map series designated with this GSGS number was the Europe (Air) series 
at a scale of 1:250,000 which existed prior to the outbreak of the War.  These were 
reproduced as escape and evasion maps, largely on silk and tissue, at a scale of 
1:500,000.  In reducing the scale, MI9 did not in any way alter the detail shown on the 
original map (even the series number) with the exception of the scale factor, so that on 
the resultant sheet, the font size of place and feature names appears to be very small, 
although the detail is still legible.  The date on most of the sheets was in fact often the 
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date of the original operational paper map and not the date of the escape and evasion 
map production.  This is notably the case where compilation and imprint dates shown 
on the escape and evasion maps pre-date the start of the escape and evasion map 
production programme.  This is also confirmed by the imprint numbers shown in the 
marginalia, often indicating print volumes well in excess of those produced as escape 
and evasion versions.  The one exception to this was where boundaries are shown ‘at 
1943’, for example in [Series 43].  Indeed, when D. Survey eventually assumed 
responsibility for escape and evasion map production in 1944, they proposed changes to 
the printing colours of boundaries and country names.  In a letter dated 28
th
 November 
1944, MI9 came back strongly opposed to change, insisting that their policy of ‘present 
frontiers in red and pre-Munich frontiers in mauve’ be adhered to, not least because it 
had always been specified as such in their training courses and lectures.
99
   
          MI9’s lack of knowledge of map production processes and procedures manifested 
itself in many other ways.  It is a cardinal cartographic rule that different versions of the 
same map are identified differently, usually by a change in the edition number or, at the 
very least, in the production/print date.   Both MI9 and the companies they initially used 
to print the maps were oblivious to such practices.  As a result, the escape and evasion 
maps carried no edition numbers or production dates, and some maps apparently 
identified as being the same were in fact different.  To give a few examples: there were 
at least two versions of sheet C (refer to Appendix 1) with one version extending one 
degree longitudinally further east than the other version.  There were also at least three 
versions of the Danzig port plan (refer to Appendix 1).  Whilst all three versions 
provided large-scale coverage of the Port of Danzig, one carried the sheet number A4, 
whereas the second version carried no sheet number and the third carried the sheet 
number A3.  The three versions varied also marginally in scale and in geographical 
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extent.  They also carried different intelligence annotations, the sheet marked A4 
carrying far more intelligence information than the other two versions, in the form of 
annotations directing escapers, for example, where to find Swedish ships, where the arc 
lights were located and how far the beam of light extended.  In the case of sheets J3 and 
J4 (refer to Appendix 1), the geographical areas of coverage of the two sheets were 
sometimes reversed and the scale was varied, sometimes being produced at 1:1,378,000 
and at other times reduced to 1:1,500,000.  These are the principal variations identified 
to date: there may well be others yet to be discovered.  It is important to describe them 
at some length since they are only really identifiable when extant copies of the maps can 
be compared.  The differences do, however, highlight the extent to which individual 
sheet identification of MI9’s escape and evasion maps needs always to be treated with 
caution.   
Carto-bibliography 
The lack of standard cartographic information provided a challenge in the compilation 
of a map inventory or carto-bibliography. It is also worth reflecting at this point on the 
current (2013) state of carto-bibliographic practice.  Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules 
Edition 2 (AACR2) are in the process of being superseded by Resource Description and 
Access (RDA) but this is in the very early stages of implementation in the USA and is 
even further behind in the UK.
100
  More importantly, it does not, as yet, contain 
guidance for maps, although some map librarians in North America are reportedly 
working on what will eventually be the new version of Cartographic Materials: a 
Manual of Interpretation for AACR2.  In an attempt to ensure that the form of the carto-
bibliography being compiled by the author as a result of the current research proves to 
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be of value to professional map librarians and archivists, the instructions in the Manual 
have been adhered to in so far as is possible and, additionally, advice has been sought 
from map librarians/archivists in both The National Archives and the British Library.  It 
has been important to ensure that the data fields described are capable of being captured 
into an automated map catalogue system in the future. 
          The solution to the challenges posed by MI9’s lack of adherence to usual 
cartographic identification procedures has been to utilise the standard cartographic 
technique of showing in square brackets [ ] any information which does not appear on 
the printed maps and which helps to identify the maps. The series number and series 
title, for example [Series 43] and Series GSGS 3982 [Fabric], have been rendered in this 
form to aid identification.     
          Where the base map used for escape and evasion map production carried no sheet 
number, MI9 devised an arbitrary sheet numbering system.  In the case of their early 
attempts based on the maps of John Bartholomew & Company of Edinburgh, the sheets 
carried an upper case Roman alphabet letter, often in conjunction with an Arabic 
number, for example C, H2.  MI9 appeared to cause significant production problems 
when they decided (for unknown reasons) to cut and panel sheets of one existing 
operational series to produce an escape and evasion series.  [Series 43] is a good 
example of this practice.  It is clear that this escape and evasion series was produced by 
panelling together sheets or sections of sheets from the International Map of the World 
(IMW) series.  There are examples of coverage diagrams in the extant files of the 
composition of sheets by this method.
101
  There are also indications that the practice 
caused considerable angst to the regular military map makers when they eventually 
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became involved in the escape and evasion production programme.  On 3
rd
 December 
1944, Lieutenant Colonel W. D. C. Wiggins wrote to MI9:  
Your proposed sheet lines do not (I have noticed this on 
previous layouts of yours) take into consideration existing 
map series sheet lines, printing sizes or fabric 
sizes…Production is much simpler if we stick to graticule 
sheet lines as opposed to your, rather vague, 
rectangulars.
102
   
He might also have added that the practice must have greatly increased the production 
costs.  The point appears to have been disregarded by MI9 who continued with arbitrary 
sheet lines and numbering systems, exemplified by [Series 43], [Series 44] and [Series 
FGS]. 
         The carto-bibliography has been compiled as a set of nine appendices, each one 
relating to an identifiable series or group of MI9 maps.  It has been produced in such a 
way that it can be regarded both as an integral part of the present research exercise and 
also as a stand-alone reference for future researchers and map librarians/archivists.  It is 
the result of many hours spent in record repositories all over the country.  In all, extant 
copies of the maps were discovered in some eight public collections and three private 
collections. The details of these are contained in the individual introductions to the 
appendices which are designed to ensure the future value of the carto-bibliography as a 
stand-alone reference work.   
Maps based on Bartholomew originals and other escape and evasion maps with 
similar sheet numbers 
As Christopher Clayton Hutton indicated, MI9 initially appeared to work in isolation 
from the military map-makers and chose rather to approach commercial map publishing 
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firms directly for help.
103
   As previously described,   Hutton had contacted the firm of 
John Bartholomew in Edinburgh at the suggestion of Geographia in London.   It was 
(John) Ian Bartholomew, the Managing Director, himself who gave Hutton his first 
lesson in map-making.  Hutton himself indicated that ‘thanks to the assiduities of the 
managing director and his staff…I learned all there was to know about maps’.104  
Hutton was given copies of many of Bartholomew’s own maps of Europe, Africa and 
the Middle East which formed the basis of MI9’s initial escape and evasion map 
production programme, and the waiving of all copyright charges for the duration of the 
War was a considerable financial gesture from Bartholomew since MI9 went on to 
produce in excess of 300,000 copies of the maps (refer to Appendix 1 for details of the 
print runs). 
          The maps are readily identifiable as being based on Bartholomew maps since they 
are identical, in specification, colour and font style, to the company’s maps of the time.    
They are generally small scale (1:1,000,000 or smaller), produced in 3 colours (red, 
black, grey/green) and without elevation detail. A few of the maps carry confirmation of 
their source since they clearly show the Bartholomew job order number relating to the 
original paper map along the neat edge of the silk map.  The alpha-numeric code A40 
which appears in the NW corner of some copies of sheet F (refer to Appendix 1) was 
very much a Bartholomew practice. The company introduced this code in the early part 
of the twentieth century, mostly on their half inch mapping. The formula is a letter 
(either A or B) followed by a two digit number:  
A = January-June and B = July-December.   
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The number is the year of printing, so A40 indicates that the original paper version of 
this map was printed between January and June 1940.
105
    
          The existence of a direct link between MI9 and the Bartholomew company is 
reflected also in the existence in contemporary company files of a memorandum dated 
3
rd
 August 1940 from Ian Bartholomew to the company’s London office, on the subject 
of Captain Clayton Hutton and indicating that a letter had been received from him 
thanking them for the prompt attention in sending the plates they had requested.
106
  The 
letter itself is not in the file.  The memorandum is not only confirmation of the link but 
also indicates that Bartholomew not only handed over printed paper copies of the maps 
but also provided plates for the on-going reproduction.  Further confirmation is 
contained in the first version of Hutton’s memoirs to be published (under a pseudonym) 
by the inclusion of black and white photographs of two silk maps which can be readily 
identified as sheets A and C in the MI9 inventory (refer to Appendix 1 for details).
107
 
Final confirmation was revealed by the existence of a printed copy in a contemporary 
Air Ministry file of a map which was identifiable as sheet A/Germany carrying a clear 
imprint of the Bartholomew Company name.
108
  (This map’s particular significance is 
discussed at Chapter 6).  
          As already indicated, MI9 added to the maps what passed for a rather crude sheet 
identification system in the form of an upper case alphabet letter, often in conjunction 
with an Arabic number (for example C, H2, K3).  However, even this practice was not 
consistent as the same numbering system was also applied to some sheets which were 
clearly not based on the Bartholomew small scale maps.  The large scale sheet of the 
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port of Danzig (A4) at approximately 1: 16,000, the large scale map of Schaffhausen 
(A6) and the medium scale sheets of Italy (J5 and J6 at 1:275,000, J7 and J8 at 
1:110,000) are six such examples.  Sheet A4 Danzig appears to be an amalgam of the 
detail from a British Admiralty chart with additional ground intelligence added in the 
form of intelligence annotations.  (This particular map will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6).  Sheet A6 of Schaffhausen is based on large scale, native German and 
Swiss topographic maps of the border area and sheets J5, J6, J7 and J8 appear to be 
based on large scale, native Italian topographic maps.  For the purposes of constructing 
the carto-bibliography, however, they have been identified as one series based on the 
similarity of the sheet numbering system.  Certainly it appears that the first small scale 
map of the area was identified with a single alphabet letter, such as A, and that any 
subsequent map produced which was located in the same geographic area was 
numbered A1, A2 etc in sequence.  To prove that this was, indeed, the approach adopted 
would assume that, since sheets J5 to J8 all provided large scale coverage of the Italian 
area, sheet J should be a small scale sheet of Italy.  This cannot, however, be proved 
conclusively, since no extant copy of sheet J has yet been found and no mention of it 
appears in the record.    
           Those sheets where extant copies have been located in British record repositories 
are shown at Appendix 1 and the various states in which the sheets were produced, 
either singly or in combination, are also detailed at Appendix 1.  A typical example of a 
map based directly on a Bartholomew map (sheet C) is shown at Illustration II and an 
example of a sheet utilising the same numbering system but clearly not based on a 
Bartholomew map (sheet A4) is shown at Illustration III.   
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Illustration II: part of sheet C 
  
 
 
Illustration III: sheet A4    [Danzig] 
 
           
 (Both illustrations are reproduced with the permission of the owners)          
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Fifteen sheets which are believed to have been produced but for which no extant copies 
have been identified to date in British record repositories are listed at Appendix 2.  This 
latter group is either noted on the print records or represents gaps in the assumed 
consecutive numbering sequence or, in one case, has been spotted by a colleague at a 
map fair but no details were recorded.   
          A total of 58 sheets have been identified in this initial group of the escape and 
evasion maps, of which some 40 are clearly based on Bartholomew maps, some of the           
latter carrying the original Bartholomew job order number which has allowed them to 
be compared directly with the lithographic paper copy held in the company’s print 
archive now housed in the National Library of Scotland’s map collection in 
Edinburgh.
109   
By autumn 1942, there was an increasing awareness that the small scale 
maps being issued to aircrew were regarded by them as too small scale.  The need for 
better maps at larger scales gained momentum and ‘a new series gained approval’.110  It 
is not clear what this new series was, but it is likely to have been the fabric versions of 
GSGS 3982 (see the following section), as they started to be produced at that time, their 
earliest print dates being the late summer and autumn of 1942 (refer to Appendix 3).  At 
this stage valuable information about the Swiss frontier was also being incorporated into 
a map of the frontier area produced at 1:100,000 scale.
111
 
Europe Air 1:500,000 Series GSGS 3982 [Fabric]  
Despite the evidence indicating that MI9 engaged initially with commercial companies 
to develop and progress the escape and evasion mapping programme, there was clearly 
contact with the operational map-makers at some stage since any map series carrying a 
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GSGS series number is immediately identifiable as an operational series.  This group of 
escape and evasion maps was produced by x2 reduction of the original operational 
Europe (Air) series, from 1:250,000 scale to 1:500,000 scale. They could only have 
been produced from the original reproduction material which would have been held by 
D. Survey since, apart from their scale and print medium, they are identical in all 
respects to the original lithographic paper maps.  As a result of the scale reduction, the 
escape and evasion maps are one quarter the size of the original operational lithographic 
maps printed on paper.  These maps were variously referred to as ‘miniatures’ or 
‘handkerchief’ maps.112  The sheets are printed in six colours and individual sheet 
coverage is two degrees longitudinally (°E) and one degree latitudinally (°N).  All 
geographical values of the extent and coverage of individual sheets have been derived 
from an index of the original series acquired from the Defence Geographic Centre 
(DGC): this index has also been used as the basis of the cover diagram shown as 
Illustration IV.  Where extant copies of the maps have been discovered, these have been 
used to confirm sheet-lines. The sheet numbers and titles have been extracted initially 
from the print record and spellings, including the use of diacritic marks, have been 
confirmed against extant sheets and/or the map index. The sheets are printed in six 
colours.  Illustration V shows part of sheet L32/2 Konstanz in this series, a map which 
will assume particular significance later in the thesis at Chapter 6.    Escape and evasion 
versions of some 74 sheets were produced (refer to Appendix 3 for the detailed record).  
Over 35,000 copies were printed between 10
th
 July 1942, when production apparently 
commenced, and an unrecorded day in July/August 1944, when the decision was taken 
to cease production.  One can therefore conjecture that MI9’s contact with D. Survey, 
either directly or using the Ministry of Supply as an intermediary, had started at least by 
                                                             
112 
Whilst possibly apocryphal, since no confirmation of this description has been found 
in the records, it carries the ring of authenticity because of the small size of the maps 
and their reduced scale.   
70 
 
mid-1942. Despite the significant number of copies produced, relatively few extant 
sheets have been discovered.  This may reflect the fact that many of the print runs were 
very small, 45 and 100 being common (refer to Appendix 3). 
          The sheets in this series were produced sometimes singly and sometimes in 
combination, although it has not proved possible to identify from the records the various 
combinations which were produced.  They were produced on fabric or paper, the latter 
being variously described in the print record as ‘RL’, an acknowledged abbreviation for 
rag lithographic paper, ‘thin BANK paper’, ML (Mulberry Leaf) or MLS (Mulberry 
Leaf Substitute). One interesting group of a block of four of these sheets was produced 
under the code-word ‘Dutch Girl’.  They are centred on Arnhem and are of non-
standard geographical extent, location and scale, being one inch to 6.56 miles or 
approximately 1:420,000; as a result they are referred to in the record as Sections 
1,2,3,4.
113
  The details are shown at Appendix 3.  The record shows that some 4,400 
copies of these four sheets were produced in June 1942 and were described by 
Christopher Clayton Hutton in earlier correspondence with Victor Watson of the 
Waddington Company as ‘a very, very urgent requirement’.114  The purpose of 
producing these sheets at that stage is not clear, although it might have related to the 
combined operations which took place at that time and are known to have involved  
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Illustration IV: cover diagram of GSGS 3982 [Fabric] 
 
© UK MOD Crown Copyright, 2014 
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Illustration V: GSGS 3982 [Fabric] 1:500,000 part of sheet L32/2 Konstanz 
 
(Illustration provided by, and reproduced with the permission of, the owner.) 
 
Section X of MI9 and SOE. 
115
  In all probability, the subsequent printing of the same 
sheets, which took place in the period prior to August 1944, was in timely support of the 
Battle of Arnhem, otherwise referred to as Operation Market Garden, which took place 
in September 1944.    
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Norway 1:100,000 Series GSGS 4090 [Fabric] 
Once again MI9 must have acquired access to the reproduction material of yet another 
operational map series produced by D. Survey.  Thirty-three sheets of this pre-war 
GSGS series of Norway at 1:100,000 scale were printed on silk apparently for escape 
and evasion purposes in 1942.  The sheets are located in a block to the north of Oslo and 
adjacent to the Swedish border.  Thirty-one sheets are monochrome, based on the 1940 
state of the original GSGS 4090 sheets, and two sheets (26B and 26D) are printed in 
four colours (black, red, brown, blue) and are based on the 1942 revision of the GSGS 
4090 sheets.  The original lithographic paper maps were based directly on original 
native Norwegian maps, some of which dated back to the early years of the twentieth 
century.  The original Norwegian maps were based on the Oslo meridian.  The GSGS 
series maps, therefore, carry a conversion note to the effect that the Oslo meridian is 10° 
43’ 23” E of Greenwich.   
          It is believed that the purpose of this particular group of escape and evasion maps 
was specifically to help Allied airmen, who were shot down and bailed out, to evade 
capture and reach neutral Sweden.  It is also known that crews flying damaged aircraft 
which they knew were unlikely to return home, were briefed to try, if they could, to put 
them down in southern Sweden.
116
  It is possible, therefore, that the maps were issued 
during pre-flight briefings only to those members of RAF crews destined to over-fly 
Norway or adjacent parts of Denmark and Germany.  It is, however, also possible that 
the maps related to combined operations discussed by SOE and MI9’s Section X, 
scheduled for summer and autumn 1942.
117
  Section X had only been established in 
January 1942, specifically responsible for planning escapes but also apparently for 
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providing support for other intelligence-mounted operations.  The operation mounted in 
Norway was described as ‘mysterious’ in SOE terms, referred to only by its code name 
(Grouse) and scheduled to take place sometime after the end of September 1942.
118
  It 
related to the heavy-water plant, the Norsk Hydro facility at Rjukan, on which SOE had 
mounted a huge intelligence-gathering operation as a precursor to blowing up the plant.  
It was known that this plant was producing heavy–water which the Germans were 
planning to use in the manufacture of atomic weapons: this was undoubtedly the reason 
that it was such a strategic sabotage target for SOE.  It cannot be coincidence that the 
coverage provided by this group of silk maps included sheet E35 West, the Rjukan 
sheet, providing detailed coverage of the plant’s geographic location and adjacent area, 
a location which had been chosen by the Norwegians during their pre-war construction 
of the plant because of its isolation ‘between Vermok and Rjukan, in the precipice and 
glacier-bound wilderness of Hardanger Vidda’.119  Extant copies of all sheets have been 
located.  A detailed list of those sheets in this series known to have been produced as 
escape and evasion maps on silk is at Appendix 4 and Illustration VI is sheet F31 West 
in this series, printed on silk.   
[Series 43] 
The use of standard operational mapping continued into 1943.  This particular escape 
and evasion series had no title or individual sheet names.  All sheets had the prefix 43 
which, it is believed, refers to the year in which production commenced, namely 1943.  
The escape and evasion series has, therefore, been identified as [Series 43].  A detailed 
list of the sheets, which are all small scale (1:1,000,000) with some large scale insets is 
provided at Appendix 5.  There are ten basic sheets, produced largely in combinations, 
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Illustration VI: GSGS 4090 [Fabric] 1:100,000 sheet F31 West 
 
© UK MOD Crown Copyright, 2014 
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with only one sheet apparently printed single-sided.  The coverage extends from 12°E to 
36°E (Portugal to Turkey) and from 36°N to 52°N (central Spain to Denmark).   
 
          It is notable that the records indicate that over one million copies of these sheets 
were produced.  It is possible that, as with [Series 44], they were produced for 
operational use in the field as well as for escape and evasion purposes (see the following 
section on [Series 44] for details of the proposed operational use of E&E maps).  
Approximately 75% of the large print volume was of three particular combinations, 
namely 43A/B, 43C/D and 43KEast/West.  The sheets specifically provide cover of 
Western Europe, including Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, Switzerland and northern Italy, and appear to have been printed in 1943 and 
1944, prior to the D-Day landings.  This comprehensive spatial coverage in itself adds 
strength to the theory that they were produced in such large numbers for operational 
reasons as well as for escape and evasion purposes.   
 
          The sheets are multi-coloured and are layered, demonstrating a high level of 
technical competence in printing so many colours on fabric and maintaining the colour 
register.  They are all printed on man-made fibre (MMF): none appears to have been 
printed on silk.  All are irregular in size and coverage, and appear to have been 
produced by panelling together sections of the International Map of the World (IMW) 
sheets which would again imply access to the reproduction material held by D. Survey.   
Extant copies of all sheets have been located.  Illustration VII is an example of the 
series, showing also a larger scale inset of a cross-border area. 
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Illustration VII: [Series 43] 1:1,000,000 sheet B showing part of the large scale 
inset at 1:300,000 of the German-Swiss border 
 
 
(Illustration provided by, and reproduced with the permission of, the owner.) 
          The IMW series had been originally proposed as a new world series by the 
German geographer, Albrecht Penck, in 1891, drawing together all the nationally held 
mapping of the colonial exploration by individual nation states during the 19
th
 century 
into a collaborative international series to face the challenges of the new century and for 
the good of all humanity.  The series had been progressed in its coverage significantly 
during World War I, largely through the combined efforts of the Royal Geographical 
Society (RGS) and the War Office.  By the end of that war, some 90 IMW sheets had 
been produced by the cartographers of the RGS, providing coverage of the whole of 
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.
120
  It was this same series which provided 
the source of this escape and evasion series and were apparently also deemed reliable 
enough for operational use during the next war.  
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[Series 44]  
Identical to [Series 43] in terms of its specification was [Series 44].  Similarly, this 
escape and evasion series had no title or individual sheet names.  All sheets had the 
prefix 44 which, it is believed, referred to the year of production, namely 1944.  The 
escape and evasion series has, therefore, been identified as [Series 44].  A detailed list 
of the sheets, which are all small scale (1:1,000,000 or 1:1,250,000) and of the Far 
Eastern theatre of war, appears at Appendix 6.  This makes them the only series of 
escape and evasion maps to provide coverage outside the European theatre of war and 
adjacent areas in Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, it is likely that the series was 
produced as an operational rather than an escape and evasion series.  There is certainly 
evidence in the correspondence files of the time which seems to point to this being the 
intention.  In a letter dated November 1944 to the Director of Military Survey, 
Lieutenant Colonel W.D.C.Wiggins, the Survey Division of Headquarters Strategic 
Allied Command (SAC) South East Asia (SEA) set out preliminary enquiries prior to 
making a formal request.
121
  They wanted reassurance that if they requested silk maps 
for use by assault troops operating in jungle and mangrove conditions, such could be 
provided in sufficient numbers.  Wiggins replied on 15
th
 November 1944 indicating that 
they would be better served by using US wet-strength paper or Rag Lithographic paper 
sprayed with cellulose varnish since these would be ‘durable, waterproof and 
oilproof’.122 
 
The series comprised 18 basic sheets, produced in nine set combinations 
providing coverage of most of Indonesia, the Malay peninsula, Thailand, Burma, French 
Indo-China, the south and east central provinces of China.  Again, the sheets were all 
printed on man-made fibre (MMF): none appeared to have been printed on silk.  The 
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sheets were all irregular in size and coverage, and are known to have been produced by 
panelling together sections of the IMW (International Map of the World) sheets.  
Diagrams showing the panelling of the IMW sheets to construct sheets 44N and 44O in 
this series appear in the files.
123
  Each sheet comprised sections of nine IMW sheets, 
which must have caused considerable production challenges.  Extant copies of all sheets 
have been located. 
[Series FGS] 
This group of escape and evasion maps was also the smallest group.  Five sheets have 
been identified in this series, produced as nine different combinations or single-sided.  
They are listed at Appendix 7 and are all small scale, either 1:1,000,000 or 1:1,250,000 
scale, covering the area of northern Europe and Scandinavia from Denmark and 
northern Germany to the northern extent of the Scandinavian archipelago, and eastward 
to the Finnish/Russian border.  The sheets were of irregular shape and disposition, and 
again appear to have been produced by panelling from the IMW sheets since they were 
identical in specification to [Series 43] and [Series 44] above.  The significance of FGS 
in the sheet numbers has not been identified, unless it was Finland, Germany, 
Scandinavia.   Extant copies of all sheets have been located. 
Miscellaneous maps 
The penultimate group was a collection of miscellaneous maps produced by MI9 
apparently as briefing or reference maps.  They were all small scale and often based on 
existing maps produced for briefing and reference purposes by the Assistant Directorate 
of Intelligence (Logistics) since some of them carried the ADI(L) map reference.  They 
are listed in detail at Appendix 8.  Some of the maps carry similar sheet numbers to 
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those described in a previous paragraph and listed at Appendix 1, for example 9J3 and 
J3, yet another example of the confusion in MI9’s cartographic procedures. 
MI9 Bulletin maps 
A small group of maps was produced for inclusion in the MI9 Bulletin: these are shown 
at Appendix 9.
124
  In some cases evidence has been found that the maps were produced 
also on fabric for escape and evasion purposes. In other cases no copies on fabric have 
been identified.  In at least one case, a map carries the same sheet number as an item in 
Appendix 1, namely A2, but is clearly a quite different map.  This appears to be yet 
another example of confusion in MI9’s identification of their maps.   
The production of the maps 
It is clear that, certainly in the early part of the War, MI9 had little, if anything, to do 
with MI4 and the military map-makers of the time, specifically D. Survey which was 
the military mapping organisation responsible for the production of all operational 
mapping for both the Army and the Royal Air Force.  Indeed, responsibility for the 
escape and evasion map production only passed to D. Survey, at that time located in 
Bushey Park, Middlesex, on 10
th
 August 1944.   
The pre-war removal of MI4 from London and its re-location in Cheltenham had 
caused increasing difficulties and concerns, since they were separated from the 
Operations, Intelligence and Planning Staffs at the War Office in Whitehall and also 
from the Air Ministry Map Section located at Harrow.  Recognition of the need for 
daily contact with the General Staff in Whitehall and the need for bigger and better 
accommodation than was available at Cheltenham prompted the decision to move back 
to London, despite the possible disruption of operational mapping work at a critical 
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stage in the war.  MI4 had been re-designated Geographical Section General Staff 
(GSGS) and was moved to Eastcote in outer London and to the nearby factory site at 
Hanwell where the building was known as ‘Hygrade’.  At the same time the cross 
service importance of GSGS was recognised and it was upgraded from Branch to 
Directorate level with the creation of the Directorate of Military Survey under Brigadier 
Martin Hotine.   It was doubtless this move back to London which allowed MI9 greater 
access to existing operational mapping and to the production of escape and evasion 
maps based on existing GSGS series such as GSGS 3982.
125 
Prior to August 1944, the MI9 War Diaries indicate that production was 
managed on MI9’s behalf by the Ministry of Supply working closely with commercial 
companies.  As already noted, the company which appears to have played a significant 
part in the production was the John Waddington Company Limited, Dewsbury Road, 
Leeds, Yorkshire.  Certainly, the remaining post-war stock of the maps, when located in 
a D. Survey map depot over thirty years later, was found to be interleaved with the 
printed card from Waddington games.
126
  Whilst the published history of the Company 
made only passing mention of the important, covert, war-time role they played, the 
correspondence files of the time illustrated the almost daily contact which took place 
between Norman Watson, the Managing Director and E. D. Alston of Section CT6(c) in 
the Ministry of Supply located in Room 307 at 4 South Parade, Leeds 1, the 
acknowledged intermediary with the War Office section responsible for the 
requirement, i.e. MI9.
127
  There was certainly some direct, but very limited, contact 
between the Waddington Company and MI9, the large proportion of the contact being 
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with Alston as the intermediary.  Whilst one recognises the security aspect of this 
separation and the need to keep the programme and its purpose a tightly controlled 
secret, there is no doubt that the lack of direct contact, compounded by the lack of 
cartographic awareness by all the parties involved, created its own additional, and 
arguably unnecessary, challenges.  
Waddington was apparently chosen as the company had already proved its 
ability to print on silk.  The Company was founded in Leeds in 1905; it specialised in 
theatrical printing and later established a printing outlier in London.  Their expertise 
eventually led to them being invited to produce the programmes for the Royal Gala 
(later Command) performance on silk for members of the Royal Family during the 
1930s.
128
  Christopher J. L. Bowes was the Finance Director of the company until his 
retirement on health grounds in 1985.  By the time he was depositing, in national record 
repositories and collections, maps and correspondence files left after the company had 
been sold in 1999, he was describing himself as the company archivist.  In the deposit 
he made to the British Library Map Library, his covering letter, dated 27
th
 August 1999, 
posed the question about the company’s wartime involvement with MI9: Why 
Waddingtons?
129
  He went on to offer the following commentary that initially the 
company had not been ‘very good’ at printing the maps on silk and they had had to 
develop new techniques, adding that it might have been preferable for the work to have 
gone to commercial map publishers such as Bartholomew, Philips or even the Ordnance 
Survey who he suspected would have been better placed to do the experimenting.  The 
point was well made.  There is considerable difference between the printing in which 
Waddington was involved, i.e. board games, posters, programmes, etc., and that of 
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printing maps, even if they were afforded access to the original reproduction material of 
the maps.  The challenge would have been exacerbated by the fact that the requirement 
was for the maps to be printed on silk. Bowes conjectured that there was some ‘hidden 
politics’ involved.  He may, of course, have been right, but it is also worth making the 
point that the character and approach of Christopher Clayton Hutton should also be 
considered.  There is no doubt that Hutton was convinced, wrongly, that his idea of 
maps on silk was original and unique.  He also appears to be a man left very much to his 
own devices and not used to taking advice or guidance from anyone.  He is variously 
described by his contemporaries as ‘eccentric’, ‘genius’ and by Foot and Langley as 
‘wayward and original’.130  It is clear that he was certainly single-minded in his 
approach, cartographically ignorant and convinced that, because he knew and 
understood the objective of the exercise, he was correct in the approach he adopted.  
This point has to some extent been made in the previous chapter and will be considered 
again when the success of the programme is assessed in the Conclusion. 
The first recorded orders for the printing of the maps by Waddington are dated 
6
th
 January 1942.
131 
 The following month the company purchased four sewing 
machines in order to machine-sew the edges of the silk maps.
132
  However, Bowes 
mentioned that Hutton produced a booklet on 14
th
 February 1942 in which he stated 
that, by that date, 209,000 maps had been distributed to units of all three Services, 
comprising 56 different maps on single-sided and double-sided silk or paper.  Bowes 
regarded this as a rather odd statistic which could only be explained if, prior to that 
time, either other companies were involved in the printing or orders had been placed 
verbally with Waddington.  There is, however, ample evidence that MI9, through 
Alston in the Ministry of Supply, was in regular contact with the company certainly 
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from May 1941, and very possibly prior to that, and that considerable experimentation 
was taking place.  On 12
th
 May 1941 Alston wrote to Victor Watson commenting that 
the inks being used were apparently too old and ‘did not work’.133  On 29th May he 
wrote again asking for the silk ‘to be mounted’ for printing.  Any fabric on which an 
image was to be printed needed to be held taut during the printing process to prevent 
movement and the possibility of a resulting blurred image.  Certainly the usual method 
of printing on silk and the one utilised by the Macclesfield textile companies was to 
stretch the silk across a wooden frame.
134   
By September of that year there is evidence that Waddington was involved in 
secreting maps inside board games during the manufacturing process. This aspect of 
MI9’s work is addressed in detail in Chapter 3.  There is no doubt that the company was 
involved in printing the maps as well as hiding them inside board games in preparation 
for despatch to the prisoner of war camps.  There are many examples in the file of 
Watson quoting map production costs to Alston and indicating that, for a range of 
reasons, the costs involved were up to 75% above their usual production costs.   On 6
th
 
January 1942, for example, he quoted for the cost of the ‘completed reproduction of 
Double Eagle, progressing with Emerald, costs for necessary photographic work, in 
preparing original, cutting material to size, preparing for lithographing (sic), hemming 
on all four edges, backing sheets for mounting the fabric’.135  There is evidence also that 
the Kodak company was involved in the production of the plates, although no detail was 
offered.
136
  There are numerous items of correspondence between the two individuals 
detailing the number of copies required and the titles or sheet numbers of the items but, 
at no stage are they described as maps: they are rather referred to as posters or pictures.  
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However, in all cases the sheet numbers and titles can be identified as items in the MI9 
escape and evasion map production programme.  A comprehensive three-page list of 
sheets in GSGS 3982 was produced around mid-February 1942.
137
  A list of nine maps 
produced on 26
th
 February 1942 is also identifiable as having the form of sheet numbers 
which allowed them to be identified as Bartholomew based maps, for example Caspian 
Sea T2/T4 and Kenya Q.
138
  Apparently the maps were often despatched by rail to 
London Kings Cross Station addressed to Major C. C. Hutton and marked ‘to be called 
for’.139   
Sourcing of silk and paper 
Henry Town of Allied Paper Merchants, located at 81 Albion Street in Leeds, was 
involved in experiments trying to increase the strength of the paper being used without 
increasing its thickness.  At the same time the Ministry of Supply was tasking 
Waddington to carry out trials on Bemberg yarn (rayon), a man-made replacement 
fabric for silk and often referred to as Bemberg silk.
140
  The sourcing of silk was a 
continuing issue for the Ministry of Supply, their priority always being parachute 
manufacture rather than map production, and it is clear that there was a continuing 
search for a suitable fabric to replace silk.  It is also clear that academics were involved 
in various trials, a certain Professor Briscoe being mentioned by Alston in the Ministry 
of Supply in a letter he wrote to Watson on 7
th
 April 1943, commenting on the ‘Collodio 
– Albumen process.’141  It is likely that the academics were based at the nearby 
University of Leeds which has long had a highly renowned textiles faculty.   
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Experiments were carried out, authorised by the Ministry of Supply, in printing methods 
and also into the use of different printing inks, the latter involving chemists from ICI 
visiting the Waddington factory in Leeds in June 1942.  
The sourcing of silk supplies became a real issue for the Ministry of Supply 
relatively early on in the War.  Supplies from the Far East (especially Japan), not 
unexpectedly, dried up and HMG had to turn to their contacts in the English silk 
industry based in Macclesfield for help in securing alternative sources.  The leading 
Macclesfield silk manufacturing companies had had the presence of mind to stockpile 
raw silk from Japan prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East but this supply 
was soon under considerable pressure from the Ministry of Supply who needed it for 
parachute production.  Nylon had only just been developed (in the USA), it was not yet 
available in the UK, at least in the quantities required.  All the standard supply sources 
for silk, China, Japan, Italy and France, were in enemy hands.  It was necessary to 
identify alternative sources as a matter of urgency.  That task fell to Peter William 
Gaddum.  Born in 1902 and educated at Rugby School, he worked for the family firm of 
H. T. Gaddum from 1923.  He was aged 36 at the outbreak of war and already serving 
in the Army.  He was allowed to leave the Army and became Chief Assistant in the 
Ministry of Supply, responsible for the supply and control of silk and rayon which he 
proceeded to source from the Near and Middle East.  He flew to Cairo and made his 
first purchase in December 1941.  From there he travelled to Beirut in Lebanon where 
he remained based until January 1944.  Silk cocoons were available in Turkey, Iran and 
Lebanon, although much of the reeling of the silk took place in Lebanon.  In the two 
years he remained in the Middle East, Gaddum travelled widely to ensure a secure 
supply of the silk needed at home for the war effort, always ensuring that he obtained 
the highest possible grade of silk.  During the period, he visited Baghdad, Tehran, 
Cairo, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta and Mysore at various times and took only one-month 
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of home leave in the entire period.  Whilst still relatively young, he did not enjoy good 
health, being plagued by sciatica.
142
  Eric Whiston, the son of another famous 
Macclesfield silk manufacturing family, was sent out to Lebanon to assist Gaddum, who 
eventually returned home in December 1944.  Whiston moved to Rome in December 
1944 and was based with the Allied Command.  He was subsequently charged to wind 
up the Middle East establishment and released from his war duties on 27
th
 December 
1945 by H.O. Hambleton who went under the impressive title of The Controller, Silk 
and Rayon Control, in the Ministry of Supply, based in the Memorial Hall, Queen 
Victoria Street, Macclesfield.
143
  Whiston immediately journeyed to the Far East, 
presumably to ascertain the situation there with regard to silk supply for the 
Macclesfield manufacturers, as life at home returned to a more normal routine.  
Whilst there is no evidence that any of the escape and evasion maps were 
actually printed in Macclesfield, there is evidence that the Macclesfield silk 
manufacturers were involved in the finishing of the maps, i.e. hemming and folding.
144
  
The Board Minutes of the company Brocklehurst Whiston Amalgamated (BWA) for 
11
th
 July 1940 indicated that they had received an approach from Messrs Johnson & 
Company Ltd of Great Yarmouth asking for help in looking for premises suitable for 
making-up purposes since they ‘were under orders from the Ministry of Supply to 
evacuate their present premises’, presumably to avoid the Luftwaffe bombing raids over 
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East Anglia.
145
  It is clear that BWA did identify premises in nearby Congleton which 
representatives from the Johnson Company found suitable but no-one could persuade 
HM Office of Works, who had requisitioned the premises, to release them.   It should be 
noted that the Johnson Company was regularly used at that time by D. Survey to print 
standard operational mapping, so it could be that they were also involved in printing the 
escape and evasion maps, although no confirmatory evidence has been discovered.  
In addition to the continuing search for silk, it is clear that MI9 and its agent, the 
Ministry of Supply, was always looking for acceptable silk substitutes, since the priority 
for dwindling silk supplies was always parachute production.  Whilst they certainly 
made good use of American rayon technology, a man-made substitute for silk, once the 
USA had joined the Allies, they also utilised mulberry leaf pulp which could be 
manufactured into an extremely thin and near-noiseless paper which is variously 
referred to in the records as ‘ML’ (Mulberry Leaf) or more usually as ‘tissue’ or simply 
‘paper’. The pulp had been discovered by the Royal Navy on a Japanese ship 
immediately prior to Japan entering the war.  It proved to be a timely and valuable cargo 
which the ship’s Captain was persuaded to give up.146 
Conclusion 
The sheer numbers of maps produced in the escape and evasion map production 
programme bear testimony to the organisational drive in MI9 to ensure that the 
programme progressed, albeit apparently against all the odds.  An evaluation of the size 
and scope of this aspect of Britain’s war effort has, until now, not been undertaken.  
This research has revealed its extraordinary extent and thereby highlighted its very real 
significance in the overall history of both military map-making and World War II.  The 
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lack of D. Survey (formerly MI4)’s involvement until much later in the war produced 
unnecessary challenges.  It did not, however, appear to prevent MI9 progressing 
production: they simply carved their own path, although arguably at greater effort and 
cost.  The maps were produced in very substantial numbers.  It also becomes clear that 
at least some aspects of the map production programme progressed from the original 
idea of escape and evasion to embrace both the intelligence aspects of the war and also 
the operational aspects.  Whatever the tangential purposes, in terms of escape and 
evasion there remained for MI9 the not insignificant challenge of ensuring that the maps 
reached the prisoners of war in sufficient numbers and in a timely and appropriate 
fashion to ensure that they were of use, hopefully to facilitate successful escapes.  This 
aspect will be addressed in detail in Chapter 3.    
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Chapter 3 
Escape Aids and Communication with the Camps 
All my life, magicians, illusionists, escapologists in 
particular, have fascinated me. I expect it goes back 
to the night I tried to outwit Houdini. 
(Christopher Clayton Hutton).
147
 
 
The previous chapter set out the nature of the map production programme.  The extent 
of that programme, in terms of both variety and volume, is made clear in the individual 
map series inventories shown at Appendices 1-9.  It is now appropriate to examine in 
detail the very significant challenge of ensuring that prisoners of war, who were 
planning to escape, received the various escape aids and gadgetry which MI9 had 
contrived to have produced, not the least of which were the maps themselves.  After 
considering the British tradition and propensity for smuggling, and the national 
fascination with games and magic, the chapter explores the escape training afforded to 
Intelligence Officers, the concealment of escape aids in games and leisure equipment 
sent to prisoners, items secreted in books and records, and in Christmas crackers and 
pencils.  Thereafter, the means used to copy maps in the camps and the importance of 
conveying compasses to potential escapers are considered.  The development of 
emergency ration packs, purses of currency with maps and the modes of delivery of the 
escape aids, in their apparently harmless host packages, into the camps are reviewed.  
Finally, the level of organisation and planning of escapes in the camps is considered.  
Essentially the chapter seeks to demonstrate how MI9 was able to ensure that the escape 
aids, and especially the escape and evasion maps, were conveyed to the camps and 
contributed to the planning and execution of successful escapes.     
          Hutton needed to devise a fool-proof system to deliver the escape aids to 
recipients imprisoned in the camps and later confessed that he spent many sleepless 
                                                             
147
 Hutton.  Official Secret, p.9. 
91 
 
nights wrestling with this challenge.
148
  MI9 was acutely aware that most of the many 
thousands of men taken prisoner at Dunkirk had little or nothing by way of escape aids 
and devices and yet each of them was a potential escaper.  They reasoned that getting 
the aids through in small numbers was not what was required; they needed to devise 
methods which would allow a steady flow of thousands of aids and devices.  This was 
precisely what they attempted to do and it was here that the staff of MI9 were able, once 
again, to demonstrate their considerable ingenuity, resourcefulness and creativity.   
The art of smuggling and a fascination with magic 
Officers working within MI9 needed to devise methods by which the maps and other 
escape aids could be smuggled into the camps without being detected and it is 
fascinating to discover the extent to which Hutton and his colleagues resorted to the 
basic tenets of smuggling which, over the centuries, British smugglers had arguably 
developed into an art form.  With a coastline of some 15,000 kilometres in length, the 
United Kingdom’s borders are impossible to patrol in their entirety and, particularly in 
earlier times, determined groups have exhibited ingenious expertise in outsmarting the 
customs’ authorities.  There is a considerable history of contraband being smuggled into 
the country through hollowed out containers, seemingly of standard construction when 
viewed externally, or concealed beneath the false bottoms of seemingly standard 
containers.
149
  The significant characteristic of items designed to carry contraband goods 
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was hollowness and it was a lesson which Hutton quickly incorporated into his plans.  
What MI9 embarked on in 1940 was thus essentially a programme of large scale 
smuggling to ensure that the maps and other escape aids which they had caused to be 
produced would successfully reach the prisoners of war and thereby ensure that their 
planned escapes had the greatest possible chance of success. 
          Hutton confessed to his own childhood fascination with magic and the illusionary 
escapology tricks as practised by Harry Houdini, and the extent to which he had 
personally been involved in such an experience with Houdini, described previously in 
Chapter 1.
150
  In his personal reflections, Hutton provided a remarkable insight into his 
penchant for devising means to deceive the enemy.  Few men could have proved better 
suited to the task.  It was against this backdrop of his own fascination with smuggling 
and magic, that the programme to smuggle escape aids into the camps began to take 
shape.  
Role of the Training School at Highgate and the MI9 Bulletin 
It was part of the training which Intelligence Officers received at IS9, the training 
school in Highgate, that they were briefed on the types of escape aids which MI9 
devised.  A key tool of the training offered at the School was the Bulletin.  This was an 
extremely detailed volume compiled by MI9, and was essentially a textbook, designed 
for use by Intelligence Officers when instructing others and was likely regarded as the 
escapers’ handbook.  It was produced as an A5 size, loose-leaf manual for ease of 
updating through the regular issue of amendments issued in numerical sequence and 
each carrying the month and year of issue.  The overall security classification of the 
Bulletin was MOST SECRET.  The first entry was a short, true story about Winston 
Churchill’s experience of escaping in the Boer War and leaving behind  his escape aids 
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when he dropped over the wall: the moral of the story was emphasised ‘ALWAYS 
CARRY YOUR ESCAPE AIDS WITH YOU’.  The Bulletin comprised 23 chapters in 
all, with the first seven chapters covering such topics as security, escape and evasion, 
escape aids, international law, interrogation by the enemy, field-craft, and travel through 
Europe by rail. The subsequent chapters, each dedicated to a particular country or 
geographical region, provided a detailed description of the circumstances in each, 
recommended routes for escapes and detailed supporting maps.  There were tips on 
successful escape ruses, physical appearance (how to blend in) and recommended 
behaviour.
151
             
          It was in Chapter 2 of the Bulletin that all the various aids to escape were listed 
and described in detail, but it was in the individual country chapters where copies of the 
maps produced to support particular, recommended escape routes, were to be found.  It 
was in Chapter 15/Germany where Maps Nos. 4 and 5, Schaffhausen Salient (East) and 
(West), numbered A1 and A2 respectively, were to be found.  These maps are described 
in detail in Chapter 2 and Appendix 9, and their significance is further commented upon 
in Chapter 5.  The maps were accompanied by ground photographs of the border area 
showing detailed views of topographic features (streams and paths) and landmark 
features (telegraph posts).  These photographs may well have been those taken by 
Johnny Evans during his pre-war reconnaissance of his own successful escape route in 
World War I.  It was also in Chapter 15 of the Bulletin that a set of large scale plans of 
the Baltic ports was to be found.  These were detailed plans of Danzig/Plan No.1 
marked A3, Gdynia/Plan No. 2 marked A10, Stettin/Plan No.3 marked A11 and 
Lübeck/Plan No.4 with no additional sheet number marked.  None of the Baltic port 
plans was marked with a security classification.  This absence of any security marking 
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was notably unlike the 2 small scale maps of Norway Military Zones marked Map B 
covering southern Norway, and Northern Norway marked Map C, both dated March 
1943, which were both classified SECRET.  Details of all these maps can be found at 
Appendix 9 and the significance of the Baltic port plans is considered in Chapter 6.  
  Apparently operational aircrews were only allowed direct access to the Bulletin 
under the supervision of their Commanding Officer or the RAF Station’s Intelligence 
Officer.  They were not, however, under any circumstances allowed to make notes or 
copy items in the Bulletin: everything had to be memorised.  In the case of the maps, 
this must have been particularly challenging, not least since those being briefed had 
absolutely no idea of where they might find themselves in the event of capture.  
Notwithstanding the restrictions placed on its access and use, there is no doubt that the 
Bulletin contained the very best information and advice on escape and evasion known to 
MI9.  By autumn 1942, it was being updated by the issue of regular monthly 
amendments which also included intelligence information gleaned from the reports of 
the debriefing interviews to which all successful escapers were subjected.
152
    
  
          The Bulletin was indeed a veritable bible of escape and evasion, and contained 
everything that could be of assistance to Service personnel who found themselves cut 
off in enemy occupied territory or captured by the enemy.  It was devised as a textbook 
for all who were called on to give instruction on escape and evasion and its contents 
could change regularly and radically in the light of new information received from the 
field.
153
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The use of board games, sports equipment and other leisure items 
The maps were smuggled into the camps hidden inside all sorts of items such as games 
boards (Monopoly, Ludo, Snakes & Ladders, draughts), dart boards, cribbage, 
backgammon and chess sets, pencils, gramophone records, sports equipment such as 
table tennis sets and squash rackets.
154
  It has been suggested that cricket bats and balls 
were also sent into the camps, although no proof has so far been discovered that these 
also conveyed escape aids.  Certainly there exist some family history stories that 
companies such as Spalding were manufacturing cricket bats with hidden compartments 
inside which maps could be secreted.
155
  John Worsley was a war artist who had been 
captured and sent to the Marlag and Milag Nord camp constructed by the Germans 
south west of Sandbostel, some 40 kilometres north east of Bremen. One of his 
surviving water-colours depicts a cricket match in full flow.  Whilst it is difficult to 
make out the bat at all clearly, the stumps and wicket keeper, complete with pads, are 
very clear, providing evidence that cricket equipment was clearly sent to the prisoners 
of war.    Indeed, there are also mentions of cricket matches in some of the wartime 
reminiscences.
156
  There is, however, no indication in the extant records that the 
Spalding Company was ever involved in covert activity with MI9.
157
     
          Hutton tackled this very challenging part of his task with apparent alacrity.  The 
first company which he turned to was the Waddington Company of Wakefield Road, 
Leeds.  He was already in regular contact with the company, through the Ministry of 
                                                             
154 
TNA: AIR 20/6805, enclosure 9, p.5. 
155
 Donald Purr was the Export Sales Manager for A.G.Spalding & Bros during World 
War II.  His son recalls that, as a young child, he was told by his father that Spaldings 
had manufactured cricket bats with silk maps hidden in the handles and compasses in 
the top of the handles and these had been sent to prisoners of war. 
156
 James.  Escaper’s Progress.  The Remarkable POW Experiences of a Royal Naval 
Officer, p.29. 
157 
A list of the manufacturers involved in helping to produce escape aids for MI9 
appears at enclosure 4 (originally 8A) of TNA: AIR 20/6805.  It was produced after the 
war by Sqd. Ld. J. Whitehead (Ret) who had worked for MI9.  The list does not include 
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Supply, having established that they were rare, if not unique, in the commercial sector 
in being able to print on silk.  Since they were already printing maps on silk for MI9, it 
was but one further step to ascertain the extent to which they could help MI9 in the 
manufacture of the means to despatch the maps into the camps.   The fact that they were 
the principal agent in the UK to manufacture and distribute the English version of the 
popular US board game Monopoly was an undoubted gift to MI9.  Monopoly boards 
began to be manufactured with escape maps hidden inside them.  Those containing 
maps of Italy had a full stop after Marylebone Station and those containing maps of 
Norway, Sweden and Germany had a full stop after Mayfair.
158
  Additionally, boards 
were also produced containing maps of northern France, Germany and associated 
sections of the frontier: MI9 again insisted they carry some distinguishing mark and, in 
this case, it was a full stop after Free Parking.  The practice ensured that there was a 
ready means of differentiating which boards carried particular maps and this system of 
coding also ensured that the appropriate games were sent to prisoners of war in the 
appropriate geographical area.  Currency was, of course, also needed by those planning 
to escape and the Monopoly money provided an ideal hiding place for local currency.  
Waddington was also sent in March 1941 a selection of small metal instruments and 
asked if they could consider how best to secrete these in the Monopoly sets.  Such 
instruments comprised saws and compasses.   
 
          When Christopher C.L.Bowes, the Waddington company archivist, came to 
deposit a notable number of escape and evasion maps into the British Library collection 
in 1999, he wrote that one of the ways of smuggling maps to prisoners was to enclose 
them in a pack of cards.   
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          The map would be made from a material impervious to water and 
sandwiched between the back and the pip side of the cards by water 
soluble glue.  When dropped into a bucket of water the cards could 
come into three parts: front, back and the map.  Each segment of map 
was serially numbered (in orange on the cards that I have seen) and 
overlapped the next segment on all sides by about ¼ inch.  Each pack 
contained one map in 48 segments.  The four aces contained a small 
scale map of Europe and the Joker held the key or map legend.  To 
make up such a pack must have been fiendishly difficult because of the 
overlaps.  There are one or two specimens in the RAF Museum at 
Hendon (I think, though it might be Duxford).
159
  (see Illustration VIII )  
  
 
Illustration VIII: games box and playing cards 
 
 
          On 11
th
 May 1942 a letter was passed to the company from the Ministry of 
Supply with an order for 224 packs of playing cards, 24 packs of which were to be Prize 
Packs ‘on the formula we discussed’: this appears to relate to the type of packs 
described by Bowes.
160
  It is clear from ensuing correspondence that a considerable 
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increase in the cost of manufacturing such playing cards resulted, not least because of 
the need to ensure adequate overlaps between the cards.  The overlaps were deemed 
necessary to ensure the total map was covered and that no portion would be missing. 
Such increased cost was later queried as being ‘rather high’ and the statement was made 
that the requirement was deemed ‘not of sufficient importance to warrant 
expenditure’.161  This was a rare, possibly unique, indication that MI9 was alert to the 
costs of its endeavours. The cards which were produced were packed into individual 
packs and also packed in bridge sets.   
 
          The Per Ardua Libertas volume was produced by Hutton in February 1942.  It 
was a detailed photographic review of the range of work for which MI9 had been 
responsible during the first two years of its existence.  The volume was bound in red 
leather and was clearly a high quality presentation piece, possibly seeking to influence 
their sister organisation in the USA, MIS-X, the Americans having declared war on the 
Axis powers on 11
th
 December 1941.
162
  The volume showed a photographic record of 
the way in which the playing cards were produced.  It also contained photographs of 
various sizes of chess sets and confirms that maps were hidden inside them during 
manufacture.  Norman Watson of Waddington was able to provide Alston, his principal 
contact in the Ministry of Supply and intermediary with MI9, with details of three 
companies in London which marketed pocket chess sets, indicating that they were 
probably agents rather than actual manufacturers.  The companies were Thomas Salter, 
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Illustration IX: artwork of a chess set 
 
(Reproduced with the permission of the RAF Museum, Hendon.) 
 
Baileys and E. Lehman & Co.
163
  There is also separate confirmatory evidence, in the 
form of the original artwork held in the RAF Museum, that chess sets were produced 
with secret compartments inside the boards, within which maps could be hidden (see 
Illustration IX).     
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Books and records 
During the course of the war, Hutton needed continuously to generate new and 
ingenious ideas for hiding the maps and other aids, not least because the German camp 
guards did discover some of his early hiding places.  Hutton acknowledged that the 
majority of the hiding places were undiscovered for long periods of time but each, in 
turn, was eventually spotted by an alert guard and had to be replaced by a new host 
device.
164
  Once MI9 had been alerted to the discovery, they suspended distribution of 
the items until an alternative replaced it.    Initially, for example, Hutton had used books 
but, once they had been discovered as the repository of escape aids, he turned his 
attention to gramophone records, approaching John Wooler, Head of the Record 
Development Laboratory at EMI.  Hutton’s initial idea was apparently to conceal 
miniature compasses inside the records.  However, he rapidly discovered from Wooler 
that it was also possible to conceal maps and currency in the records.  Wooler pointed 
out to Hutton that when the Columbia and His Master’s Voice (HMV) record 
companies amalgamated in 1930, the two companies were using very different 
processes for record production.
165
  Essentially, HMV records were solid, whereas those 
produced by Columbia used a more economical method of Col Powder lamination.
166
  
The possibility of exploiting the lamination process was quickly realised since it 
allowed items to be hidden under the laminate in specially incorporated compartments.  
By adding extra layers it was possible to conceal up to four maps in each record or a 
combination of maps and currency (see Illustration X).  It is clear that Wooler did the 
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pressing of these special records himself at weekends when the usual press workers 
were not around.  Records were packed into boxes, each box containing five records.   
 
Illustration X: drawing to show layered construction of a gramophone record 
 
(Reproduced with the permission of the RAF Museum, Hendon.) 
 
One record contained a frontier map in two parts i.e. the map and the route.  Whilst not 
specified, the map is believed to be the Schaffhausen map, sheet Y (see details in 
Chapters 2 and 5, and Appendix 1).  Records survive of the despatch which took place 
on the 14
th
 May 1941 and it is clear that some of these boxes were destined for Oflag 
IVC, Colditz,  Stalag XXI D, Posen and Stalag Luft 111, Sagan.  Sagan can only be 
identified by four men whose names appear on the despatch list, namely Flight 
Lieutenants J.C. Breese and D.A.Ffrench-Mullen, Pilot Officer W.H.C. Hunkin and 
Squadron Leader W.H.N. Turner, and whose names also appear in the Sagan Camp 
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history as coded letter writers.
167
  Certainly it is the case that some of the individuals to 
which the records were despatched subsequently escaped successfully, for example 
Captain P.R.Reid from Oflag IVC, Colditz.  The timing of the despatch is also such that 
the hidden map might have helped in the escape from Colditz of Airey Neave. (Neave’ s 
escape is described in detail in Chapter 5).  Sagan was notable as the camp where the 
tunnels Tom, Dick and Harry were dug and through which (Harry) the Great Escape 
took place in March 1944.  Fifty of the recaptured British and Allied officers were 
notoriously executed by their German captors.    The location of the camps at Colditz, 
Posen and Sagan are all shown on the map of prisoner of war camps reproduced at 
Illustration XI. 
 
          A total of 1,300 gramophone records containing maps were produced and 
despatched.
168
  Hutton’s choice of the particular gramophone records to send was 
clearly subjected to the same careful consideration and reasoning which was the 
hallmark of all his work: he chose to send recordings of the works of Beethoven and 
Wagner, studiously avoiding the selection of any Jewish composers which would have 
been automatically confiscated by the German censors or guards.  Whilst the records 
were perfect in every aspect of manufacture and could be played, Hutton did see the 
irony of the fact that the prisoners of war had to break the records in order to access the 
concealed items and, employing a touch of black humour, he dubbed the whole 
enterprise ‘Operation Smash-Hit’.169 
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Illustration XI: map showing location of prisoner of war camps 
 
© UK MOD Crown Copyright, 2014 
 
Christmas crackers 
 It is clear that other members of MI9 came up with ideas for concealment of escape 
aids from time to time.  One ruse was apparently the brainchild of Jimmy Langley who 
had escaped from a German field hospital after Dunkirk, and successfully reached the 
UK after a lengthy journey through France and Spain.  He was largely responsible, 
together with Airey Neave, for running the European escape lines.  His idea was to hide 
maps, currency, compasses and dockyard passes inside Christmas crackers which were 
despatched in September 1943 in boxes as apparently innocuous seasonal treats from 
the Lancashire Penny Fund, one of the cover organisations, to arrive in the camps in 
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time for Christmas.
170
  The parcels were accompanied by an open letter to the Camp 
Commandant inviting them to share in this harmless Christmas cheer.  The prisoners of 
war had been alerted in coded letters beforehand which colour box was ‘good’ and 
which was ‘naughty’ to ensure that only the innocent crackers went to the German 
captors, although it was subsequently reported that the escape aids in some of the 
crackers were discovered by the Germans.  The matter was apparently regarded as 
serious enough for the Germans to report the matter as a breach of the Geneva 
Convention.  However, since the ‘contraband’ had not been sent under cover of the Red 
Cross, the referral apparently resulted in no action.
171
  
Toiletries and Pencils 
In October 1943, as part of a Hogmanay scheme, sticks of shaving soap were being sent 
in toilet parcels into 8 camps where there had previously been no contact with MI9.  
The sticks of soap contained maps, compasses, money and a message.
172
  It was 
successful in 4 of the 8 camps chosen.
173
               
           Pencils were also used as the secret conduit for the provision of maps.  Certainly 
at one stage the Cumbrian Pencil Company became involved in covert activity with 
MI9.  The company is mentioned in a post-war list of companies as being involved with 
MI9.
174
  The Pencil Museum in Cumbria also bears witness to the Company’s 
involvement with the examples in their collection of Derwent pencils appearing 
perfectly normal and usable but with a silk or tissue map rolled very tightly inside the 
pencil.  The Per Ardua Libertas volume also contains an illustration of maps being 
concealed in bridge marker pencils.  
                                                             
170
 TNA: WO 165/39, report dated September 1943; TNA: WO 208/3242, p.77. 
171
 TNA: AIR 20/6805, enclosure 9, p.5.  
172
 TNA: WO 208/3242, p.78. 
173
 TNA: AIR 20/6805, enclosure 9, p.5.  
174
 TNA: AIR 20/6805, enclosure 4 (originally 8A).  
105 
 
  
Reproduction of the escape and evasion maps in the camps 
It is clear that when the maps got through, they almost certainly needed to be copied in 
whole or in part.  A single map was of little use if there were multiple planned escapes, 
as there often were.   There are mentions in the literature of the need to copy maps, such 
as Airey Neave’s description that ‘less technical minds studied languages, copied maps 
and collected stolen articles of civilian clothing.’175  There are also indications that the 
prisoners of war were able to set up miniature printing works.  Wallis Heath, who had 
been an officer in the Royal Corps of Engineers, later recounted the story of how the 
prisoners of war in Oflag XI, Braunschweig, initially hand copied maps which they had 
received from MI9.  However, he and Philip Evans, a prisoner in the same camp, had 
experience of printing and so they decided to set themselves up as the Brunswick 
Printers.  They did so in the knowledge that the Allies were advancing and the camp 
apparently planned a mass escape as they feared German reprisals.  Showing 
considerable ingenuity, they were apparently able to create both the substitute artwork 
and printing plates they required.  They removed some limestone tiles from the toilet 
area and ground them clean to ensure the surface would be a suitable one to use as a 
lithographic stone in printing.  They traced the detail of the maps onto the tiles using 
carbon paper which, one can only assume, they had stolen or acquired through bribery 
from their German guards.  Separate reverse tracings were made for each colour on the 
map, black for text and railways, red for roads and blue for rivers.  These were to act as 
the individual printing plate for each layer of detail on the map.  They then went over 
the line-work with a fine pen dipped in boiled margarine.  In essence, they were using 
the lithographic principle that water and oil do not mix and utilising what was 
essentially the collotype method of reproduction.  Tiles were coated with gelatine, taken 
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from the tins of meat in Red Cross food parcels, to act as a sensitising agent.  Inks were 
made from all sorts of powders, sometimes even those intended as stage make-up.
176
  
Those elements of map detail drawn in the margarine retained the coloured ink.   They 
constructed a printing press from wooden floor boards covered in leather with a roller 
made from a window bar.  The tiles were used in turn to build up the map image.
177
 
Whilst the maps made by the Brunswick Printers were never apparently used as the 
Braunschweig Camp was liberated peacefully, there is some limited evidence that 
similar techniques were employed elsewhere and the resultant maps used successfully 
by escaping prisoners of war.  Certainly there are two maps in a collection in Scotland 
which appear to be crudely printed versions of escape and evasion maps, although their 
provenance cannot now be proved conclusively.  (For details and illustrations, please 
refer to Chapter 6). 
 
          When the individual camp histories came to be written at the end of the war, they 
often contained useful check lists of the sort of escape aids which were needed and 
found to be most useful.  Certainly, that for Stalag Luft III Sagan contained a very 
detailed chapter on the type of escape materials which had been needed.  Maps at 
varying scales were described, such as large scale port plans ‘showing location of quays 
used by neutral shipping’ and ‘maps of neutral frontiers’.  There was also mention of 
the need for a map tracer and enlarger.
178
  Interestingly, in the Colditz camp history, it is 
clear that the prisoners were able to steal such a machine, known as a pantograph, from 
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the canteen and put it to very good use, although it was not made clear why such a 
machine would be in the canteen in the first place.
179
  Use of the pantograph not only 
meant that maps could be traced and enlarged at the same time, but also that multiple 
copies could be produced through repeated use of the machine. 
   
Compasses, Purses and Escape Packs 
From the beginning Hutton had decided that compasses were as vital as maps to aid the 
escapers.  He designed them in a quite bewildering variety of forms.  Miniaturised, they 
were hidden in the buttons of RAF uniforms, both trousers and tunics.  When eventually 
the buttons were found by German guards to hide compasses, Hutton simply resorted to 
altering the screw direction by having them manufactured with a left, rather than right, 
hand thread which proved to be a simple but very effective change.
180
  In addition, 
Hutton arranged for almost anything made from metal to be magnetised, for example 
razors, hacksaws and pencil clips.  Together with maps, compasses were sometimes 
hidden in a small compartment inside the heel of an RAF flying boot so that any air 
crew who were shot down, and managed to evade capture, had at least a fighting chance 
of finding a route to escape successfully.  
          Purses with currency and maps were also provided for RAF flight crews.  They 
were essentially tobacco pouches but they were also used to hold maps (see Illustration 
XII).  This illustration of a purse and the map contents is an example of what was issued 
to RAF pilots over-flying occupied Europe.  This particular one was issued to Flight 
Lieutenant John H. Shelmerdine DFC who, for three years from April 1942 flew 
Spitfires out of RAF Benson in Oxfordshire on photographic reconnaissance flights 
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over Western Europe.
181
  The term Purse Maps was at one point coined as the generic 
term for all escape and evasion maps produced on fabric and tissue.  Some years ago, in 
the early 1980s, the Intelligence Corps Museum held a volume of escape and evasion 
maps entitled Purse Maps.  Sadly this was apparently lost in the move of the Museum 
from Ashford in Kent to Chicksands in Bedfordshire.   It was a large, black-bound folio 
of one hundred pages with ‘PURSE MAPS’ marked on the spine.  It contained maps on 
37 of the 100 pages, many of them double-sided and a few of which have never been 
found elsewhere in other collections.  The source of the folio in the collection at that 
time was clearly indicated as being MI9.   
Illustration XII: purse and folded maps 
 
(Reproduced with the permission of the owner.)   
          Purses were also produced containing town plans and addresses of British 
Consulates in Spain, although there is evidence that these were in fact photographic 
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plans which were subsequently considered to be undesirable for inclusion.  MI9 directed 
that they should be removed and destroyed as a new type of purse was to be made 
available and the older ones were to be withdrawn and returned to MI9.
182
  
 
          It was Johnny Evans who, with the benefit of his escape experience in World War 
I, had long advocated to Hutton the need for some form of food-pack or emergency 
ration box to sustain the evader.  Based on his own experience in World War I, Evans 
assured Hutton that ‘the escaper’s greatest enemy is hunger.  When a man is starving, he 
very soon becomes reckless and insensitive.’183  In fairly typical fashion, Hutton 
initially decided against involving the Quartermaster’s department in whose field of 
responsibility this would fall, but rather went directly to commercial companies who 
had proved to be so helpful and supportive thus far in MI9’s covert work.  He felt that 
the standard fifty cigarette tin was ideal in size and shape as it would fit into the breast 
pocket of an RAF flyer’s uniform and also into the map pocket of battle-dress trousers.  
He acquired these cigarette tins in large numbers from the Wills cigarette factory in 
Bristol, having personally approached the company Directors to seek their cooperation.  
After experimenting and listening to the experiences of former escapers such as Evans, 
Hutton apparently decided that each pack should contain malted milk sweets (provided 
by Horlicks), chewing gum, a bar of peanut blended food, water purifying tablets, a 
rubber bottle for water, a small saw, a bar of chocolate, Benzedrine tablets (for the 
purpose of keeping escapers awake at critical times), matches, a compass, thread, tape 
and two tissue maps (one of Germany and one of northern France).
184
  This escape pack 
became standard issue for RAF crews over-flying occupied Europe.  Later, after the 
Chairman of Halex, the toothbrush manufacturers, had been persuaded to help, a new 
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case was manufactured in plastic.  This plastic case had three advantages over the 
cigarette tin: it was waterproof and transparent, it had a compass built into the screw top 
and it could be moulded to better fit the human frame, proving less obtrusive and rather 
more comfortable than its predecessor.
185
  Indeed, the escape pack became very popular.  
It was later modified further to avoid the inclusion of a rubber bottle, rubber having 
become scarce, whereby it was made in one piece of plastic with a screw top to serve as 
a water bottle in its own right.  Despite preferring to avoid the ‘pettyfogging 
bureaucrats’ in the Ministry of Supply, Hutton found that he had to deal with them since 
he needed food supplies to ensure the efficacy of the escape packs.  He had a number of 
brushes with them but largely succeeded in acquiring supplies of everything needed for 
inclusion in the escape packs.
186
  
 
          As with some of the maps, after the war ended, the Ministry of Supply sold off 
some of the surplus escape packs.  It is clear that some of these were purchased by an 
enterprising individual who subsequently advertised them for sale as ‘Holiday 
Accessories for Campers’ at the not inconsiderable price at the time of 11/- (shillings), 
the equivalent of £13-64 in present day terms.
187
  
 
Delivery and Communication 
Given the volume and diversity of escape aids being manufactured for MI9, there was a 
pressing need to develop a reliable system of delivery.  They had to smuggle the items 
into the camps without arousing the suspicions of the enemy.    There were two existing 
supply channels, both provided for under the Geneva Convention, namely Red Cross 
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parcels and monthly parcels sent by family and friends.   MI9’s system had to be 
different and separate to ensure that neither of these two existing channels was ever 
compromised.  Such compromise would have inevitably resulted in the withdrawal of 
the privileges and MI9 was already only too aware of the extent to which some of the 
camps were dependent on Red Cross food parcels as a veritable lifeline since camp 
rations were often extremely thin.  In response, therefore, distinct but entirely fictitious 
cover organisations were set up, amongst which were the Prisoners’ Leisure Hour Fund, 
‘a voluntary Fund for the purpose of sending Comforts, Games, Books etc to British 
Prisoners of War’, the previously mentioned Lancashire Penny Fund, and the Licensed 
Victuallers’ Sports Association.  The War Diary entry for August 1941 noted: 
This month has marked an important step forward in the parcel side of 
our work.  In March, April and May large numbers of parcels containing 
escape material as well as clothing of all kinds were sent to prisoners 
under the auspices of “The Prisoners Leisure Hour Fund”.  Considerable 
anxiety was felt as to whether the Enemy would swallow this Fund and it 
has been most gratifying for us to receive during this month no fewer 
than 63 acknowledgements of parcels despatched under its name.
188
 
 
These organisations had properly headed notepaper and apparently real, but entirely 
fictitious, addresses in London.  The notepaper for the Prisoners’ Leisure Hour Fund 
was particularly notable; not only did it contain details of the company’s officers and 
non-executive Board members, but it also carried an apparent quotation from Runyan 
(sic) ‘the treasures to be found in idle hours – only those who seek may find’, clearly an 
allusion to what was contained in the parcels and an apparent play on the work of John 
Bunyan and the notion of pilgrimage.  It provided yet another example of the black 
humour which sometimes characterised MI9’s covert work (see Illustration XIII).  
There were many more of these cover organisations carrying such titles as the Authors’ 
Society, Browns Sports Shop, Jig Saw Puzzle Club, League of Helpers, The Old Ladies 
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Knitting Committee, The Empire Service League, League of Helpers, Crown and 
Anchor Mission and others with similarly innocuous titles.
189
  
                                                              
Illustration XIII: headed notepaper of one of MI9’s cover organisations 
 
 
          MI9 was keen to test the extent to which parcels were getting through 
successfully to the prisoners in the camps and, therefore, inserted special cards 
requesting that the Camp Commandants allow the prisoners of war to acknowledge 
receipt, thus saving the prisoners one of their weekly letters.  The Germans proved to be 
very helpful in allowing the prisoners to send back their signed receipts.  To afford as 
much cover as possible to  the ‘naughty’ parcels,  MI9 also sent in ‘good’ parcels 
containing much needed winter clothing, jumpers, socks, vests and the like.  The 
receipts clearly indicated what had been received and were franked with the Oflag 
stamp from which they had come.  A number of the extant examples show clearly the 
stamp of Oflag IVC, namely Colditz  (see Illustration XIV).     
                                                             
189
 TNA: AIR 20/6805, enclosure 9, p.4.  
113 
 
 
                  Illustration XIV: receipt showing Oflag IVC despatch stamp 
    
   
          In his wartime memoirs written many years after the war, Lieutenant John Pryor 
RN, mentioned his receipt of a ‘naughty’ parcel, how he had been alerted to its 
imminent arrival in the Marlag camp through a coded message in a letter from his 
(unknown) Auntie Florrie, how they were able to intercept the parcel in the parcel room 
and what it contained, in his case a chess set.  When the chessboard was split open, it 
was found to contain German currency, hacksaw blades, copies of a German Ausweise 
(work and travel pass or permit) and examples of letters of introduction.
190
  John 
(Johnny) Pryor was apparently the best forger of documents in that particular camp.
191
  
In his memoirs Pryor also recalled enough about the title of the organisation for it to be 
identified as part of this research as the Licensed Victuallers’ Sports Association.  There 
is no doubt that the Germans did find some of the escape aids and the prisoners did try 
to alert MI9 to any mishaps.  In the coded letter dated 14
th
 February 1943 from John 
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Pryor, the hidden message was ‘German found content of games parcel for Franklin. 
Milag.’192  Franklin would have been the name of the recipient and MI9 would know 
what the parcel contained and, therefore, which method of hiding the escape aids had 
been compromised.  Such a warning would have ensured that that particular method 
would not have been used again and no further parcels would have been despatched to 
Franklin.  It has already been noted in Chapter 1 that the Germans were aware of at least 
some of the Escape and Evasion maps, through discovering them in clandestine parcels, 
and the extent to which escape was regarded as a duty by the British officers and 
men.
193
   
           
          The men in Stalag Luft III Sagan regarded the most secure method of concealing 
escape aids to be ‘in games parcels, especially in poker chips, shove ha’penny boards 
and dartboards, chess sets etc.  A first rate carpentry job of this kind could not be 
detected unless the article was destroyed completely.’194  Apparently every method of 
concealment was successful at one time or another: the German censors tended to 
concentrate on one category for a period, as their suspicions were aroused, and then 
turned their attention to another category, i.e. all gramophone records would be 
searched before they moved on to search all items in another category.  After the winter 
of 1942, all gramophone records which arrived in Sagan were apparently sent to Berlin 
to be x-rayed and 20% were found to contain escape aids.  No records were allowed in 
the camp thereafter until the Senior British Officer (SBO) eventually persuaded the 
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Camp Commandant to allow the German Medical officer to x-ray them, presumably as 
he knew that they were ‘clean’ by that time.195    
 
          Certainly in the Sagan camp, all parcels arrived at the local railway station and 
the post office.  They were collected by prisoners of war supervised by German guards 
and parcel censorship staff.  Red Cross parcels were stored in one store and all other 
parcels were placed in a separate store where they were sorted by the prisoners of war 
who had been briefed by their Escape Committee, as a result of coded messages from 
MI9, on which parcels to select and remove.  Cigarette and tobacco parcels were usually 
not checked by the Germans, as together with Red Cross parcels, they were regarded as 
above suspicion.  The selected parcels were often, therefore, secreted into the sacks of 
the cigarette and tobacco parcels in order to smuggle them into the compounds.  Games 
parcels were often subsequently smuggled back into the store, once the aids had been 
extracted, so that suspicion would not be aroused.   
  
          MI9 was in direct communication with the camps from the very earliest months 
of its operation.  Initially, the only means of communication with the prisoners of war 
was through coded letter traffic.  By 1942, this coded communication had developed 
markedly with messages being distributed more widely.  As a result, escape equipment 
was being sent in increasing volume into the camps.  By Christmas 1942, MI9 was 
feeling bold enough to send the first bulk parcel containing only escape material into 
Oflag IVC Colditz.
196
  They were advised by a successful escaper from Colditz, likely 
to have been Airey Neave, who had returned to the UK earlier that year, that they 
should send advance notification to the camp so that the store room could be broken 
into and the parcel’s contents extracted.  The plan worked successfully and the plan was 
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implemented with other camps.  Some 70% of these bulk parcels subsequently 
successfully reached the camps and the men for whom they were intended.  This 
considerably eased the problem of continuously searching for new ideas to conceal the 
escape aids.  By August 1943, large quantities of escape aids were arriving in the 
camps, including material as bulky as cameras, typewriters and wireless sets.  The 
wireless sets allowed far more immediate contact with the camps.
197
  
 
           The degree of contact with the camps varied enormously.  Stalag VIIA 
Moosburg, for example, did not apparently receive very much by way of escape aids.  
This camp was located some 29 miles NE of Munich and by 1944 there were in excess 
of 10,500 British prisoners of war in the camp.  After the war, one of the liberated 
prisoners reported that the only escape aids they had received were contained ‘in some 
gramophone records’ which arrived in July 1942 and no further parcels were received 
for the duration of the war.
198
  This clearly indicates that delivery was patchy to some of 
the camps.    
 
          The methods of communication, especially the coded letter traffic, between MI9 
and the camps, played a very significant part in the whole story of the escape and 
evasion mapping programme and are, therefore, addressed in detail in the following 
chapter.   
 
Camp organisation 
Given the considerable level of organisation, planning and activity which characterised 
the work of MI9 to support the objective of successful escape, it arguably comes as no 
surprise to discover that this was matched by a similar level of organisation and activity 
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in the camps.  Each camp sought to create its own Escape Committee, headed by the 
Senior British Officer (SBO), or the Senior American Officer (SAO) in camps where 
the two nationalities were mixed.  All escape plans had to be authorised and overseen 
by this Committee.  Whilst the organisation, of necessity, was rather more loose than 
that of any operational battalion or squadron, organised it most certainly was, albeit in a 
very unobtrusive way.
199
  In the Milag and Marlag Nord camp, the Escape Committee 
had a system of ‘patents’; all schemes were registered with the Committee and each 
person was allowed the first attempt with their own idea.
200
  The Escape Committees 
directed and supervised all activity in support of any plan it authorised, including the 
provision of the requisite escape aids.  The aids provided by MI9 were carefully 
allocated, plans were monitored, and all supporting activity, such as the provision of 
civilian clothes, the forgery of local papers required for travel or the copying of maps, 
was overseen by the Committee.   
 
          It is likely that MI9 was helped in its attempts to hoodwink the Germans by the 
age, physical condition and life-style of the guards.  Many of them were elderly and 
certainly not fit enough for operational action on the front lines.  Their own life style 
was far from comfortable, with the result that many were easily bribed.  In some camps 
it is clear that the black market was extensive and the Germans were very corrupt, ‘there 
being nothing that could not be obtained at a price for either money or cigarettes.’201  
Whilst some of the ruses and methods employed by MI9 were discovered and they had 
to keep coming up with new ones, it is clear that the sheer volume of activity by MI9 in 
keeping up the flow of escape aids helped to support many successful escapes. 
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          Those prisoners who had particular expertise from their civilian employment 
were given support work which maximised the value of their contribution.  It has 
already been noted that prisoners in the Brunswick camp were able to create a crude, but 
very effective, print works to re-produce maps.  John Pryor, whose personal story will 
be recounted in more detail in Chapter 6, was regarded (as already mentioned) as the 
master forger in Milag and Marlag Nord Camp.  His son recalls that his copperplate 
handwriting could look as if it had been typeset.  Clearly an innate talent was put to 
good use during his captivity in producing forged passes for potential escapers, an 
artistic talent which he subsequently employed to good effect as a hydrographic 
surveyor when he returned to active duty after the war.  Those who had been tailors 
were employed to make the civilian clothes; those with any kind of technical, or even 
criminal, bent were able to pick locks, make keys or even steal items which were 
needed.  The men had sufficient leisure time to scrounge or steal from, or bribe their 
captors; any bribery was usually done with cigarettes. 
 
          It was usual, though by no means consistently done, for those planning to escape 
to be employed on map copying, as this afforded them the opportunity to learn the 
geography of the terrain over which they planned to travel.  There is, however, little 
mention in the subsequent escape reports of the maps, which appears to reinforce Foot’s 
comments that all who were issued with escape maps were briefed never to mention 
them: it is clear that few did.
202
  There is evidence that in some of the camps, roster 
systems and timetables were organised so that, as some of the men were deployed 
copying maps or producing forged documents, for example, others were deployed to act 
as look-outs and give warning of the approach of any of the German guards.
203
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         It is clear that there was a level of organisation in many of the camps which 
allowed the escape activities to proceed relatively unencumbered.  The infrastructure 
that was created allowed many of the escape plans to proceed to a successful outcome.  
It was very important in the greater scheme of things that the camp organisations were 
effective in realising the benefits of MI9’s detailed work in support of escape activity. 
   
Passage and volume of parcels into the camps  
MI9 certainly kept detailed records of the despatch of parcels to the camps.  Almost 
certainly this would have been in the form of a card index noting the contents of the 
individual parcels, to which camps they were despatched, when and what 
acknowledgements were received.  Although this record does not appear to have 
survived, it is possible to track the volume of the parcels despatched through the 
monthly entries in the War Diary.  For example, the entry for August 1941 indicated 
that 497 had been despatched up to that point, of which 78 had been acknowledged.  An 
additional 193 clothes parcels i.e. straight parcels, had also been despatched, of which 
33 had been acknowledged.  By July 1943, almost 400 parcels were despatched in a 
single month to camps in Germany and Italy and one of the parcels sent to Germany 
consisted entirely of escape aids.
204
  No evidence has been found to support the 
hypothesis that the Germans had an equivalent organisation and there appears to be no 
indication that there was any similar traffic passing in the opposite direction, although it 
is not possible to make an unequivocal statement to this effect.   
 
Conclusion 
The story which emerges from this chapter is one of breath-taking ingenuity and 
inventiveness engendered by necessity, initially by MI9, but the more so by the 
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prisoners of war themselves.  Having embarked on a programme to produce escape and 
evasion maps in an appropriate form and in sufficient numbers to ensure that the escape 
philosophy was enacted in reality, MI9 sought to ensure that those maps reached the 
camps in prompt and effective ways.  Escape, whether ultimately successful or not, took 
a great deal of planning both at home and in the camps, and MI9 showed their acute 
awareness of this and the extent to which the maps were a key part of successful escape.  
It is also clear that the prisoners of war showed admirable courage and indefatigability, 
apparently accepting and actively responding to the philosophy of war that it was each 
man’s duty to attempt to escape.  The Escape Committees must have been re-assured in 
their commitment and endeavours when they saw the extent to which MI9 was seeking 
to support them.  When they asked for items, MI9 did their best to respond.  The 
escapes from the camps were always a team effort and for every man that made it home 
successfully, there was a support team left behind in the camps. Similarly, at home, 
there was a very real sense of teamwork and cooperation as commercial companies in 
the UK contributed both materially and in terms of their expertise to the whole escape 
and evasion enterprise which MI9 had created and fostered.  It is certainly the case that 
the reality of what was done has proved to be decidedly more astonishing and 
impressive than that conveyed by any work of fiction.   
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Chapter 4 
Coded Correspondence 
‘Cryptography concerns communications that are deliberately designed to keep secrets 
from an enemy.’  (Simon Singh).205 
 
It is clear from the previous chapter that it was critical to the success of getting the maps 
and other escape aids into the camps, in order to assist the prisoners of war in planning 
and executing their escape, that regular contact with the prisoners of war was 
established and maintained by MI9.  Under the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war 
were allowed to receive up to two letters and four cards monthly.
206
  MI9 took full 
advantage of this aspect of the Convention by establishing a system of coded letter 
exchanges with the camps.  This was certainly the principal method of contact before 
wireless sets were smuggled into the camps. As this research into the detailed character 
and scope of the escape and evasion mapping programme has progressed and especially 
as a result of the successful deciphering of a cache of John Pryor’s coded letters, the 
sheer volume and real significance of the coded letter traffic has begun to emerge.
207
  It 
has become very clear that coded letters constituted a vital means for gathering 
intelligence from the prisoners of war and a channel through which they, in turn, could 
send their requests for escape and evasion maps of particular areas.  The evidence 
assembled has thus substantially reinforced the assertion regarding the significance of 
the coded letters which was highlighted in the author’s discussion with Professor 
M.R.D. Foot.
208
  There can now be no doubt that coded letters were indeed a key part of 
the system which ensured that maps and other escape aids reached the camps in a timely 
fashion to aid the escapers in their attempts to return home.   
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          The letters allowed the potential escapers to indicate precisely what they needed 
to support their escape plans and, in turn, alerted them not only to the nature of the 
parcel being sent but also to the particular markings it would carry.  The coded letters 
were of crucial significance to the way in which MI9 was able to ensure that 
information on the escape aids, not the least of which were the maps, was 
communicated with the camps.  Requests for, and the despatch of, items to aid the 
escapes which the prisoners were planning, were made through this important and 
covert channel of communication.  Discovering how it worked, why and just what it 
owed to the sheer ingenuity and commitment of both MI9 and the prisoners of war 
themselves, as this chapter will show, provides another key part of the whole story of 
the escape and evasion mapping programme. 
 
Background history of the use of codes
209
 
In his fascinating book on the history of code use, Simon Singh highlights the 
importance of effective coded communication through history by monarchs and 
generals in governing their countries or commanding their armies and the fact that it 
was the threat of enemy interception of critical messages which was the catalyst in the 
development of codes and ciphers.
210
  Singh, in particular, describes how the practice of 
utilising codes has often had a dramatic impact on the course of history.  How different, 
for example, might British history have been had Mary, Queen of Scots, not engaged in 
treasonable activity and incriminated herself through coded letters.  The letters were 
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intercepted and successfully deciphered by Queen Elizabeth I’s Principal Secretary, Sir 
Francis Walsingham, generally acknowledged as the founder of Britain’s Secret  
Intelligence Service.
211
  The Babbington letters did, however, use an elaborate and very 
obviously enciphered text, and it was from Tudor times onwards that the art of 
enciphering and coding grew inexorably.    
 
          The system which MI9 elected to pursue was, of necessity, rather different to the 
obvious encipher approach which would never have made it past the German censors.  
MI9 chose rather to develop a system of constructing letters which did not arouse 
suspicion as they appeared quite innocuous, but contained a hidden message. This was a 
distinctly alternative way of employing cipher alphabets.  In essence, it did not matter if 
the general encryption method, or algorithm, became known; rather it was the specific 
key which identified the particular encryption which needed to remain secret.  Even if 
the encoded message or cipher text was intercepted by the enemy, it could only be 
deciphered if the key was known.  This was exemplified exactly in the deciphering of 
John Pryor’s letters.  The general encryption method which MI9 employed has, of 
course, been known for some time since it had been publicised originally by Green and 
later by Foot and Langley.
212
  The key comprised two Arabic numbers and an alphabet 
letter.  In Green’s case this was 5 6 O.213  However, Pryor’s individual key was not 
known and had to be identified.  The numerical parts of his code were discovered early 
in the research as he had recalled it correctly, as it later transpired, in his memoirs as 5 
4, but the alphabet letter was unknown.  The discovery of the key was achieved by a 
lengthy process of elimination, testing each letter of the alphabet until a word which 
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made sense was deciphered.  This proved to be the letter S.
214
  A full consideration of 
the construction of the code used in the letters is made later in this chapter. 
 
Selection and training of the code users and development of the codes  
It is not, perhaps, surprising to discover that coded correspondence between MI9 and 
the camps played such a key role in the escape and evasion mapping programme.  It is 
worth recalling that one of the intelligence organisations pushing hard for the creation 
of MI9 in 1939 was MI1.  MI1 was, in fact, the Military Intelligence Code and Cipher 
School which subsequently morphed into the Government Communications 
Headquarters, more generally known as GCHQ.  It is, therefore, quite likely that MI9 
staff also worked with MI1 in the development of the coded communication with the 
camps, although no confirmation of this likely connection has been discovered to date.       
  
          With the fall of  France in June 1940, barely six months after the creation of the 
Branch, MI9 knew that over 50,000 Army personnel, in particular, were in captivity and 
very few of them  had been briefed on any aspect of escape and evasion, and none had 
been briefed on coded correspondence.  Indeed, at that stage they knew of only three 
prisoners of war who were code users, two in the Royal Air Force and one in the Royal 
Navy.  They very quickly alerted the censors to the need to try to identify any letters 
from prisoners of war which they ‘suspected of secondary meaning or of containing a 
private means of communication.’215  Through this means they were able to identify a 
few private codes which some individuals had had the foresight to establish with their 
families prior to deployment.  MI9 contacted these individuals, initially using the 
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private codes they had set up.  By early 1941, MI9 was in contact with men who had 
been briefed on the coded system prior to deployment and who were in turn briefing 
others in the Oflags into the system.  The big challenge was then to establish contact 
with the Stalags.  They managed this through padres, doctors and dentists who had the 
opportunity to minister to the needs of the Other Ranks (ORs) in the Stalags and could 
identify those most likely to be able to pick up the coded system and use it.  They then 
briefed these men and slowly the system was spread through the camps.  During 1941 
the work grew to such an extent that a dedicated section had to be formed to cope with 
the increasing volume of coded letters being sent and received.  The new section, 
Section Y, was formed in January 1942 and was attached to the training school in 
Highgate.
216
  From these small beginnings, the coded system of contact with the camps 
grew and developed apace.        
 
          Potential coded letter writers were initially selected by the MI9 lecturers and 
trainers from officers who attended the training courses at the Highgate School or who 
they met during their lecturing visits to the various RAF camps and operational Army 
units.  MI9 was on the look-out for men who appeared bright, responsible and discreet.  
These individuals were taken aside at the end of the lecture or training course and taught 
a simple code so that, if captured, they could conceal a coded message in an apparently 
routine letter to their family.
217
  Before the selected individuals were authorised as code 
users, they were required to do practice exercises to ensure that they were proficient 
enough with the system of encoding. 
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          From very early in 1940, the staff of MI9 were involved in devising codes.  By 
April of that year, Lieutenant Commander Rhodes and Flight Lieutenant Evans were 
spending a great deal of their time in trying to perfect a suitable code.  Initially known 
as the H.K. code, it had been suggested by Mr Hooker in the Foreign Office and was 
regarded by MI9 as the best idea put forward for a straight-forward and simple code.
218
  
The code was taught to the selected RAF and Army personnel.  It was imperative that a 
detailed record of those briefed in the code was kept and that their families were also 
subsequently briefed, should their sons be unfortunate enough to be captured: as with all 
MI9’s records, these were held on a detailed card index.219   
           
          By September 1940 coded letters were being exchanged with men in prisoner of 
war camps in Germany and, at home, a scheme had been started to ensure that contact 
was maintained with the close family of any code-user who had been captured.  Local 
intermediaries were established on a regional basis and families were regularly briefed.  
MI9 was determined that their relationship with the families should be personal rather 
than being perceived as formal and official. The War Diary entry for August 1941 
mentions the ‘good relations and close co-operation’ which had been established with 
the relatives and the extent to which it was increasing.
220
  Relatives clearly appreciated 
this and were known to have expressed their thanks to the War Office, indicating how 
they valued ‘the War Office keeping in touch with them in a personal way’ and not just 
behaving as an ‘official machine’.221  It must have been some consolation to the families 
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to know that their sons were still doing their duty and continuing to contribute to the 
war effort whilst remaining in captivity.   
 
          The system of codes steadily developed and related research work is regularly 
mentioned in the War Diary, although no detail about the construction of the codes and 
methods of encryption and deciphering was ever disclosed in the monthly reports.  That 
detail was, however, included in other reports produced at the time and it is clear that 
work continued throughout the war on the development of the codes.  There were 11 
codes developed in all, some being retained for very specific use.
222
  Codes I, II, III and 
VI were apparently developed for use in general correspondence with the camps.  Code 
III was being developed during early 1942 and this was in use in some of the camps 
later that year.  Although regarded as an effective code, it apparently limited the length 
of the message when compared with Code II and the code users appeared to be more 
prone to making errors in their messages.  Whilst it had proved relatively easy to spot 
errors with Code II, it proved to be far more difficult to spot errors with Code III.  By 
April 1942, the development of Code VI had progressed and was being taught to 
potential code users.  Code V was specifically developed for use in Oflag IVC, Colditz.  
This code was established within the camp by communicating its detail through code 
users there who were already using Code II.  The first message using the new code was 
received from Colditz in October 1942: it had been correctly encoded in every respect.  
Code IV was given to MIS-X for their use.  After the USA entered the war, MI9 had 
advised particular code users to brief selected US prisoners of war in the Oflags, in 
anticipation of them being ultimately segregated.  Code VII was used in the Middle East 
and Code VIII was retained for special operations, in particular those being organised 
                                                             
222 
TNA: WO 208/3242, Enclosure I, p.84. 
128 
 
by SOE (the Special Operations Executive).  Codes IX, X and XI were apparently 
developed but had never been used by the time the war ended.
223
      
 
The coded letter writers and their role 
Coded messages contained three different and important types of information, namely 
intelligence, the state of morale in the camps, and of most relevance in terms of this 
research, planned escapes.  The extent of the role played by the coded letters which 
passed between MI9 and its team of covert correspondents in the prisoner of war camps 
in terms of the intelligence which was actively sought and supplied is, perhaps, one of 
the more surprising aspects to emerge in the course of this research and one which 
appears previously to have been largely unacknowledged by historians.  Certainly Julius 
Green’s book describing his World War II experience revealed the extent of his own 
involvement in responding to MI9’s requests for current intelligence information.224  By 
1941 Green was in the camp at Sandbostel, close to Bremen, and coincidentally the 
camp in which John Pryor was held at the same time.  Green received a letter dated 11
th
 
February 1943, purporting to be from Philippa, possibly his sister, and ostensibly 
chatting about the mundane matters of the family’s general health, especially that of 
‘Aunt Eleanor’ and ‘Daddy’.  He was asked in the coded request: ‘we know of two large 
oil plants which we call Blechammer North and South are either or both partly working 
or completed is there a third plant making aviation petrol near Heyderbreck’.  Green 
replied on 24
th
 March 1943 in a letter to his ‘Dear Dad’ which appeared to talk about 
war bonds and investments and which he signed ‘Your affect. son Julie’, his familial 
nickname. However, Green had managed to encrypt within his letter the response 
‘Blechammers making from 6 to 9 thousand qts oil daily I’ve access to plant’.225  Green 
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was in the privileged position as a dentist of being in that elite group of prisoners of war 
who were allowed under the Geneva Convention rather more freedom of movement 
than most prisoners of war.
226
  Doctors and padres also belonged to this group and it is 
known that MI9 maximised the opportunities presented.  In Green’s case he felt on 
occasion overwhelmed by the amount of potentially valuable information he was able to 
acquire, commenting ‘so much information was pouring in to me now that I could not 
possibly encode it all.’227  Part of what he saw was evidence of the extermination 
programme of his fellow Jews which he described in his book in hauntingly moving 
terms: 
Once, on the way to visit the main camp at Lamsdorf, my guard and 
I had to change trains.  In a siding we saw a train of closed trucks 
from which an intolerable stench issued ... we walked back with the 
moaning and whimpering from the trucks in our ears …  The trucks 
contained Hungarian Jews who were being transferred to an 
extermination camp for ‘processing’.  The sound has never left me 
and I still hear it.
228
 
 
It is not known whether Green ever reported this experience to MI9 or whether any 
action about the concentration camps was ever taken prior to liberation but it is clear 
that their existence was known to some of the prisoners of war.       
 
          Similarly, John Pryor, a captured naval lieutenant and a prisoner of war, was also 
providing intelligence which would clearly be of considerable assistance to the RAF for 
targeting purposes.
229
  In a letter he sent to his parents in December 1942, which at face 
value was describing the gardening activities in the camp and the Christmas parcels 
which had been received from the Red Cross, he encrypted the message ‘Large 
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munition dumps just south of new bridge at Narkau on new Berlin-Marienburg road’ for 
MI9.
230 
 Since all Pryor’s received correspondence was lost during his repatriation in 
1945, there was initially no indication that he was responding to a received request or 
simply providing acquired intelligence.  However, it subsequently emerged that he was, 
in effect (just like Julius Green), responding to requests for information.
231 
  
 
          Evidence was also found, as part of this current research, of the second aspect of 
the coded letter traffic, namely the extent to which it afforded MI9 the ability to assess 
the morale of prisoners of war in the many camps with which they were able to 
establish and maintain contact.  In March 1941 Pryor had written a letter to his parents 
mentioning the vegetable garden, receipt of parcels and a letter from home.  In it he had 
managed to encrypt the coded message ‘owing supposed condition prisoners canada we 
may suffer here urgent inquiries necessary.’  These words conveyed information that 
there were fears amongst the prisoners who apparently expected the German guards 
would take retaliatory action over the reported mis-treatment of German prisoners of 
war being held in Canada.   
 
Decoding of request for escape aids 
The principal interest of the coded traffic, however, in so far as it is relevant to this 
research, is to demonstrate the way in which it reflected the importance of the contact in 
requesting and providing the wherewithal to assist planned escapes.  In a letter sent in 
May 1942 to his parents, which at face value purported to talk about the books he 
wanted and the extent to which the camp gardens were improving, Pryor managed to 
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encrypt the following message: ‘clothing and local maps obtained require some of 
borders especially swiss pasport information and renten marks’.  Despite the spelling 
mistake in ‘passport’, it was unmistakeably a request for assistance to support an 
escape.  Since this letter was the first to be decoded as part of the current research 
project, it provides an ideal example of the methodology employed to uncover the 
hidden message: this is shown later in this chapter at figures 1 and 2, pages 146 and 
147.  The precise response to this message is unknown.  However, it is known from 
Pryor’s own memoirs written in his later life that he did receive early in 1943 a letter 
alerting him to expect a parcel from the ‘London Victuallers’ Company’ (almost 
certainly the Licensed Victuallers Sports Association, a known cover organisation for 
MI9 which was referred to in Chapter 3). He recounted in some detail how he was then 
detailed by the Escape Committee to be present in the Post Room to ensure that the 
parcel was not opened by the German censors, but was appropriated by the prisoners of 
war and carefully whisked away to be hidden until it could be opened and explored in 
more secure surroundings.  He continued by describing the chess set he found inside the 
parcel and the subsequent splitting open of the chessboard to reveal its hidden contents, 
namely German currency, hacksaw blades, copies of German passes and letters of 
introduction.  The items were handed over to the Escape Committee.  There is no 
indication as to whether he received a response to his request for maps of the Swiss 
border; however, it is more than likely that he did, since the Swiss border was certainly 
an escape route recommended by MI9.  Interestingly, when it came to Pryor’s own 
escape (described in detail in Chapter 6), the route he attempted was not across the 
Swiss border but via the Baltic ports which were located geographically very much 
closer to the Marlag and Milag Camp.  
  
132 
 
          There is also evidence contained in a letter received by Lieutenant F.C.Hamel of 
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), also a prisoner in the Marlag and Milag 
camp.  The letter was sent in June 1943 and purported to be from his mother.  It carried, 
however, a hidden message from MI9 which read ‘Decca records Alger soak covers to 
get maps’.232  It appeared to alert them to the despatch of a parcel to an individual 
named Alger.  It is also apparent from the message that MI9 was continuing to use 
gramophone records but, instead of hiding the maps in a laminated compartment in the 
centre of the record, they were rather encapsulating them in the record covers, probably 
in similar fashion to the method used to hide them inside playing cards.  
 
Volume and passage of coded letter traffic 
MI9 responded promptly to requests for information and equipment to aid escape, such 
as currency, passes, maps, saws, compasses.  They could advise on routes, specifically 
which were the best and most likely to result in a successful escape and which to avoid.  
By the 28
th
 February 1941 most of the coded letters received in London contained 
requests for escape materials and German currency.
233
  By this time also, MI9 had 
developed the Number II code and were also briefing men involved in particular covert 
operations.  One disadvantage of the coded letter was the length of time it could take to 
reach its destination in either direction.  It often took weeks and sometimes months for 
the letters to arrive.  It appears that MI9 enjoyed more success in maintaining contact 
with the camps in Germany than with those in Italy.  The relative lack of success in 
Italy was ascribed to the inefficiency of the Italians as ‘mail and parcels could take over 
a year and were often lost or destroyed’.234  The transit and delivery of letters and 
parcels to the camps in Germany appeared to be rather more swift and efficient.  It is an 
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irony that Teutonic efficiency apparently contributed to the success of the escape and 
evasion programme.     
 
          The numbers of letters steadily increased as more personnel were briefed in their 
use and as more men were captured.  In the month of March 1941, 60 coded letters were 
received in MI9 and 56 were despatched.
235
  Four months later the total number of 
acknowledgement slips for parcels and coded letters received from the camps had 
increased to 4,279 or approximately 138 every day.
236
  Incoming letters were picked up 
by the Censors who were given a list, known as the Special Watch List, by MI9 of the 
names to look for and ensure that any letters from them were re-directed to MI9.  By 
December 1941, there were 928 names on the list and MI9 knew it could potentially rise 
very quickly to 1,500.  They recognised how challenging and taxing it was for the 
Censors to pick up all the coded letters.  This identification of which letters to de-code 
was, after all ‘the vital link in the chain and, if broken, the whole structure will 
collapse’.237  MI9, therefore, made every effort to ensure that the list of names was kept 
as current as was humanly possible in order to make the Censors’ job less onerous.  The 
decoding work was regarded as urgent and always treated as a priority by MI9.  Once 
they had decoded the hidden messages, the letters were passed on to the families.  
Matters relating to escapes were dealt with by MI9; anything relating to technical or 
operational intelligence was passed immediately to the appropriate departments of the 
three Services.  It was not unknown at this stage of the war for over a dozen intelligence 
reports to be received in a month.  They were also succeeding in speeding up the transit 
of coded letters so that, by the end of June 1941, the War Diary entry notes an example 
of a letter despatched by MI9 on 10
th
 May, reached the particular Camp during the first 
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week in June and a reply was received in MI9 on 29
th
 June.
238
  By this time there were 
72 coded correspondents operating in the camps in Germany and Italy.   
 
          Prisoners of war who were being transferred to different camps would often pass 
on their code to a fellow prisoner to ensure that contact with the camp was not lost.  It 
was also the case that some prisoners who were to be moved were briefed by code 
holders so that the code could operate from the camp into which they were being 
moved.  Such was the case with Lieutenant John Pryor who indicated in his memoirs 
that it was during January 1941 whilst he was in Oflag VIIC/Z at Titmoning that he was 
approached by a junior Army officer who had heard that the naval prisoners were to be 
moved to another camp.  He asked Pryor if he would be prepared to learn a secret code 
so that messages could be hidden in his normal letters home.  Pryor confessed that he 
was initially suspicious, thinking that the officer might be a German plant.  He 
approached the Senior British Officer, General Fortune, and was reassured that the 
approach was genuine.  Pryor proceeded to learn the code.  This practice of teaching the 
code methodology to others indicates the close cooperation which existed between the 
prisoners of different Services and was a practice which Pryor himself used later on in 
his captivity.  In March 1942 he wrote a letter in which he hid a message indicating that 
he had taught codes to four others, namely ‘elder 6 5 M heap 5 7 K hamel 7 5 O wells 5 
6 J’.  There is an indication in his letter that he had been asked to do this since the 
hidden message starts by indicating that he had understood the coded letters dated 24
th
 
December and 3
rd 
January which he had received.   Interestingly, but inexplicably, he 
found it necessary to re-send the four codes he had allocated by repeating the message 
in a letter he sent two weeks later in early April.  Not surprisingly, the two letters are 
superficially about quite different topics and the hidden messages, as a result, are 
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encoded differently though relaying the identical information: in itself, this 
demonstrates the sheer versatility of the coded letter system.  
       
          It is clear from Pryor’s memoirs just how much effort went into the planning and 
execution of escapes.  Of particular note was the extent to which he was able to use the 
MI9 code and encrypt messages in some twenty one letters to his parents.  They 
contained both intelligence and requests for assistance. His efforts serve as a stark 
reminder of the raison d’être of MI9 and the extent to which prisoners of war had taken 
on board the escape philosophy.   Of necessity the codes were hardly simple; they had 
to avoid detection by the German censors.  To encode letters, as Pryor did, must have 
taken many hours of intellectual effort in circumstances which were hardly conducive to 
such activity.  It is to his eternal credit, and that of the many other prisoners of war who 
endured captivity, that he continued to do exactly what MI9 asked them to do, harass 
the Germans at every opportunity, attempt to escape, be the proverbial thorn in the 
enemy’s side, and provide intelligence in response to requests.  In return, MI9 stuck 
determinedly to their part of the ‘agreement’, providing all the escape aids in their 
considerable armoury to aid the planned escapes.  They also ensured that all families 
who had sons in captivity and who had been schooled in the art of sending and 
receiving coded letters knew exactly what was happening.  It must have been some 
comfort to those families to know that their sons were still able to contribute to the war 
effort despite their incarceration behind barbed wire in occupied Europe for such long 
periods of time.   
  
          By July 1941, MI9 was operating a network of 254 code correspondents.  By 
February 1942 they were in contact with 27 Camps in Germany and Italy and estimated 
that the system allowed them to maintain contact with over 62,000 prisoners of war.  
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They also knew of 465 attempted escapes by that time.
239
  The work done to develop the 
codes and make them more robust has been described earlier in the chapter (page 131).  
The value of the coded letters as a source of potentially useful intelligence information 
was being steadily realised by other Government departments.  They increasingly 
passed questions to MI9 to be directed through the coded letter system to prisoners of 
war in particular camps where they were known to work outside the camps alongside 
Germans and could report on what was going on in the surrounding area.  The 
occurrence of this practice is suggested by the volume of intelligence passed by Green.  
There was one reported compromise of the system by British Government officials and 
this occurred when the British Military Attache (MA) in Stockholm acted unilaterally in 
sending parcels to prisoners of war and included instructions on how to use one of the 
codes.  Three camps, Stalag Luft, Oflag IX and Oflag VIB, were able to warn MI9 what 
the MA had done, that it had been discovered by the Germans and the whole system 
was potentially compromised.  An MI9 officer was immediately despatched to 
Stockholm to order the MA to stop sending parcels.
240
  It was never clear why he had 
taken such action in the first place but the extent to which his action potentially 
compromised the whole system was clear.  MI9 immediately stopped using the Number 
III code and speeded up the introduction of the Number VI Code.  Code users were able 
to alert MI9 on more than one occasion to problems such as the discovery of escape aids 
in parcels.  Interestingly, no reported discovery of maps has been found.   
 
The construction of the coded letters 
It is, perhaps, germane at this point to set out how the codes worked and specifically 
how the letters were constructed with the messages hidden.  There are two significant 
published works which discuss the detail of the MI9 code, both of which have already 
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been previously mentioned.  The first was authored by Julius M. Green and published in 
1971.
241  
It was based entirely on his personal experiences as a dentist in the field during 
World War II and specifically as a prisoner of war, eventually finding himself in 
Colditz.  Green had been a Territorial Army reservist from his days at Edinburgh 
University in the early 1930s.  He was commissioned in 152 Field Ambulance Brigade 
of the 51
st
 Highland Division on 24
th
 August 1939.   The second source is Foot and 
Langley’s book published eight years later.242  Both books contained a detailed 
appendix setting out how the code operated.  However, Foot and Langley acknowledged 
that Green’s book was the source of their information.  
 
          Coded letters were immediately identifiable by the form of the date: 22/3/42, 
rather than the more usual form of 22
nd
 March 1942; this numeric date form indicated 
that the letter contained a coded message.  Underlining the signature also confirmed that 
the letter carried a coded message, as did the inclusion of the word ‘very’ in the closing 
line e.g. ‘yours very sincerely’.  The length of the message was determined by 
multiplying together the number of letters in the first two words of the first line of the 
letter after the salutation.  If the first two words each comprised five letters, then the 
message was 5 x 5 = 25 words in length and a grid 5 x 5 needed to be constructed.  If 
the words had different numbers of letters in them, then the first word indicated the 
number of words running horizontally in the grid and the second word indicated the 
number of words running vertically in the grid.  In the example being used, a grid was 
drawn with 25 squares in it, i.e. 5 x 5.  The rest of the first line of the letter was ignored.  
It was then necessary to start with the second line of the letter and resort to the 
numerical part of the personal key of the individual coder; in the case of Julius Green 
this was five and six, meaning that the fifth and sixth words alternately were selected 
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and placed in the grid, starting in the top left hand corner and working left to right on 
each consecutive line as indicated in the grid below.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 
16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 
 
The message, however, was eventually read starting bottom right, reading across and 
then diagonally, across and diagonally, etc, as shown below, reading in sequence 1 – 25. 
 
25 24 22 19 15 
23 21 18 14 10 
20 17 13 9 6 
16 12 8 5 3 
11 7 4 2 1 
 
The last word of the message, therefore, went into the first box on the grid and the first 
word of the message went into the last box of the grid.  It appeared that different code 
users were briefed to use different word counts.  That of Julius Green was the fifth word 
followed by the sixth word, whereas that of John Pryor was the fifth word followed by 
the fourth word.  It is clear that there were variations in the codes given to each code 
user and MI9 needed to have kept a very detailed record on the previously mentioned 
card index.   
   
          If the word ‘but’ occurred as the fifth or sixth letter, it signified the end of the 
message which should, of course, also have accorded with the completion of the grid.  
Words which were hyphenated or had an apostrophe in them were to be treated as one 
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word for the purposes of counting e.g. ‘two-days’, ‘I’ve’.  If the word ‘the’ occurred in 
the sequence, i.e. the fifth or sixth word, this indicated that the spelling code started.  
Commencing with the next sentence, the first letter of each consecutive word was 
written down in groups of three.  Each letter was identified on the alphabet listing 
shown below and then the number of the column in which it occurred. Thus, if the 
sentence started ‘Which brings the’ the significant letters were w  b  t.   Each group of 
three letters signified a letter in the table.  With the example given of w  b  t, and using 
the alphabet grid which  Julius Green used, shown below, w was in column 3, b was in 
column 3 and t was also in column 3.  This represented the number 333 which indicated 
that the letter was N. 
 
O 111 P 211 Q 311 
R 112 S212 T 312 
U 113 V 213 W 313 
X 121 Y 221 Z 321 
. 122 A 222 B 322 
C 123 D 223 E 323 
F 131 G 231 H 331 
I 132 J 232 K 332 
L 133 M 233 N 333 
 
          Julius Green’s spelling code consisted of the alphabet starting with O.  The 
alphabet was written down in three columns, as shown, and after Z, a full stop occurred.  
This meant 27 items and three columns of nine letters.  The word was built up by 
continuing to take the first letter of consecutive groups of three words until the full stop 
occurred in the coding (i.e. 122).  The de-coding then continued by moving to the next 
sentence and reverting to the word count.  Again, there were variations since it could 
also involve moving to the next paragraph and then reverting to the word count.   
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          In the same way that there were variations in the word count, it was proved by 
Professor McMullan that there were also variations in the alphabet code.  He identified 
the letter S as the missing alphabet key in John Pryor’s code by a lengthy elimination 
process of all other letters of the alphabet.  The S alphabet code is shown below:- 
S 111                    T 211                    U 311 
V 112                   W 212                   X 312 
Y 113                   Z 213                     .  313 
A 121                   B 221                    C 321 
D 122                   E 222                    F 322 
G 123                   H 223                    I 323 
J 131                    K 231                    L 331 
M 132                  N 232                    O 332 
P 133                   Q 233                    R 333 
 
 
Whichever alphabet code was used, it was based directly on a form of modular 
arithmetic where the pattern of three is key to constructing the coded message and de-
ciphering it.   
 
          Whilst MI9 did initially describe their codes as ‘simple’, it is clear that, from a 
layman’s perspective, they were far from simple and, in order to avoid the searching 
oversight and scrutiny of German censors, it is hardly surprising.
243
  The code user was 
essentially required to reverse engineer his message.  He started with the message to be 
encoded, constructed the grid, numbered it, placed those numbers/words in the correct 
order in his letter with the requisite number of spaces alternating between, reflecting his 
own personal numerical code, and then sought to construct a sensible sounding but 
totally innocuous letter linking it all together.
244
  The whole exercise required 
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considerable intellectual horse-power, time and commitment to plan and construct the 
message ahead of time.  They were then in a position to maximise the use of the limited 
opportunity they were given by their German captors to write letters home, and commit 
that opportunity to a covert purpose.  It must also have been a considerable morale 
booster for the prisoners of war to know that, despite their loss of liberty, they were still 
in a position to contribute in a very significant way to the war effort, and also to have 
the re-assurance of knowing that an entire organization was working at home to aid their 
attempts to escape, that they might contribute valuable intelligence information, and that 
the authorities at home were ensuring that their families were being kept briefed about 
their continuing contribution.  It must also have relieved the considerable boredom of 
long months and years spent in captivity with ample ‘leisure’ time on their hands.  
 
Decoding a hidden message 
Using the letter dated 7/5/42 which John Pryor wrote home, reproduced as a Word 
document at Figure 1, the exercise to decode the letter is marked up on a Word 
document and is shown at Figure 2 where significant words and letters are highlighted 
in red.
245
  The following method of decoding was employed to discover the hidden 
message.  The first two words after the salutation are ‘Last week’: a 4 x 4 grid is, 
therefore, constructed.  Moving to the second line of the letter and using Pryor’s 
numerical code of 5 and 4, the fifth word is  ‘marks’, so this goes into the top left box of 
the grid and is, therefore,  the final word of the message.  The fourth word after this is 
‘the’ which indicates that the alphabet code starts at this point.   
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Figure 1 coded letter            
                                                                                                           7/5/42 
My Dear Mummy & Daddy,  Last week I received a short letter from Robert. 
The envelope had the marks of five of the RAF censors.  I can’t imagine what his new  
number on the envelope means, maybe he has been turned 
over to rather different occupations, which of course I can’t know anything  
about.  I am glad the information I sent you, especially about the Uffa  
Fox and  other books of the  sailing variety, reached you.  As regards 
other possible books, my present desires seem mostly for interesting  
literature of events in our country’s history.  A subject I am unfortunately  
very weak in.  The gardens are improving, borders of wire which  
require a net to keep the football off.  Possibly a move to Marlag 
Nord in the late summer may prevent getting all advantages from some 
of the later plants, but we hope not.  During the course of  the  
last days we obtained some chairs, from local sources I believe,  
also some tables, which give the recreation room a much better  
appearance.  A few weeks ago we arranged a rather useful  
scheme, so men could get “legergeld” by remitting money at home 
for that received here.  After another year – year and  a half  
my clothing requirements etc. will be  but a mere trifle.  As I  
have received all your clothing parcels sent off up to the end of  
1941.  The suitcase in the last one arrived a bit battered but  
still quite usable.  Private cigarette and tobacco parcels seem to be 
coming in better now, so I am hoping to get another shortly as my 
last one arrived in November.  Now I must stop, hoping you are 
all as well as  I am.  Remember me especially to Marj.  Your very loving son.                                                                                                                              
John.   
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Figure 2 coded letter with hidden message highlighted 
My Dear Mummy & Daddy,  Last week (4x4 grid) I received a short letter from Robert. 
The envelope had the marks (5) of five of the (4 - start alphabet code) RAF censors.  
I can’t imagine what his new number on the envelope means, maybe he has been 
turned over to rather different occupations, which of course I can’t know anything 
about.  I am glad the information (5) I sent you, especially (4)  about the Uffa Fox and 
(5)  other books of the (4 – start alphabet code) sailing variety, reached you.  As 
regards other possible books, my present desires seem mostly for interesting literature 
of events in our country’s history.  A subject I am unfortunately very weak in.   
The gardens are improving, borders (5) of wire which require (4) a net to keep the (5 – 
start alphabet code) football off.  Possibly a move to Marlag Nord in the late summer 
may prevent getting all advantages from some of the later plants, but we hope not.  
During the course of (4) the last days we obtained (5) some chairs, from local (4) 
sources I believe, also some (5) tables, which give the (4 – start alphabet code) 
recreation room a much better appearance.  A few weeks ago we arranged a rather 
useful scheme, so men could get “legergeld” by remitting money at home for that 
received here.  After another year – year and (5) a half my clothing (4) requirements 
etc. will be  but (5 – indicates end of message) a mere trifle.   
As I have received all your clothing parcels sent off up to the end of  
1941.  The suitcase in the last one arrived a bit battered but  
still quite usable.  Private cigarette and tobacco parcels seem to be 
coming in better now, so I am hoping to get another shortly as my 
last one arrived in November.  Now I must stop, hoping you are 
all as well as  I am.  Remember me especially to Marj.  Your very loving son.   
                                                                                                                             John.  
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This means that, starting with the next sentence, the first letter of each consecutive word 
is written down in groups of three, each letter is identified on the alphabet listing shown 
below and then the number of the column in which it occurs.  Thus, in this example, the 
decoder moves to the next sentence which starts ‘I can’t imagine’ and proceeds to list 
the first letter of every word in groups of three.  Each group of three letters signifies a 
letter in Pryor’s alphabet table, O, as shown below.     
             O 111                    P 211                   Q 311 
           R 112                    S 212                   T 312 
           U 113                    V 213                   W 313 
           X 121                    Y 221                   Z 321 
           . 122                      A 222                   B 322 
           C 123                    D 223                   E 323 
           F 131                    G 231                   H 331 
           I 132                     J 232                    K 332 
           L 133                    M 233                  N 333 
Transposing each group of three letters into the alphabet letter from this table, the 
following word emerges. 
ICI          333   R 
WHN      222   E 
NOT       232   N 
EMM      211   T 
HHB       222   E 
TOT        232   N 
RDO       313   . 
 
The word spells ‘renten’, the name of the currency in Nazi Germany, and becomes the 
second word on the grid.  At the point where the full stop occurs, the decoder reverted 
to the 5  4 sequence at the start of the next sentence in the letter but maintaining the 
correct rhythm.  Having finished on the fourth word at the previous stage, this time the 
fifth
 word is counted.  This gives the word ‘information’ which becomes the third word 
on the grid. The following fourth word is ‘especially’ which becomes the fourth word 
145 
 
on the grid.  The fifth word is ‘and’ which becomes the fifth word on the grid.  The next 
fourth word is ‘the’ signalling that the alphabet code starts again at the beginning of the 
next sentence.    Taking the first letter of each word and setting them out in groups of 
three produces the following:- 
 
ARO   133   P 
PBM   121   A 
PDS    111   S 
MFI    133   P 
LOE    332  O 
IOC    333   R 
HAS   211   T 
IAU   313    .  
 
It contains a spelling error but is nonetheless recognisable as the word ‘passport’ which 
becomes the sixth word on the grid.  Reverting to the start of the next complete sentence 
in the letter and picking up the 5  4  rhythm, the fifth word is ‘borders’ which becomes 
the seventh word on the grid.  The following fourth word is ‘require’ which becomes 
the eighth word on the grid.  The following fifth word in the letter is ‘the’ which 
indicates that the alphabet code starts again, as follows:- 
PAM    111   S 
TMN    212  W 
ITL      323    I 
SMP     111   S 
GAA     111  S 
FSO      313   . 
 
The ninth word on the grid is ‘swiss’.   
Reverting to the start of the next complete sentence in the letter and keeping the 5 4 
rhythm, the fourth word is ‘of’ which becomes the tenth word on the grid.  The 
following fifth word is ‘obtained’ which becomes the eleventh word on the grid.  The 
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following fourth word is ‘local’ which becomes the twelth word on the grid.  The 
following fifth word is ‘some’ which becomes the thirteenth word on the grid.  The 
following fourth
 word is ‘the’ which indicates that the alphabet code starts again at the 
beginning of the next sentence.  This produces the following:- 
AFW   132  M 
AWA  121  A 
ARU   133   P 
SSM   111   S 
CGL    313   . 
 
The fourteenth word on the grid is ‘maps’. 
Reverting to the start of the next complete sentence in the letter and keeping the 5  4 
rhythm,  the fifth word is ‘and’ which becomes the fifteenth word on the grid. It is 
worth noting at this point the deliberate repetition of the word ‘year’ which makes no 
sense in English but is clearly designed to ensure that the fifth word is ‘and’ so that the 
hidden message will make sense.  The following fourth word is ‘clothing’ which 
becomes the sixteenth and final word on the grid.  To reinforce the point, the fifth word 
after this point is ‘but’ which confirms the end of the coded message: the introduction of 
the apparently superfluous ‘etc’ ensured that ‘but’ occurred as the fifth rather than the 
fourth word.  Placing all these words in their correct consecutive position on the grid 
produces the following:-  
 
marks renten information especially 
and pasport borders require 
swiss of obtained local 
some maps and clothing 
    
Starting in the bottom right corner and reading across and diagonally in sequence, the 
message reads ‘clothing and local maps obtained require some of borders especially 
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swiss pasport information and renten marks’.  Leaving aside the mis-spelling of 
‘passport’, it is a clear request for maps of the Swiss border, and information which 
would allow them to produce passports.  It also carries an indication that they have 
already been able to obtain local maps and clothing.   
 
          It is worth noting at this point that Pryor was at the time (May 1942) located in 
the Westertimke camp near Sandbostel in northern Germany.  Asking for maps of the 
Swiss border is perhaps surprising, since the distance to be covered was considerable.  
Escape via the Baltic ports, which is what Pryor and others subsequently attempted, 
would have been more likely.  The message does, however, serve as a stark reminder of 
the raison d’être of MI9 and the extent to which prisoners of war had taken on board the 
escape philosophy.  John Pryor’s memoirs contain many mentions of planning escapes 
and he clearly recalled that escaping was the duty of every prisoner of war but with ‘the 
whole of NW Europe under German control and with no maps or compass it seemed a 
pretty hopeless task.
246
  He was involved in detail in the preparation of the escapes, 
often helping to dig the tunnel.  He, himself, did escape but was recaptured (see Chapter 
6).  However, he helped many others to escape successfully.  He was liberated by the 
advancing Allies in 1945 and went on to serve his country also in peacetime as a 
hydrographic surveyor in the Royal Navy. 
 
    Organisation in the Camps 
The level of organisation in the camps dedicated to planning and executing escapes has 
been described in Chapter 3.  Such detailed organisation was also maintained so far as 
the coded letter system was concerned.  The ingenuity required to compose a message 
that seemed like an innocent and innocuous letter to the family back home must have 
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been very great and would have needed some considerable time.  Time was something 
the prisoners of war had in abundance but they would also have needed their colleagues 
to keep watch to ensure that the activity was not discovered by the guards.  The SBOs 
and the Escape Committees decided which messages were sent and by whom.  They 
alone knew the identities of all the coded letter writers in each camp.  New arrivals were 
interrogated by them and, if they knew the code, they were ordered not to send 
messages independently but only when told to do so.  There were reports from at least 
one camp, namely Stalag Luft III/Sagan, at the end of the war that mistakes had been 
made by MI9.  The criticisms mentioned use of the same typewriter for letters to 
different individuals in the same camp; different signatures by the same fictitious 
individuals; one prisoner’s code key marked on the envelope instead of his prisoner of 
war number; use of similar notepaper for letters to different code users; and a lack of 
understanding in MI9 of the difficulties of keeping detailed records in the camps of all 
coded messages sent.
247
  Such detailed criticisms could only have been made by a team 
that was monitoring each and every letter.  Whilst the prisoners of war in each camp 
apparently knew that some means of secret communication between the camp and the 
UK existed, its precise form was known only to the SBOs, the Escape Committees and 
the code users.  The activity was certainly managed in a highly controlled and 
meticulous fashion with considerable attention to the detail and the security.    
 
Conclusion 
This review of the exchange of coded letter correspondence reveals two particularly 
remarkable points.  The first of these is the considerable degree to which prisoners of 
war exposed themselves to danger, not simply in planning their own escapes but also in 
sending intelligence information back to MI9.  Whilst the penalty for attempted escape 
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was thirty days in solitary confinement, the penalty for providing intelligence was likely 
to be a session with the Gestapo for alleged espionage activities.  Secondly, the sheer 
cleverness of the codes is strikingly impressive.  As noted already, the codes employed 
were described as simple by MI9, but the finesse of the methodology was such that, 
since each was likely unique to the user, it was unlikely to be discovered.  Since each 
code comprised three elements, namely two Arabic numbers and a letter of the alphabet, 
there were 2,600 possible permutations.  This allowed for the existence of 2,600 coded 
letter writers, if each was to use a unique code.  By December 1940 there were already 
928 coded correspondents in operation and it was anticipated that this number would 
likely increase to 1500 very rapidly.
248
  By the end of the war in 1945, a total of 12,500 
coded letters had been despatched and received by MI9.  The peak year was 1943 with a 
total of almost 4,500 in that year alone.  By 1944, radio communications had been 
established in many of the camps and, together with the collapse of Italy, this resulted in 
a reduction of the coded letter traffic.
249
   
 
          There is indeed no evidence that a coded letter was ever deciphered by the 
Germans (or the Italians) or, indeed, that they were even aware of their existence, until 
the action by the MA in Stockholm which might well have wrecked the entire system, 
but apparently did not.  The difference in national approaches to the use of codes is also 
relevant.  The Germans used a technical approach with machines to encrypt their coded 
messages, of which ENIGMA is the most famous.  The British had always tended to 
regard codes and encryption as an intellectual exercise, preferring to use people rather 
than machines.  Crosswords and chess were well-known as leisure activities in the UK; 
it was essentially the same approach of the application and discipline of intellectual 
thought and logic which allowed the coded letter approach to succeed as effectively as it 
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evidently did.  It was arguably this significant difference in national traits and practices 
which allowed MI9 to succeed with this most important link in the whole escape chain: 
it allowed the prisoners of war to indicate what they needed by way of maps and other 
escape aids and ensured that MI9 could respond by reporting what was being sent, to 
whom and when. 
 
         MI9 regarded the whole operation of coded correspondence as a success story.  
From their perspective, they took inordinate care with the operation of the entire system.  
They also recognised that, integral to the success, had been the outstanding security and 
planning which had taken place in the camps.
250
  It is, therefore, perhaps one of the most 
surprising aspects of the whole story of the coded letters to realise the extent to which it 
has not been addressed in detail by historians to date.  Certainly Foot and Langley 
mentioned it in the history of MI9 which was published over 30 years ago and Green’s 
book tracing his own role as a coded letter correspondent with MI9 was published over 
40 years ago.
251
  Foot and Langley acknowledged Green’s book as their primary source 
and Foot emphasised in conversation as recently as 2012 the importance of the coded 
letters.  One might reasonably ask why that importance was not recognised by other 
historians, especially those who more recently have had access to rather more open MI9 
related files than Foot and Langley ever did in the 1970s.  One might conjecture that the 
story has perhaps been overshadowed by that of Bletchley, ENIGMA, Alan Turing and 
his staff.  For whatever reason, it is certainly the case that the coded letter story appears 
to have engendered no real interest or consideration by historians and, more particularly, 
by those involved in the history of British intelligence in the twentieth century.  And 
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yet, when one considers precisely what MI9 managed to do and what the prisoners of 
war managed to contribute in terms of current intelligence as well as planning escapes, 
it has to be acknowledged that this was a quite stunning contribution to the war effort.         
 
          The construction of the network of coded correspondence bears testimony to the 
extent to which escape had become a professional undertaking involving painstaking 
planning and execution.  The programme of coded correspondence was every bit as 
carefully planned and executed in all its aspects as the map production programme.  By 
this stage of the unfolding story, it is very clear that MI9 demonstrated the same 
professionalism, attention to detail and application in every aspect of the escape and 
evasion programme on which they had embarked.   The importance of the coded 
correspondence as a vital link in the escape chain will become even more clear in the 
next two chapters where a number of case studies will show the extent to which the 
maps were used in the geographical areas selected by MI9 and in a number of particular 
escapes which are described.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Chapter 5 
A case study approach: Airey Neave and the Schaffhausen Salient 
Life’s battles do not always go to the stronger and faster man, but 
sooner or later the man who wins is the man who thinks he can. 
(Anonymous).
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The way in which the mapping programme was conceived, the significant resources 
which were dedicated to it, the ways of getting the maps into the camps and the method 
of coded contact have been set out in earlier chapters.  There remains, however, the 
whole issue of how the maps were used in actual escapes and the extent to which they 
successfully, or otherwise, fulfilled their role.  This aspect is now explored through 
three case studies, each selected to highlight a different aspect of the mapping 
programme.  The first case study, the focus of this chapter, assesses the escape of 
perhaps one of the most well-known personalities to emerge from World War II, Airey 
Neave, who followed one of the principal escape routes out via Switzerland.  The 
second case study, outlined in the chapter that follows, describes the Baltic ports’ route, 
another MI9 recommended route and for which they produced some of the largest scale 
maps in their entire inventory.  The final case study focuses on the survival of two maps 
produced by the prisoners of war themselves, based directly on maps which MI9 
successfully smuggled into the camps.  Each study has been selected to demonstrate 
how the maps were used, and the extent to which they were a key aspect in escape 
attempts: in essence, the purpose of the case studies is to demonstrate the geography of 
escape.    
Case study escape routes 
Before setting out each of the case studies, it is necessary to appreciate  some important 
aspects of the escape routes which were selected by MI9 and the critical extent to which 
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MI9’s rationale for their choices was reflected in the escape and evasion mapping 
programme.  It is certainly the case that there were more attempts and more successful 
escapes from German prisoner of war camps than there were from Italian camps. As 
noted before, to a very great extent and in a surprisingly paradoxical way, this appeared 
to reflect German efficiency and Italian inefficiency. MI9 relied on German efficiency 
to deliver, in a timely manner, the coded letters and parcels, containing the escape aids.  
Italian ineptitude, on the other hand, meant that letters and parcels were often held up 
for months behind a wall of bureaucracy and sluggishness.  MI9, therefore, appeared to 
concentrate resources on aiding and supporting escapes from Germany.  Time was spent 
in documenting the passage of the coded letter traffic.
253
  Prisoners of war with whom 
MI9 was in coded contact were encouraged to acknowledge receipt of the letters they 
received.  There were a number of examples of this in John Pryor’s letters.  His letter 
dated 22/3/42, for example, contained a coded message which confirmed receipt of two 
coded messages from MI9 ‘yours 24 dec and 3 jan understood .....’.254  The message 
continued with details that Pryor had briefed four other men in the coded letter system 
and provided the individual codes he had given to each man.   
          The principal escape routes out of Germany which MI9 chose were south to the 
neutral country of Switzerland and north via the Baltic ports to the neutral country of 
Sweden.  Because of the landlocked nature of Switzerland, there had to be a further 
route out via France and Spain.  This onward movement was, however, through 
organised escape routes, amongst the most famous of which were the Pat and Comet 
Lines.  The Pat, or PAO, line was named after Patrick Albert O’Leary, the cover name 
of a Belgian national, Albert-Marie Guérisse, masquerading as a French speaking 
Canadian airman, who established the escape route from Marseilles via the Pyrenees to 
                                                             
253 
TNA: WO 208/3242, p.80.  
254
 World War II Experience Centre, reference SWWEC RN/Pryor J. 
154 
 
Madrid.  The Comet Line ran through western France and, similarly, across the 
Pyrenees to Madrid.  Along these organised escape lines, the escapers were not on their 
own; they were accompanied by members of the Resistance, sometimes by paid guides 
and even, on occasion, by professional smugglers, who knew the terrain, so that large 
scale mapping, in particular, was not required.  A good example of this was coverage of 
the Pyrenees.  Series 43 sheets, described in Chapter 2 and listed in detail at Appendix 
5, which cover Western Europe, are all at small scale (1:1,000,000) with four larger 
scale insets of  border areas, and even those vary in scale from as small as 1:500,000, 
through 1:300,000 to the largest one at 1:250,000 scale.  Two of the insets appear on 
sheet 43A and both are at 1:500,000 of sections of the Pyrenees across the French-
Spanish border. MI9’s mapping resources tended to be concentrated on small-scale 
blanket coverage with large scale coverage of specific escape points.  This aspect is also 
reflected in the first two of the three case studies chosen.  It is also important to 
highlight that the largest centres of MI6/SIS activity during World War II appear to 
have been concentrated in Berne, Stockholm, and Madrid, the capital cities of the three 
principal neutral countries in Europe, and the centres through which escapers would 
need to travel as part of their escape routes. SIS certainly ensured from as early as the 
summer of 1940 that they controlled the escape routes which MI9 sought to establish 
through the neutral nations.  It was also the case that the section within MI9 responsible 
for this aspect of their work was run by Jimmy Langley who was in fact a member of 
SIS and was never actually appointed to the staff of MI9.  (This aspect of the SIS/MI9 
relationship will be considered in more detail in the Conclusion). 
          The first of the case studies covers the Schaffhausen salient, a rather tortuously 
oriented section of the German-Swiss border.  The second study relates to the route via 
the Baltic ports, another extremely successful route to freedom and the one chosen by 
many, not least a number of the coded letters writers, for example John Pryor.  The final 
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case study is of a rather different type.  It relates to surviving copies of two MI9 escape 
and evasion maps which were clearly produced inside a prisoner of war camp.  They 
survived in a Scottish University collection where they were deposited a few years after 
the war, in one case in 1947, and described simply as ‘prisoner of war’ maps.  Sadly no 
records survive which would allow their earlier provenance to be traced.  However, this 
research will show that the circumstantial evidence of their derivation and production 
will prove to be strong and very relevant in terms of MI9’s mapping programme. 
          What now follows is a description of the Schaffhausen escape route. This route 
was important in the greater scheme of MI9 organised escape, not least in terms of the 
success rate which attached to the attempted escapes across this particular border: 
almost 20% of all successful escapes throughout the 6 years of the war were into 
Switzerland and the majority of those were along this route.   
Escape to Switzerland: the Schaffhausen Salient
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MI9 appeared to work hard to identify potential escape routes and provide the necessary 
maps to help prisoners of war to escape.  One of the most intriguing maps identified has 
been sheet Y, a large scale (1:100,000) map of the Schaffhausen salient, located on the 
border area of Germany and Switzerland, to the west of Lake Constance. (see 
illustration XV)   Sheet Y is a very different map from most of the escape and evasion 
maps which MI9 produced.  Firstly, at 1:100,000, its scale is very much larger  
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Illustration XV : sheet Y 
 
(c) British Library Board, Maps CC 5a 424.
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than most of their mapping programme.  Secondly, it is clear that the localised area of 
coverage had been carefully selected to afford escaping prisoners of war the maximum 
chance of a successful escape.  Thirdly, it contains a considerable amount of textual 
information, in military circles known as ‘goings’ information (terrain analysis), i.e. 
identifying and describing in considerable detail the significant features in the landscape 
which would help the escaper to navigate a successful route and also highlighting any 
features which would likely hamper or impede escape.  The goings information (terrain 
analysis) on sheet Y commenced by stating: 
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Escapes into Switzerland have the greatest chance of success if 
attempted across the frontier of the Canton Schaffhausen.  The 
region around Lake Constance is to be avoided.  
 
Illustration XVI : sheet A1 Schaffhausen Salient (West) 
 
(Reproduced with the permission of the RAF Museum, Hendon.)  
Sheet Y was based directly on native Swiss-German topographic mapping of the border 
area and, because of the density of detail, the colour specification and the need to print 
on fabric (which had initially proved a considerable technical challenge for the 
Waddington company), the one extant copy of this sheet which has been identified, is 
quite difficult to read, despite its larger scale.  MI9 also produced cover of the same area 
at the same scale in two sheets, namely Schaffhausen Salient West and East, marked 
respectively A1 and A2 (see Illustration XVI).
257
  These two maps were included in the 
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Bulletin: refer to Appendix 9.  The significant difference between these two maps and 
sheet Y is that they were redrawn to a simpler specification to show only a selection of 
the topographic detail on sheet Y.  Contours have been removed and elevation data were 
shown only in outline by hachures.  The textual goings information has also been 
removed, but the man-made landmarks described have been included as annotations, for 
example, ‘the   brickyards at Lohn’.  The result is a considerable enhancement in the 
clarity and readability of the detail when compared to sheet Y.   
          By 8
th
 May 1940, MI9 was despatching this ‘special map of the Northern Swiss 
frontier near Schaffhausen with a memorandum on the prevailing conditions in the area 
obtained from MI sources’.258  This was clearly sheet Y.  It is fascinating to try to 
discover just how MI9 was able to produce such a detailed map which contained so 
much local intelligence information, and key to the story is the role played by the officer 
recruited to MI9 to act as the principal point of contact and liaison with the RAF, 
namely Squadron Leader A.J. (Johnny) Evans.    
          Johnny Evans’ role as a lecturer, user of coded correspondence as a means of 
escape, and source of ideas for escape aids, has already been mentioned and discussed 
previously, particularly in Chapter 3, but it was really in the production of sheet Y that 
his contribution appears to have been even more significant.  Evans had been a major in 
the newly formed Royal Flying Corps in World War I.  He had been involved in the 
Somme offensive in July 1916, over-flying the German front line in an attempt to take 
out their gun batteries.  His aircraft engine failed and, although he survived the crash 
landing, he was immediately captured.  Because his brother had been captured at Ypres, 
and the family had received no news of him for over a year, together with the statistical 
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likelihood of capture as a member of the fledgling Royal Flying Corps, Evans had had 
the foresight, prior to his deployment, to set up a coded contact system with his mother.  
His mother was able to maintain contact with him once he had been captured and she 
succeeded in providing maps and compasses, secreted inside food parcels, to aid his 
ultimately successful escape.  
          Evans, and his colleague, Lieutenant S.E. Buckley, originally with the 
Northamptonshire Regiment and later with the Royal Flying Corps, escaped from a train 
whilst being moved from one camp to another.  They walked over 130 miles, south 
from the point where they jumped from the train close to Nuremburg, all the way to the 
Swiss border.  They had decided not to attempt to board a train but rather rely on 
walking to the border and staying off the beaten track.  It took them 18 days to reach 
their objective, the Schaffhausen salient, and cross safely to freedom in Switzerland.  
Their biggest challenge was to find enough food to sustain them and they resorted on 
many days to digging up potatoes from the fields they passed as the meagre rations they 
carried had run out early in their escape.  They did, however, have the ‘excellent maps’ 
which Evans’ mother had sent him and ‘accurate and detailed knowledge of the whole 
route.....to the frontier’ acquired from fellow prisoners who had escaped, been re-
captured and had briefed fellow escapers on the detail of the route to freedom.
259
  
However, Evans clearly recalled the problems they had faced on this particular stretch 
of the border and, particularly, in knowing precisely when they had reached safety.  On 
such a winding stretch of the border, it was easy to be confused and cross back into 
Germany by accident.  The detailed goings information which appeared on the northern 
edge of sheet Y (see Illustration XV) clearly reflected his own, first-hand experience, as 
follows: 
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On no account should the railway line Singen–Schaffhausen to 
the South be crossed, as the course of the frontier then becomes 
complicated, and it could be possible to cross into Switzerland 
and then immediately back into Germany through ignorance of 
the frontier.  
 
Evans became convinced that his World War I experience might prove of value during a 
second war which many began to anticipate in the 1930s.   
          Evans, however, went further than simply recalling his World War I experience 
and offering the benefit of it to MI9.  As Hutton described his actions, Evans decided to 
spend a holiday cycling around the Schaffhausen district in 1937.  His objective was to 
photograph both sides of the section of the German-Swiss frontier across which he had 
made his ‘memorable march to freedom’.260  The fact that sheet Y carried detailed 
textual directions on the nature of the frontier alignment doubtless reflected his own 
experience.  Evans subsequently joined MI9 in 1940, becoming one of their most 
valuable lecturers and trainers.  Whilst no record has been found which clearly identifies 
sheet Y as the product of Evans’ foresight, there is much circumstantial evidence to 
support such a hypothesis.  It is a matter of record that the map covers the same stretch 
of the German–Swiss frontier across which he had escaped to freedom in World War I; 
he produced much of the intelligence described in minute detail on the map; he was 
certainly a committed member of the MI9 staff from the beginning; the map of the 
Schaffhausen salient was one to which MI9 attached great significance and Evans was, 
from the beginning, regarded as one of their best lecturers at the Training School.  
Hutton reinforced the perception of Evans’ contribution by emphasising the extent to 
which Evans’ photographs of the Schaffhausen salient proved invaluable to MI9’s 
work.
261
  As indicated in Chapter 3, these photographs are likely to be the ones 
reproduced in the MI9 Bulletin showing detailed views of the topographic and landmark 
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features which would be of most navigational significance to those attempting to escape 
across this particular stretch of the frontier, including views of river banks and areas 
patrolled by German border sentries. 
          There were many escapes through the Schaffhausen salient which were 
documented in the records, almost all of which were initially highly classified.  Pryor 
had asked for maps of the Swiss border in one of his coded letters and he also 
mentioned in his memoirs the escape attempt by Lieutenant R.F. Jackson on 2
nd
 
February 1944.   Jackson was fluent in French and was furnished with papers indicating 
he was a French national.  Having succeeded in getting clear of the camp, he travelled 
south by train to Schaffhausen, a considerable distance from the camp, and then made 
his way on foot to the border.  Unfortunately, in the dark, he stumbled on a trip wire and 
was caught by guard dogs before he was able to cross into Switzerland.  It is notable 
that he chose to travel south to the Swiss border, which had been the area for which 
Pryor had originally requested maps.  Whether or not Jackson had access to maps is not 
mentioned by Pryor.  As has been shown, the Schaffhausen salient, west of Lake 
Constance, on the south German/Swiss border was, however, a well-researched escape 
route and one for which MI9 had produced three large scale and very detailed maps to 
aid the escapes.  The importance of the route and of the maps produced of the area will 
be more fully demonstrated in the first case study which follows, the escape of Airey 
Neave from Colditz.  
 
Case Study 1: Airey Neave’s escape from Colditz  in 1942     
The story of Neave’s escape demonstrates not only the importance of the Schaffhausen 
escape route, but also the value of the maps which MI9 produced to aid that particular 
route.  It is, therefore, key to this attempted review of MI9’s escape and evasion 
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mapping programme to look in detail at one of the few successful escapes during World 
War II across this particular border which was subsequently recorded publicly.  It 
demonstrates not only the importance of the Schaffhausen escape route, but also the 
unquestionable value of the maps which MI9 produced to aid that particular  route to 
freedom.    
          Airey Middleton Sheffield Neave was born in London on 23
rd
 January 1916.  
Educated at Eton, he went on to read jurisprudence at Merton College, Oxford, where 
he graduated in 1938.  At the outbreak of war, Neave (already in the Territorial Army) 
became a lieutenant in the Royal Artillery.  He was sent to France early in 1940 as a 
Troop Commander in the 1
st
 Searchlight Regiment of the Royal Artillery.  On 26th 
May, whilst trying to defend a forward position to the south of Calais, he was wounded 
and subsequently captured, as he lay on a stretcher.  He was held in various Oflag and, 
after a number of unsuccessful escape attempts, he was eventually imprisoned in Oflag 
IV C, the castle in Saxony more commonly known as Colditz.  The fortress, which 
stood on the site of an earlier castle, had been largely constructed in the sixteenth 
century by the Elector of Saxony, and extended further by Augustus the Strong of 
Saxony in the eighteenth century.
262
  It was to Colditz that those who repeatedly 
attempted to escape were often sent as its construction and location ensured that 
breaking out of such a fortress was a considerable, if not impossible, challenge.   Neave 
was in fact the first British officer to escape successfully from Colditz, and not Pat Reid 
who was depicted as such in the film The Colditz Story.  The portrayal clearly rankled 
with Neave who subsequently complained and took action to set the record straight.
263
  
Neave told his own story in the first book he published in 1953.
264
  He insisted that he 
had written the book without access to official sources, but simply from his own 
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personal recollections.
265
  That may well have been the case but it is certain that he 
would still have needed official sanction at that time to publish such a book, not least 
since, as a recently elected Member of Parliament, he was very much in the public eye.   
          In many ways Neave personified the approach to escape which MI9 had sought to 
inculcate.  He mentioned the philosophy of escape a number of times in his published 
account of his escape in a very telling way, to the extent that it was later quoted by Foot 
and Langley: 
The real escaper is more than a man equipped with compass, 
maps, papers, disguise and a plan.  He has an inner confidence, a 
serenity of spirit which makes him a Pilgrim.
266
  
Neave had attempted to escape on two previous occasions from Colditz, on 20
th
 August 
1941 and on 23
rd
 November 1941.  The first attempt saw him try to walk out dressed as 
a German guard and the second involved crawling through the attics and trying to drop 
down 70 feet on a knotted sheet over the wall: both attempts failed before he got clear 
of the camp.  He eventually succeeded on 5
th
 January 1942.  Dressed as a German 
Oberleutnant, he was accompanied by his Dutch colleague, Lieutenant Toni Luteyn of 
the Netherlands East Indies Army.  The two nationalities had apparently ‘agreed to pool 
their resources for escaping’.267  Most of the Dutch officers spoke fluent German and 
were, therefore, ideal travelling companions.  The British were able to contribute the 
aids to escape which had been provided by MI9.
268
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Illustration XVII : Neave’s successful escape route 
 
 
(produced by the GeoMapping Unit, Plymouth University.) 
          In plotting the entire route of their escape (see Illustration XVII), as described by 
Neave in his book, on a small-scale map of Germany and northern Switzerland and 
using also his subsequently discovered escape report, one aspect of their escape became 
abundantly clear.  Whilst he and Luteyn travelled south towards the Swiss frontier, they 
did not make for the nearest point of the frontier, i.e. they did not travel due south to the 
frontier but veered south west at one point in order to reach the Schaffhausen salient.  
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From Colditz, they had walked six miles to the small town of Leisnig where they caught 
a train to Leipzig, a distance of some 30 miles further on.  From there they travelled 
south 180 miles by train to Regensburg where they changed trains for Ulm.  They 
travelled a further 110 miles to Ulm where, on arrival, they again changed trains, trying 
to get to Singen on the Swiss border.  Singen is located some 80 miles south west of 
Ulm, close to the Swiss border and the Schaffhausen salient, and to the west of Lake 
Constance.  It had been in Ulm that they had almost been recaptured since their attempt 
to purchase tickets for a destination on the Swiss border had apparently aroused 
considerable suspicion.  They were fortunate to avoid recapture in Ulm, and then 
decided to continue to travel by train to Singen, but to avoid the main line, travelling 
rather through Laupheim, Biberach, Pfullendorf and Schwachenreuter.
269
  From 
Biberach it would arguably have made more sense for them to travel directly south 
towards the eastern end of Lake Constance, being less than 40 miles distance to the 
Swiss border, instead of which they chose a much longer route    They eventually 
crossed the frontier south of Singen, reaching Ramsen which was the first settlement 
inside Switzerland.  The more one considered their route, the clearer it became that their 
aim had always been to reach the Schaffhausen salient section of the border.  Why 
would they do that if they had not already been briefed on the most likely point to cross 
the border successfully and consulted a map which showed detailed coverage of that 
stretch of the border?  In considering their route to freedom, which Neave eventually 
described in more detail in his escape report, the virtually inevitable conclusion is that 
Schaffhausen was always their objective.   
          Such a hypothesis is also supported by independent evidence.  Whilst this may 
never be proved conclusively, it seems highly likely that they had access to sheet Y and 
the intelligence contained on it, or to sheet A2, since both would have provided them 
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with the detail of the area they needed and demonstrably possessed.  It now appears 
likely that Neave was trying to hide the fact that such a map had actually been sent 
covertly into Colditz by MI9, since he mentioned it neither in his book nor in the escape 
report written on arrival safely back in London.  Neave’s apparent reticence with regard 
to the role played by possession of a covertly acquired map reinforces Foot’s insistence 
that ‘maps were never discussed’ as that is what ‘we had been briefed on’.270  It is also 
significant that Neave’s first book was originally published in 1953, less than ten years 
after the end of the war, at which point the protocols and restrictions regarding public 
disclosure of MI9’s methodology would still have been paramount.271  A ‘D’ notice 
(number 42) had been issued on 19
th
 January 1946 which forbade the public disclosure 
of escape and evasion methods, including any assistance given to prisoners of war.  The 
notice also embraced the non-disclosure of information relating to the use of secret 
methods of communication with the prisoner of war camps and the identities of 
nationals of European countries who had assisted in the escape programme.
272
  There is, 
however, quite specific evidence to confirm that MI9 had, in fact, sent advice into 
Colditz on some declared escape requirements ‘concerning routes and destinations’, and 
that they had not only made plans to send parcels containing escape materials to 
selected officers in a number of specified camps, of which Oflag IVC (Colditz) was one, 
but that many such parcels had already been sent by the time of Neave’s escape.273  By 
May 1941, MI9 had received confirmation that escape material had been received in 
four camps, of which Colditz, was one of those listed.  During the same month, MI9 had 
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despatched 62 parcels under the guise of the Prisoners’ Leisure Hour Fund.274  By July 
1941, parcels had certainly arrived in Colditz, confirmation having been received in 
MI9: it was noted that they had been despatched in March and April 1941.   
          Additional evidence that it was indeed either sheet Y or A2 which Neave and 
Luteyn used is also to be found in the history of the Colditz Camp.
275
  After the war had 
ended, and on the repatriation of the prisoners of war, the Senior British Officer (SBO) 
in each camp was required by the War Office to produce a written record as an 
historical review of life in the Camp.  It is likely that these reviews were produced in 
order to ensure that any possible war criminals amongst the German guards, or 
treasonable behaviour by any of the prisoners of war, could be documented and pursued 
through proper legal process.  In writing the Historical Record of Oflag VII, Colditz, the 
rapporteur included, at Chapter X, a review of the successful escapes.   The escape 
report written by Captain P. (Pat) R. Reid of the Royal Army Signals Corps and Flight 
Lieutenant H. N. Wardle of the RAF was included.  Reid and Wardle escaped from 
Colditz on 16
th
 October 1942, nine months after Neave and Luteyn.  Following an 
identical route, they made for the same crossing point on the Swiss border and, once 
successfully across, they turned themselves over to the Swiss border guards in the same 
town, Ramsen, as Neave and Luteyn had done.  Their report includes far more detail 
about the maps they used, including mention of a ‘Swiss frontier map and half inch 
diameter brass compass, both W.D. issue.’276  In this context, the acronym W.D. almost 
certainly referred to the War Department (or Office).  It also becomes apparent that they 
must have received feedback from Neave through the coded letter system since they 
made very specific mention of beginning reconnaissance in daylight ‘to find Neave’s 
fork’ in the road leading to the frontier.  Many years after the war, in 1974, Neave 
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himself confirmed this in an interview he gave to his local newspaper.  He stated 
unequivocally that he had sent back details of the precise Swiss frontier crossing point 
to Colditz in a coded letter and that ‘the same route was later used successfully by 
Major Pat Reid.’277    
          The SBO’s history also made very clear that ‘a comprehensive supply of maps 
covering the whole of Germany was available to intending escapers.’278  Those men 
whose escape plans had been endorsed by the Escape Committee were required to make 
their own copies of the maps so that they would learn more thoroughly the detail of 
their planned route.  It was also made clear that intending escapers were shown detailed 
maps of the frontier but were never allowed to copy those particular maps, being 
required rather to memorise them, for reasons of security.    
          Careful reassembly of the various pieces of the story has shed important new light 
on Neave and Luteyn’s chosen escape route.  It can now be reasonably asserted that 
such parcels as had already been despatched to Colditz prior to January 1942 contained 
specifically a copy of sheet Y or A2 which aided considerably the first successful 
escape of a British officer from the camp, namely that of Lieutenant Airey Neave.   It is, 
moreover, now possible to contend that, although Neave described the route of his 
escape in considerable detail in his published account and said next to nothing about the 
maps, he nevertheless made use of them.  In his first published book, he described how 
he had traced in Indian ink ‘the neighbourhood of the Swiss frontier from a stolen map’, 
offering no explanation on the apparent theft.
279
  To have had an opportunity to steal a 
map of the Swiss border is, at best, regarded as unlikely, not least since Colditz was 
located in northern Germany, a considerable distance from the Swiss border.  He added 
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that the currency they were given for their journey had come from ‘black market deals 
with the guards’ and that Luteyn had been able to buy ‘a map of the surrounding 
country in a small shop’ in Ulm during their journey to the border.280  That again 
appears to be an unlikely assertion.  There is, however, extant documentary evidence 
which indicates that MI9 had despatched gramophone records to 18 named individuals 
in Colditz in May 1941.
281
  The despatch list indicated that one record in each box 
contained ‘a map of the frontier’.  Whilst there is no indication that it was actually sheet 
Y or A2, or indeed that the frontier was the Swiss frontier, the circumstantial evidence 
is strong.  One of those parcels was addressed to Captain P.R. Reid.  Reid had been 
appointed in January 1941 by the Colditz SBO to be in charge of escaping.  By October 
of that year, an Escape Committee had been formed and Neave had been appointed to 
be Reid’s deputy and had been placed in charge of the Committee’s Maps Section.282  It 
was the Map Officer’s responsibility to hide the maps being held in the Camp.  It was 
Reid who closed the door through which Neave and Luteyn escaped from Colditz, and 
who was subsequently able to escape successfully via the same route.  The conclusion 
to be drawn, therefore, is that Neave and Luteyn had access to maps supplied by MI9, 
and Neave’s commitment to his promise never to disclose information about smuggled 
MI9 maps led to the fudged account in his first book.  
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Illustration XVIII: Pesant’s sketch map 
 
 
          Neave’s personal papers contain a sketch map (see Illustration XVIII) showing 
the route he and Luteyn took once they had arrived in close proximity to the Swiss 
border.  It was surprisingly, however, not drawn by Neave, but was rather sent to him 
by a Cuban architect, Roberto Pesant, who wrote in the accompanying letter, dated 23
rd
 
September 1958, that it was his attempt to reconstruct Neave and Luteyn’s crossing of 
the Swiss frontier from the textual description contained in Neave’s book, published in 
1953.  He asked that Neave comment on the accuracy of his tracing of the exact escape 
route.  Neave replied to Pesant on 9
th
 October that the sketch map was ‘extremely 
good’, correcting a couple of aspects and commenting ‘we actually went through the 
town of Singen travelling westward before we turned south to cross the frontier as your 
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map describes’.283  Both sheets Y and A2, show the frontier crossing point on the road 
between Singen and Ramsen, located in the extreme south east corner of both sheets, 
but depicted with rather more clarity on A2 than on sheet Y. 
          For MI9, any escape from Colditz was a priority. These were, after all, the men 
who had repeatedly tried to put the MI9 philosophy of escape-mindedness into action.  
They had failed to make it back to the UK to date, but they had certainly proved 
themselves worthy of every aspect of the support mechanism which MI9 could muster.  
To this end, MI9 had developed a special coded message system, Number V, and 
proceeded to reserve its use for contact with the Colditz prisoners of war.
284
  They 
managed to send a detailed explanation of the official system through a series of coded 
messages using the existing private code which one of the prisoners of war, Captain 
R.F.T. Barry, had had the foresight to set up with his wife prior to deployment (refer to 
Chapter 4 for the detail of what transpired).  It is also clear that Neave was on MI9’s 
Special Watch List since the War Diary entry for January 1942, the month in which 
Neave escaped, noted that during the month ‘one British Officer succeeded in escaping 
from Germany to Switzerland.  He was on the Special Watch List and had received 
escape material’.  Whilst he was not identified in the War Diary entry, it was rare for the 
War Diary reports to comment on individual escapes; they tended rather to document 
monthly escape statistics.  Since Neave was the first British officer to escape 
successfully from Colditz, clearly using information with which he had been provided 
by MI9, it was likely regarded by MI9 as worthy of special mention.    
          Like all successful escapers, Neave was interviewed on his return to London.   
The report of his debriefing is of particular interest in itself.  The report is not to be 
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found in the general collection of such reports where the vast majority are to be found 
but rather in the Historical Record of MI9, almost buried from sight.
285
  A copy was 
also subsequently found in the Colditz Camp history.  The report was also notable for 
its brevity.  Most of the reports carried detailed descriptions of the escape, offering 
commentary on likely routes, appropriate behaviour, and places to avoid.  There is a far 
more detailed description of the escape in Neave’s published account than there is in the 
debriefing report.
286
  Certainly he made no mention at all in his escape report of any use 
of maps.  It was MI9’s practice to ensure that any information gleaned from returning 
escapers was relayed back to the camps to help inform and update the planning of the 
escapes.  It was for that reason that a coded message was relayed on 11
th
 November 
1944 indicating ‘strangers near schaffhausen salient are liable to arrest for questioning 
even if papers are in order’.287  Whilst it is known that the message definitely went to 
the Milag and Marlag Camp, such a message would certainly have been relayed to all 
the camps with which MI9 was in contact.  Some detail of the Swiss frontier was also 
acquired from the Dutch since two of their number had almost succeeded in reaching 
Switzerland, only to be foiled at the last moment, recaptured and returned to Colditz.
288
 
          There is clearly sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that Neave indeed 
had access to sheet Y or A2, although he personally never declared that fact in his 
description of the escape, either in the report he wrote on arrival back in the UK in 1942 
or, indeed, in the book he subsequently wrote about his escape which he later published. 
Neave kept his secrets, as he had been briefed to do, and it is understandable that no 
inkling of what really happened in terms of the maps was ever revealed in his book, 
published so soon after the war.  He certainly made clear in the interview he gave in 
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1974 that there was a great deal he had never revealed.  Sadly, he was murdered by the 
IRA in 1979, long before the notions that secrecy about possession of escape and 
evasion maps would have seemed redundant.  Even so, it is worth recalling that Foot 
remained reticent in discussing the maps until the end of his life.   
          This all certainly appeared to mirror the pre-deployment briefings which Foot had 
described and the order that  ‘maps were never discussed’, and the extent to which it 
reflected his and Langley’s expressed view that to discuss such methods could prove 
prejudicial to their future deployment.
289
  Looking at the statistics produced by MI9 at 
the end of the war, it is clear that the escape route out of Germany and into Switzerland 
was not only one of their targeted routes but was also one of the most successful: the 
total number of escapes through Switzerland was 5,143, almost 20% of all successful 
escapes from enemy occupied territory by the end of the war.
290
  Foot and Langley 
reasonably drew attention to the fact that wartime statistics ‘cannot be claimed as 
perfect’, and there are certainly variations in the figures which appear in various sources 
at the time.  The figures do not, however, vary significantly enough for there to be 
serious concern over their veracity.  It is also notable that the figures did emanate from 
MI9 which, it is known, was keenly and carefully monitoring the numbers of escapes on 
a monthly basis.
291
  
          Unravelling the story in this research of Neave’s escape has served to bring into 
focus the true contribution of the mapping programme to successful escapes and 
emphasises the extent to which MI9’s considerable efforts to communicate with the 
camps and smuggle the maps successfully to the prisoners of war paid very real 
dividends.  Escaping from Colditz was, in itself, a significant challenge; travelling 
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successfully through Germany over 400 miles to the Swiss border and crossing 
successfully to freedom was arguably only possible with detailed navigational 
information which the maps and the supporting intelligence provided.  The following 
chapter details two further case studies which seek to progress the theme of considering 
the role of the maps.  They will be used to reinforce the notion that the maps were 
indeed fit for purpose and played a major role in contributing to successful escapes.   
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Chapter 6 
Case studies: the Baltic ports and maps produced in the camps 
‘For some a map is not a piece of paper: it is a passport...’292 
 
The final two case studies seek to demonstrate further the value of MI9’s mapping 
programme and the ways in which it contributed to successful escapes.  The first one 
describes another escape route selected by MI9 which was to prove even more 
successful than the Schaffhausen route.  The final case study, albeit unsupported by 
surviving written testimony regarding the escape attempts concerned, demonstrates a 
critically important aspect of MI9’s escape programme, namely the copying of maps 
that were smuggled into the prisoner of war camps.  The methods employed by 
prisoners of war to make copies of the maps which they received has been described 
previously in Chapter 3.  However, the remarkable chance survival of two such copies 
in a Scottish university map collection is used as a final example to demonstrate the 
extent to which the maps could, and did, provide a veritable passport to freedom for 
some prisoners of war. 
Case Study 2: The Baltic Ports 
The second case study relates to the Baltic ports and includes descriptions of the escape 
experiences of Lieutenant John Pryor RN, Lieutenant David Pelham James of the Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), and Flight Lieutenant Oliver Lawrence Spurling 
Philpot DFC of 42 Squadron Coastal Command RAF.  The route via the Baltic ports 
was another of MI9’s recommended escape routes.  The Bulletin made clear that it was 
the most effective route to try to escape from occupied Europe and reach Sweden, a 
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neutral country.
293
  Danzig, Gdynia, Stettin, Rostock and Lübeck were regarded as the 
key Baltic ports to be targeted by MI9 as potential escape routes and the aim was 
always that the escapers should be looking to board a ship of the neutral nation, 
Sweden.  In extremis, some escapers resorted to Finnish ships in the hope that they 
planned to dock in a Swedish port on their return trip to Finland.    Large scale maps of 
all five ports were produced for incorporation in the Bulletin for training and briefing 
purposes (see Appendix 9 and Chapter 3).    
          There is also separate evidence to support the contention that MI9 produced 
escape and evasion versions of the port plans.  A large scale map of Danzig harbour 
(A4) at approximately 1: 16000 scale has been mentioned previously at Chapter 2.  It 
was produced in relatively small numbers in October 1942, some 300 copies in total, 
half of which were printed on silk and half on paper (refer to Appendix 1).  Analysis of 
the detail showed that it was based directly on British Admiralty (BA) chart 2377.  The 
BA chart actually comprised two large scale port plans of Danzig and Gdynia harbours.  
The Danzig plan indicated its primary source as a 1933 German Government Chart.  
Sheet A4 was a small section only of the BA Danzig port plan, centred on the railway 
terminal and timber wharves at Wechselmünde, but oriented differently, being 
significantly east of a true north bearing, and it was void of all soundings information.  
The basic topographic detail was retained and enhanced with what can only be 
described as field intelligence annotations (see Illustration III at page 67).  The Danzig 
map was produced in various forms by MI9.  At least three versions have been 
identified: there may have been more.  The different versions, varying in geographical 
extent, content, scale and sheet numbering identification, are listed at Appendices 1 and 
9.  Close scrutiny of the map detail revealed its true purpose.  Almost in the centre of 
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the map were two annotations: these were ‘Swedish ships load coal here’ and ‘Swedish 
ships unload ore here’.  If an escaper could board the ship of a neutral nation, his escape 
had virtually succeeded.  Should the escaper get as far as the port, there was sufficient 
information on the map, not only to locate ships of a neutral nation but also to show the 
most accessible route to the wharves where those ships would have docked.  Additional 
annotations showed ‘open farm land intersected by ditches’, ‘impassable marshy 
ground’, ‘large lone bush’, the location of sentries and searchlights, with even the extent 
of ‘the possible arc of light’ being drawn in the area of the railway sidings.  Such 
detailed intelligence could only have been acquired from returning escapers who had 
successfully navigated that escape route.  As already noted in Chapter 3, there is 
considerable evidence that all who successfully returned to the UK were questioned 
closely on their experiences and that all relevant intelligence was fed back both directly 
to the camps, through the coded letter system, and also included in the training lectures 
and the Bulletin.
294
    
          The small numbers produced of the Danzig port plan appeared to indicate that 
MI9’s intention was never to issue them directly to potential escapers during escape 
training or pre-deployment briefing but rather to use them as briefing aids and also to 
send them directly to the camps for targeted escapes.  Certainly, of the five port plans 
which appeared in the MI9 Bulletins (refer to Appendix 9), it has been challenging to 
find the evidence to support the contention that escape and evasion versions were 
produced, since extant copies of only one of the port plans, Danzig,  have been 
discovered to date.   No extant copies of Lübeck, Gdynia, Stettin or Rostock produced 
on fabric have yet been identified and none of the production records identified to date 
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has any indication of their production on fabric or paper media as escape and evasion 
maps.   However, entries in the War Diary do in fact indicate that escape and evasion 
versions of some of the port plans were produced.  For example, in December 1942, the 
War Diary entry indicated that a sketch map of Stettin Docks had been passed for 
reproduction prior to being sent to the German camps.
295
  Similarly, in February 1944, 
the War Diary entry reported that a plan of Gdynia, described as being ‘maps for 
prisoners of war’, had been passed for reproduction.  It is, therefore, clear that the port 
plans were being produced as escape and evasion maps to be sent directly to the camps 
in Germany to support planned escapes.   
 
          It should be recalled that those being briefed prior to operational deployment or 
during training at the Highgate school were not allowed to make copies of any maps 
which appeared in the Bulletin.  Those intelligence officers who were briefed on these 
potential escape routes were allowed only to use the maps for briefing purposes and 
those being briefed were expected to memorise, and not copy, the map detail.  The 
evidence of the War Diary entries does, however, appear to indicate that the large scale 
plans of the Baltic ports were being produced and sent to the camps, although there is 
no indication of the numbers being printed.  It is beyond question that these routes out 
of captivity to freedom were an integral part of MI9’s plans.  They were well used by 
escapers and many succeeded in gaining freedom through that route. 
   
          Sweden proved to be the most successful route home for many escapers and 
evaders: 30% of all returning personnel came home through this route and the large 
proportion had travelled there via the Baltic ports.
296
  The advisory notes on escape 
routes in the Bulletin were regularly updated with fresh intelligence and tips from 
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returning escapers. In February 1944, the Bulletin was revised to indicate that contact 
with foreign dockers could be made in certain Stettin cafés, and there were many 
helpful suggestions on the best ways to stow away successfully on board Swedish 
ships.
297
  Coded letters were also used as a means of conveying escape intelligence and 
advice to the camps.  For example, in September 1944, a coded message was sent by 
MI9 to Lieutenant Commander M.J.A. O’Sullivan RN in the Marlag and Milag Nord 
Camp indicating that four escapers had reached Sweden via Stettin.  It described that: 
 two entered Gotzlow Quay where wire meets SE end of 
basin.  Two got ship Reiher Werder Hafen.  Help received 
from French camp just E of zabelsdorf station.
298
   
 
Barely a month later, however, a coded message was sent to the camps indicating ‘ref 
escapes no more Swedish ships from Hun ports’, a clear indication that, for whatever 
reason, Swedish ships were no longer calling at German ports.
299
  This was likely to 
have resulted from Swedish anticipation of Allied victory over Germany, as they 
advanced northwards and eastwards from the Normandy landings.  Effectively, this 
meant that the escape route via the Baltic ports was no longer feasible.   Although the 
order that prisoners of war need no longer consider it their duty to escape was not issued 
until 13
th
 January 1945, well before that date (not least through regular wireless contact) 
the camps certainly knew of the Allied landings on mainland Europe.
300
    
 
Attempted escapes via the Baltic ports 
Three escapes which attempted to use the route via the Baltic ports will now be 
examined, one unsuccessful and two successful.  The first is that of Lieutenant John 
Pryor RN, who has already been mentioned in Chapter 4 since it was his coded letters 
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which were used as an example to demonstrate the role of the coded letters in MI9’s 
work.  There are, however, other aspects of Pryor’s experience which serve to highlight 
important aspects of MI9’s escape programme and one of those is the extent to which 
his experience reflected both MI9’s escape philosophy and the importance of the Baltic 
ports as a selected escape route.   
          Pryor was educated at Oundle School, Northamptonshire, from 1933 to 1937.  He 
took the military candidate examinations in 1937 and joined the Royal Navy in 
September that year.  As a cadet he trained on HMS Erebos and then served as a 
midshipman on HMS Vindictive, HMS Hood and HMS Warspite.  In 1940 he was 
ordered to Poole to assist in the small ships’ evacuation from Dunkirk.301  On Thursday 
13
th
 June, he was on board a Dutch coaster, HMS Hebe, as second lieutenant, and 
played his part in rescuing 200 of the 51
st
 Highlanders from the beach at Sainte Valérie 
in Normandy, transferring them to a troop ship waiting off-shore.  They returned to 
shore and collected a second group of troops but were unfortunate enough to be 
grounded on an unmarked shoal and came under heavy fire.  The vessel was unarmed.  
Everyone on board was forced to disembark and captured by the Germans.  As a young 
officer, and in line with German practice to separate officers and men, Pryor was 
separated from the crew of the Hebe immediately and grouped with some captured 
British Army officers.  Two of these immediately approached him, asking if he would 
join them in an escape attempt.
302
  MI9 always briefed that the best time to escape was 
before they finished up behind barbed wire.  Sadly the escape attempt did not include 
Pryor as he was quickly separated from the Army officers and placed in another lorry 
for transport away from the coast.  The group he was in was moved in stages by road, 
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north to Belgium, and by late June they were travelling on Dutch and German 
waterways deep into the heart of Germany.  By 6
th
 July he was in Laufen, south east of 
Munich having travelled for some days on board a train crowded with British prisoners 
of war.  In Laufen, close to Austria, he was taken by lorry to Oflag VIIC/H, a camp 
converted from the Archbishop of Salzburg’s summer residence on the west bank of the 
River Salz, where some 500 captured British officers were being held.  It was another 
month before his parents heard that he had been captured and he received his first letter 
from them on 24
th
 September: it was dated 12
th
 August.  He ‘celebrated’ his birthday on 
12
th
 November which he recalled, unsurprisingly, as a ‘bad day’.  His memoirs do, 
however, highlight the extent to which the prisoners of war showed that indomitable 
British sense of humour and tried to poke fun at their German captors, a practice which 
they often described as ‘goon-baiting’.303  As the Germans attempted to make them drill 
to German words of command, they would respond by ensuring that the entire parade 
became a shambles by everyone doing different things.  On 18
th
 November all the sea-
faring officers, whether from the Royal or Merchant Navies, were forced to march 20 
kilometres to Oflag VIIC/Z at Titmoning.  It was here, he recalled, that they started to 
receive Red Cross parcels.     
          The story of how Pryor joined the team of MI9 coded correspondents has already 
been told in Chapter 4.  On 20
th
 January 1941, Pryor, Elder and other naval officers 
were transported by rail and lorry to the Sandbostel camp in northern Germany, some 
40 kilometres north east of Bremen.  This proved to be a large camp comprising several 
barbed wire compounds, rows of military huts and watch towers.  The flat, sandy 
topography must have looked particularly bleak in the middle of winter, but it was clear 
that they felt more comfortable surrounded by naval colleagues in the Marlag and Milag 
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Nord huts (Marinelager and Marineinternaten Lager).  Pryor’s awareness of the extent 
to which ‘escaping was the duty of a PoW’, however hopeless a task it might appear, 
has already been highlighted.  Both in this camp, however, and the new Marlag and 
Milag Nord camp later constructed by the Germans south west of Sandbostel, it is clear 
that the there was always much activity focussed on escaping, specifically on digging 
tunnels.  Additionally, a radio had been acquired in exchange for 2000 cigarettes from a 
Belgian worker.  The prisoners of war were often better provided with cigarettes and 
chocolates from Red Cross parcels, bolstered also by supplies sent in by MI9, than 
either the local German population or conscripted workers, and they often used these as 
a form of currency.
304
  The new radio replaced the crystal set, which had been 
ingeniously constructed by using the wiring of the hut as an aerial and which had been 
accidentally destroyed by the German guards during a search: this allowed them to 
listen to the BBC news which was subsequently cascaded orally through the other huts 
every night.
305
   
          Pryor had been sending coded messages to his parents for some time but it was on 
7
th
 May 1942 that he sent the one requesting specific help from MI9 in support of a 
planned escape.  The deciphered message, requesting, amongst other things, maps of the 
Swiss border has been described in detail in Chapter 4.  Pryor disclosed the details of 
the parcel he received from MI9 and the efforts employed in the camp post room to 
ensure that the special parcels were not spotted and opened by the German guards.   
Pryor continued by describing the chess board  and pieces he had received and the 
extent to which escape aids had been concealed in the board.  Whilst Pryor made no 
mention of any maps at this stage, it was common for maps to be secreted inside 
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chessboards by MI9 (see illustration IX at page 99).  All the items received were handed 
over to the escape committee.   
          Together with Lieutenant John Wells, John Pryor’s plan to escape, which would 
have been sanctioned by the escape committee, was to pretend to be foreign workers 
dressed in suitable working attire and carrying forged passes.    They planned to travel 
by night and hide by day.  No mention was made by Pryor that they had access to any 
maps, but he had managed to make a compass by magnetising two sewing needles with 
the magnet in the handle of his razor and using a hollow shirt stud as the pivot.  Their 
plan involved them walking the estimated 45 miles to Hamburg, taking two or three 
nights to complete this section of their journey, and then boarding a train to the port of 
Lübeck where they would hope to find a Swedish ship in the harbour and smuggle 
themselves on board.  As previously indicated, this was a classic MI9 escape route on 
which they would have briefed intelligence officers many times.  The previously cited 
Danzig map (see illustration III at page 67) clearly illustrated the approach to escaping 
to a neutral country from a northern German or Polish port and it is known that MI9 
similarly produced a map of the port of Lübeck.  Whilst the only extant copy of this 
map which has been discovered to date has been the Bulletin version, as late as June 
1944 a new plan of Lübeck docks was being reported in the War Diary as having been 
produced and was being sent to the prisoner of war camps.
306
 
          Pryor and Wells took their opportunity on 20
th
 September 1943.  They remained 
on the run for two days but were sadly recaptured on the second night when they were 
seen by two policemen and, whilst Wells tried (in halting German) to talk their way out 
of the situation, Pryor was searched and found to have ‘equipment and a jacket full of 
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oatcakes’.307  They received the customary spell in solitary confinement but managed to 
see the positive side of their solitude as an agreeable change to the communal life they 
had experienced in captivity for the previous three years.  Whilst Pryor’s bid for 
freedom was not successful, it is clear from his memoirs that there were many escapes 
attempted by others in the camp, some, although by no means all, of which were 
similarly unsuccessful.   
          The escape of Lieutenant David Pelham James of the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve (RNVR) was notable since he did succeed in making his bid for freedom via 
the Baltic ports’ route.  James had made multiple escape attempts throughout his 
captivity.  His final and successful attempt was from the Marlag and Milag Nord Camp 
on 10
th
 February 1944, disguised as a ‘distressed Swedish sailor’ and he took the Baltic 
ports escape route.  He arrived back in the UK on 16
th
 March 1944.  His final escape 
journey proved to be extremely tortuous.  He journeyed initially by train to Lübeck, the 
same route which Pryor had planned to take.  When he could find no Swedish ships, he 
travelled on to Stettin where he similarly failed to find a suitable ship to board.  Stettin 
was the port where MI9 had suggested in their briefings that a good place to find 
Swedish sailors was in the local brothel.  It was a particularly useful venue for those 
attempting to escape since it was reserved for foreigners: no Germans were allowed to 
enter.  It was eventually blown up by the RAF during a raid in the summer of 1944.
308
  
In desperation, as he was running out of money, James continued on to Danzig where he 
eventually found a Danish ship, the Scandia, which he boarded and was befriended by a 
stoker.  He mentioned in his account that, had he known the layout of the port and 
continued for another three miles, he would have found the berth of the Swedish ships.  
In itself, this appeared to indicate that he personally had had no access to the Danzig 
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port plan.  However, he did know enough to make his way to a port and to seek out a 
ship bound for a neutral country.  The ship left Danzig and docked in Lübeck port en 
route for Denmark.  James knew the geography of Lübeck reasonably well from a 
previous, failed, escape attempt.  In Lübeck, he then boarded a Finnish ship bound for 
Stockholm, bribed the stoker and 60 hours later he was in the safe-keeping of the British 
consul in Stockholm.
309
   
          One final example of the successful use of this route was the escape of Flight 
Lieutenant Oliver Philpot who flew with the RAF Coastal Command out of Leuchars on 
11
th
 December 1941.  His mission was to patrol the coast of Norway, taking aerial 
photographs.  On seeing a German convoy, he attacked on a ‘mast high bombing run.’  
The enemy returned fire and the aircraft took direct hits in the starboard engine and tail.  
He was forced to land in the sea and all the crew made it into the dinghy before the 
aircraft sank.  They drifted for two days and were subsequently picked up by a German 
convoy.  Philpot was eventually imprisoned in Stalag Luft III at Sagan.   He escaped on 
29
th
 October 1943 through a tunnel and travelled by train from Sagan, over 100 miles 
south of Berlin, north to the Baltic ports.  He made for the port of Danzig and indicated 
in his escape report that he was familiar with the local geography from ‘the flimsy of 
which I had a copy and which proved invaluable’.310  The ‘flimsy’ was almost certainly 
sheet A4 of the port of Danzig which had been produced on both silk and tissue by MI9.  
He eventually boarded the Swedish ship Bjorn which was loading coal.   Although the 
Captain was not happy with his presence on board, he was hidden in the coal bunker by 
the crew and landed in Södertälje on 3
rd
 November.  He travelled by train to Stockholm 
and arrived at the British Legation on 4
th
 November.  Yet again, there is evidence that 
                                                             
309 
James. Escaper’s Progress, p.137.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
310
 TNA: WO 208/3242, pp.236-244 is the full report of his debriefing on arrival back in 
the UK. 
186 
 
copies of the large scale port plans were reaching the camps and being put to very good 
use by those planning to escape.   
 
           Despite their failed escape bids, it is clear that Pryor and his colleagues continued 
to plan escapes and harass their German captors as well as they could.  Their activity 
continued up to the Normandy landings in June 1944.  Later, messages were broadcast 
that prisoners of war should no longer attempt to escape but remain in their camps, the 
famous ‘stay-put’ order.311  MI9 was quick to realise that escaped prisoners of war 
roaming around the front line would likely be in danger and also a possible distraction 
to the advancing Allies.   Pryor and his colleagues were eventually liberated on 6
th
 May 
1945 by the 7
th
 Armoured Division and he was repatriated to his family home in 
Saltash, Cornwall, on 8
th
 May, VE Day, after almost five years in captivity.  He went on 
to continue to serve his country in a long and distinguished career as a hydrographic 
survey officer in the Royal Navy.   
             
          There are numerous examples, in both the published literature and contemporary 
records, of escapes, both successful and unsuccessful, via Swedish or Finnish ships 
from the Baltic ports.  Certainly, Lieutenant John Pryor’s unsuccessful escape with 
Johnny Wells from Milag und Marlag Nord in 1943 was an attempt to reach Lübeck.  
Whilst they were captured before they had succeeded in reaching the railway, Pryor did 
acknowledge that Lübeck was their planned destination.  James also headed directly for 
the Baltic ports, trying them in turn until he found a suitable ship.  Similarly, Philpot 
made directly for Danzig, indicating that he had access to a map which had afforded 
him knowledge of the local geography of the port.  It is a matter of record that this was 
the most successful escape route which MI9 established out of occupied Europe, to 
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Sweden and eventual freedom.  It is also a matter of record that MI9 produced large 
scale plans of the Baltic ports and persuasive evidence has been found to support the 
contention that those same maps were sent to the camps for use in escapes.  Yet again, 
MI9 planned a particular route to freedom, briefed in detail on it, and produced the 
maps to ensure that the prisoners of war had the very best chance of success when using 
this particular route.    
 
Case Study 3: maps produced in the camps    
The final case study comprises a short review of two extant maps which were 
discovered in a Scottish University collection and proved to be extremely rare.   It is a 
matter of historical record that the prisoners of war spent much time and energy copying 
maps from originals which MI9 succeeded in getting into the camps.  Some of the detail 
of this copying activity has been examined already in Chapter 3.  Multiple copies of the 
maps which were successfully sent into the camps by MI9 could be provided when 
multiple escapes were planned and executed.  If only one map got through, there was a 
clear need to copy it and the most straightforward way was simply to trace a copy.  
There is enough published evidence to confirm that this practice took place.  Neave 
described the practice of copying maps to support planned escapes.
312
  The camp 
histories written at the end of the war also described the activity, organised by the 
various escape committees (refer to Chapter 3 for detail of the activity).  However, to 
identify such copies in a British map collection is exceptional, certainly unique for this 
researcher.  The first manuscript map shown as illustration XIX was clearly drawn in 
Oflag VB.  That deduction is based on the fact that Oflag VB was located in Biberach 
which is shown at the northern edge of this map.  The map extends from this point to 
the Swiss frontier which was the escape route which would logically be taken from that 
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particular camp, since it represented the shortest distance to freedom.  A number of high 
profile escapes took place from Biberach.  Whilst many of them, not least that of Hugh 
Woollatt, Neave’s companion on the journey back from Switzerland, did escape via the 
Schaffhausen Salient, some successfully crossed the Swiss border at the eastern end of 
Lake Constance.   Indeed, the Germans realised the success of that route very early on 
and guarded that particular area so closely, that eventually most escapers from Biberach 
chose to travel the longer western route via Schaffhausen.  
Illustration XIX : manuscript map of route from Biberach to the Swiss frontier 
 
(Illustration provided by, and reproduced with, the permission of the University of 
Glasgow.)  
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          The map is in manuscript form and had been hanging on a library wall for many 
years before being properly identified.  The local record simply stated that the map had 
been deposited in the collection in 1947: the donor was not named but the map was 
described as a World War II prisoner of war map.   It was relatively straight forward to 
identify the MI9 map from which the Biberach tracing had been made.  It proved to be 
sheet L32-2/Konstanz of GSGS 3982 [Fabric] (see Illustration V on page 72).  The 
detail is so closely allied, it is clearly the source map.    
          The second manuscript map (see illustration XX) was far less easy to identify 
since it was so badly faded.  However, the availability in this day and age of software 
packages capable of enhancing photographic detail to a quite remarkable extent has 
allowed for the successful redrawing of the original map and identification of the MI9 
map from which it was apparently copied (see illustration XXI).
313
  It would appear that 
the source map is likely to have been sheet A (see illustration XXII), produced by 
Waddington at MI9’s direction from a Bartholomew map (refer to Appendix 1 and 
Chapter 2 for details of the source map).  Sheet A was certainly one of, if not the, 
earliest map in the whole of MI9’s map production programme, witnessed by the map 
being identified by the first letter of the alphabet.  It is also possibly the map which MI9 
termed Double Eagle, providing small-scale coverage of both Germany and Austria, and 
adjacent areas.      
          The existence of these two maps in a Scottish university map collection bears 
witness to the fact that they must have been used in successful escapes: how else could 
they have found their way to the UK?  They are a unique testimony to the efforts of the  
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Illustration XX : manuscript escape map (left)  
Illustration XXI : enhanced image of escape map (right) 
Illustration XXII: part of sheet A
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prisoners of war and the extent to which they were supported in their endeavours by the 
maps produced by MI9.   
Conclusion 
The three case studies were selected in an attempt to prove the considerable value of 
MI9’s mapping programme.  Each study has highlighted the value of a particular map or 
maps and the extent to which they fulfilled the role for which they were designed.   It 
was a challenging task, not least since there are so few original accounts of the use of 
the maps on which to draw.  Too many of the sources make scant mention of the maps 
or of their use and value.  It has been a lengthy task to piece together the little evidence 
which does exist and construct these three case studies.  Certainly in all three case 
studies, some telling proof exists of the extent to which the maps fulfilled precisely the 
role for which MI9 in general, and Hutton in particular, had produced them.   There is 
no way of assessing just how representative the case studies are, since so much of the 
detail of the maps and their use went unrecorded and cannot, therefore, be recaptured, 
analysed and assessed.  It seems fair to conclude, however, that the circumstantial 
evidence uncovered in the case studies is likely to have been the tip of the proverbial 
iceberg in terms of the escapes actually undertaken and the way in which the maps 
successfully fulfilled the role for which they had been designed.     
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Conclusion 
‘It was too little, too late.’ J.M.Langley.314 
This thesis has reconstructed, documented and analysed the escape and evasion 
mapping programme of MI9 and has set the programme in the wider context of the 
whole escape and evasion activity on which MI9 had embarked.  The work of this 
particular military intelligence branch has been afforded little recognition in the study of 
the history of British intelligence organisations of World War II.  Hitherto, the MI9 
mapping programme has been given even less attention and yet this study has shown 
that it amounts to a very significant chapter in the evolution of British military mapping 
and a notable episode in the history of twentieth century cartography.  The background 
research has shown that there has been a long history of military mapping on silk and 
other fabrics.  For all sorts of reasons, however, it transpires that MI9 was never in a 
position to benefit from that history and experience.   Nonetheless, it was able to mount 
a very significant programme of escape and evasion mapping despite the role played by 
an arguably self-possessed, eccentric and narrowly focussed individual who was 
allowed to operate with little or no restriction.  The context in which the branch was 
operating also arguably took its toll.  As a newly spawned intelligence branch, it lacked 
supporters from the beginning of its existence and was, too often, regarded as a threat 
by its sister organisations in the intelligence arena.   This conclusion sets out the key 
research findings and seeks to assess the extent to which MI9 was able to fulfil its role 
as the organisation responsible for escape and evasion despite the challenges which it 
undoubtedly faced: in essence, was it really ‘too little, too late’ as Langley wrote?  It 
considers the extent to which the mapping programme, as described in this thesis, 
contributed value to that role and places that programme in the wider context of British 
military mapping.     
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Maps as geo-political artefacts 
The first of the findings of studying the MI9 mapping programme is undoubtedly the 
role played by military maps as geo-political artefacts.  It was envisaged from the 
beginning of the study that a key outcome of the research would be the creation of as 
full an inventory as possible of all the escape and evasion maps that were produced 
between 1939 and 1945.  Discovering the sheer size and scope of the MI9 mapping 
programme was, however, never anticipated.  The individual maps discovered and 
identified have been documented in the nine appendices produced as an integral part of 
this thesis.  Where possible, full carto-bibliographic records have been produced and the 
location of extant copies of the maps, wherever possible without breaching confidences, 
has been provided, largely in publicly accessible repositories. No such comprehensive 
record has survived, either in The National Archives or elsewhere, and no previous 
attempt to reconstruct it has ever been made, so far as this researcher and the custodians 
of leading map collections in this country are aware.  This carto-bibliography thus 
stands as a statement of the map research contributed by this thesis.  It should also prove 
to be a valuable resource in the future, enabling librarians, researchers and students of 
historical cartography to identify precisely what it is they hold or subsequently discover.    
          There is no doubt that maps were important in reflecting and demonstrating both 
nationalism and imperialism, as well as acting as exemplars of educational standards 
and national ideals.  It is, therefore, worthwhile exploring briefly the extent to which the 
escape and evasion mapping programme of World War II tells us anything about this 
country’s culture and outlook.  Heffernan has written a number of interesting and 
arguably relevant papers concerning ‘the map as a geopolitical artefact’.315  However, 
these related largely to the early years of the twentieth century and to the First World 
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War, exploring persuasively the relationship between maps and politics.  Others have 
attempted a similar exploration during World War II.  Balchin, in particular, was 
commissioned by the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 1985 to record the role 
played by geographers in World War II.
316
  He considered the maxim that ‘Geography 
had always been vital to the prosecution of war’ and the extent to which it was ‘the 
intelligent use of geographical knowledge that outwits the enemy and wins wars.’  The 
value of training in geography had been realised during the First World War.  
Geography was deemed vital to the successful prosecution of war in three ways, namely 
in intelligence, logistics and action.  This awareness had resulted in the rapid 
development of the subject in universities and schools during the inter-war period.  
          It is an interesting aspect of Balchin’s findings that at no point did he mention 
MI9 or its escape and evasion mapping programme in his report to the RGS.  And yet, 
he must have been aware of it since Foot and Langley’s definitive account of the 
organisation is included in the list of references accompanying the report.  He certainly 
considered the role of maps and even mentioned the value of terrain analysis.  The 
evolution of European topographic mapping services was mentioned, as were the 
responsibilities of the Geographical Section General Staff in the War Office: even the 
role of geographers in SOE is covered in detail.  Of the MI9 mapping programme, 
however, there is absolutely no mention.  Since Balchin relied heavily on interviewing 
those geographers who were still alive and ready to recount their experiences, the single 
reason for that omission can only be the exclusion of any geographers from direct 
involvement in MI9’s mapping programme until the war was well progressed.  The 
reason for that,  in turn, was arguably attributable to Hutton’s single-mindedness in the 
way in which he drove his section’s programme and simply never communicated with 
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those in the War Office who could have offered detailed technical and, not least, 
cartographic production support.       
            Collier has written that ‘Ultimately, it was the Allied capacity for the mass 
production of maps, together with the weapons of war, that was to prove decisive.’317  
He was writing about the development of air survey techniques and their use in 
producing and updating mapping.  What he wrote, however, was arguably as applicable 
to MI9 escape and evasion maps as it was to the operational coverage produced by 
D.Survey.  It is this lacuna in the historiography of cartography in World War II which 
this research has sought to bridge.    
          Heffernan has highlighted the extent to which, on the eve of World War I ‘the 
largest, privately held map collection in London was maintained by the Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS)’ and the extent to which the RGS worked closely with the 
Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS) to produce the maps of Europe, 
North Africa and the Middle East required to support the operational strategy of the WO 
at that time.
318
  And yet barely 20 years later, there is no mention in the extant records 
and secondary sources of any role played by the RGS in World War II.  Why is that?  Is 
it attributable to characters such as Hutton who appeared to have had little awareness of 
the extent to which MI4/GSGS/D.Survey could help in his endeavours?  Had the 
relevance of mapping taken on a different perception among the military intelligentsia?    
There is little doubt that MI4’s absence from London at a critical time may be part of 
the explanation.  Thus the distance of the department responsible for the cartographic 
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revision of operational mapping from aerial reconnaissance from the centrality of 
military awareness and operations between 1939 and 1942 undoubtedly took its toll: 
quite how much is open to discussion and interpretation.  The fact that Hutton, 
apparently oblivious of the importance of that absence from the equation, overcame the 
challenges presented, without any real awareness of the true nature of those challenges, 
is an interesting aspect of the situation.  Evidently, without ever realising that 
organisations existed within Government Service (indeed, in the same Ministry) who 
could have rendered his job very much easier, Hutton nevertheless managed to identify 
individuals and companies who could progress his strategy.  Even so, by excluding the 
operational mapping organisation from the start and by being oblivious to the existence 
of commercial companies with considerable expertise in map production and printing, 
Hutton certainly created challenges for himself and his organisation that need never 
have existed.  Time consuming activities and significant costs were undoubtedly 
incurred which could have been avoided or, at least, contained.  It can, therefore, be 
argued that Hutton succeeded with the mapping programme despite his own lack of 
awareness of those organisations which might have helped him more promptly, more 
immediately and,  arguably, at less cost.   
          It can also be argued that MI9’s escape and evasion mapping programme was not 
about making national statements or an attempt at prestigious symbolism; rather the 
maps were produced as practical, problem-solving items.  Indeed, access to a map that 
depicted the area through which they must travel to reach a safe haven after escaping 
incarceration was quite literally the prisoner’s ‘get out of jail’ card: as revealed in earlier 
chapters, many of the maps were despatched inside Monopoly boards or in playing 
cards. Whilst Hutton cannot be regarded, at least initially, as cartographically literate, 
those officers who received the maps, copied them and used them successfully as the 
prime escape aid, most certainly were.  Unlike Hutton, they belonged to a new 
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generation which had been educated between the wars and had apparently benefited 
from what Balchin described as the upsurge in the teaching of geography, a direct result 
of the hard-won experience of World War I.   For many of them, reading maps and 
navigating routes with the aid of maps was second nature.  They belonged to the ‘Boy’s 
Own’ and the Boy Scout generation and were products largely of the public school 
system which had taught them very effectively the importance of team skills and service 
to King and country.
319
      
Hutton’s role and his focus on the mapping programme 
The research has also revealed the extent to which the mapping programme was an 
essential aspect of MI9’s entire endeavours and it was Christopher Clayton Hutton, 
universally known as ‘Clutty’, who was the key personality involved directly and who 
seems to have been the initiator of the mapping programme.  Hutton proved to be a very 
enigmatic personality.  He was variously described by those who knew and worked with 
him as both an eccentric and a genius.  In reviewing the various members of Crockatt’s 
team, Foot and Langley described Hutton as ‘the joker in the pack’, wayward yet 
original, with an apparently limitless supply of both enthusiasm and ingenuity, and 
possessing no regard for either rules or officialdom.
320
  He clearly was an eccentric 
character and was apparently left by Crockatt very much to his own devices.  Taken ill 
during the war, it seems that he left MI9 on health grounds and there is some later 
indication that he suffered a mental breakdown.
321
  The detail of the letter he wrote from 
his hospital bed in February 1943 to Victor Watson in the Waddington Company 
contained a rather strange request.  He asked that he be sent a list of all the ‘pretty 
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pictures’ (his coded phraseology for maps) and the amounts which had been paid to the 
Company for the work.  The letter ended: 
.......with my kindest regards and many thanks for the troubles 
you all took to help us over a very high stile ..... I am a broken 
spirit at being here and doubt if I shall ever be back but cannot 
tell and don’t much care.322 
Watson realised the inappropriateness of Hutton’s request and responded that he could 
not meet the request, but was happy to send a Waddington game.  In a further letter, 
Hutton acknowledged his misguided behaviour and apologised.  Hutton had left MI9 
but appeared to recover sufficiently from his illness by February 1944 to apply to SOE 
for possible employment.  The vetting form in the file noted his previous employment 
with MI9, but was stamped ‘NOT TO BE EMPLOYED’ owing to ‘traces’.323  The 
precise nature of the traces and concerns was not recorded, possibly his health and state 
of mind, but his attempt to return to the intelligence world, unsurprisingly, met with 
failure.     
          After the war, Hutton ran into further difficulty with the authorities when he tried 
to publish his own story about MI9 and also embark on a lecture tour of the United 
States.  He was keen to highlight the role he had played in MI9’s escape and evasion 
programme and earn some money at the same time.  Insights into what transpired were 
offered by a contemporary file of the Treasury Solicitor.
324
  The first book which Hutton 
published appeared under a pseudonym (Charles Connell) and there is discussion by, 
and exchanges of correspondence with, the Treasury Solicitor in the file.
325
  It appeared 
at one stage that Hutton was likely to be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act if he 
proceeded with publication, and a case against him was certainly being documented for 
the Director of Public Prosecutions.  There was clearly some negotiation with the 
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publisher and, with the inclusion of some agreed wording and the omission of 
(unspecified) sections, publication went ahead in 1955.  After publication, Hutton 
apparently threatened his publisher (Elek) with legal action for including revised 
wording some of which he regarded as libellous.  In May 1957, the Treasury Solicitor 
was informed that the action had been settled out of court and a discontinuance notice 
had been served.
326
 
          The second book he published appeared in 1960 and is the one most commonly 
associated with him.
327
  The final chapter of the book described the various personal and 
professional challenges that he encountered.  Hutton appeared to have been a troubled 
soul.  It is certain he caused himself and MI9 more challenges than were necessary.  He 
appeared to have an almost obsessive personality which led him to pursue his objective 
with single-minded focus and total self-belief.  He appeared to have complete 
conviction and self-assurance, and it may well have been the complexities of his 
personality that caused his eventual illness and hospitalisation, and the end of his career 
with MI9.    He certainly caused considerably more difficulties and costs than should 
have been encountered, and arguably would have been encountered had he sought to 
involve the military map-makers from the start.  It is, however, the case that all who 
knew Hutton, and those who wrote about him, appeared to agree that he was the right 
man for the job.  For all his undoubted weaknesses, it appears to be the case that Hutton, 
virtually single handed, managed to mount and sustain the detailed map production 
programme, and the fact that he managed to do so without the help of those best placed 
to make his life easier, arguably makes his feat the more impressive. 
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A new and inexperienced intelligence organisation 
Before considering just how successful MI9 can be judged to have been, it needs to be 
accepted that any objective judgement should to be set in the context of the wartime 
crisis and against the backdrop of individual and departmental rivalries.  Petty rivalries 
and jealousies apparently persisted despite the popular assumption that they were held 
in abeyance.  It is clear that the newly formed organisation took time to find its feet.  In 
the early days of its existence, this was due largely to a lack of staff.  It took time to 
recruit and staff the various sections, especially when the country was already at war 
and soon sustaining heavy losses and defeats.  As Head of the fledgling service, 
Crockatt was also aware from the beginning that: 
..... secret and semi-secret services like to work in a dense fog 
of security, in which the germs of inter-secret-service jealousy 
breed fast.
328
 
It should be remembered that in 1939 the Foreign Office had wanted MI9 established 
under its direct control.  The reason for that is not stated in the records of the time but is 
very likely to have been so that SIS could exert direct control and influence on its work 
from the beginning.  As it was, the Foreign Office’s opposition was overruled and, 
throughout its existence, MI9 was an integral part of the War Office where it met the 
needs of all three Services.  It became clear from the post-war published works of those 
who were directly involved with MI9 at the time, especially both Neave and Langley, 
that SIS sought to undermine Crockatt, at every opportunity, and control much of his 
Branch’s work.   
             Sir Stewart Menzies had been appointed Chief of SIS, a post generally referred 
to as C (the Chief’s code name after Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming 
KCMG CB who was the first director of what would later become SIS and who always 
initialled papers he read, C.)  Menzies’ appointment  followed the death of Admiral 
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Quex Sinclair in November 1939 and occurred barely a month prior to the creation of 
MI9 and Crockatt’s appointment.  Menzies’ Assistant Chief was Colonel (later Sir) 
Claude Dansey.  Dansey was older (63 years old at the outbreak of war) and it was 
sometimes felt that Menzies deferred to him.  Dansey appeared to be regarded as, and 
apparently preferred to be, something of an eminence grise, rather than the man in 
charge.  As Foot and Langley put it ‘He could have broken Crockatt, or anyone else in 
MI9 ...  and Crockatt knew it’.329  Certainly Crockatt kept his organisation relatively 
small and tight, and appeared to avoid any direct confrontation with SIS, even when he 
was aware of the absence of its support from his section’s work.  Crockatt was, 
however, very clear about SIS’s role and thinking, and the extent to which they were 
motivated by their history and experience during World War I.  At the end of the war, 
he wrote: 
The oft repeated statement that Nurse Edith Cavell, who 
apparently worked for SIS during the last war, had been 
discovered through assisting a prisoner of war seemed to 
dictate the whole attitude of SIS towards the Section.  
They were determined to prevent escapers and evaders 
from involving them in any way.  This attitude may have 
been correct from their own security aspect, but it was a 
terrific handicap to those trying to build up an 
organisation.
330
 
 
Crockatt sought at every stage not to cross SIS’s path.  He encouraged his staff to ‘take 
it quietly and remember we are playing very much a lone hand’.331  SIS had clearly not 
forgotten that in October 1915 Edith Cavell had been shot by the Germans for hiding 
British soldiers in her clinic in Brussels and helping them to escape to neutral territory.  
Whilst Crockatt understood their approach, he clearly regarded it as detrimental to the 
work of MI9.  He was supported in that view by both Langley (who worked for SIS but 
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within MI9) and by Neave (who worked alongside Langley in MI9).  SIS never realised 
that an increase in support for MI9 was needed: 
Their rather negative form of support continued to the last and 
had the inevitable effect of restricting the scope of the 
Section’s work in every country with which it was 
concerned.
332
     
Neave expressed his view very clearly in the second book he wrote.  The cynical belief 
of the other intelligence branches appeared to him to be that airmen shot down by the 
Germans were a matter of minor importance but he felt strongly that was indeed their 
view, describing their actions as ‘this negative campaign.’333  He was convinced that 
MI9 was simply not taken seriously enough, that it lacked influence and was afforded 
the lowest possible priority with the Air Ministry. 
          MI9 had no direct representation in the War Cabinet, whereas SIS did.  Menzies 
knew well before Crockatt did, by July 1940, of the intention to create the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE).  Menzies resented the creation of this subversive 
organisation, independent of SIS’s control.  Together with Dansey, he viewed the 
establishment of the SOE as undermining their long held monopoly of the control of 
undercover work in enemy territory.  They supposed that SOE would likely subvert, or 
at least hinder, their work of obtaining intelligence.  It is very probable that this was the 
un-stated reason for Menzies and Dansey’s offer to Crockatt in August 1940, when they 
proposed to set up an escape route for MI9 from Marseilles into Spain.  Crockatt 
accepted the offer and the details of the new organisation were arranged by Dansey.   
He chose Donald Darling, code name ‘Sunday’, to establish the escape route to run 
from Marseilles to Barcelona and Madrid, and then via Lisbon or Gibraltar to London.  
Darling’s cover was as Vice-Consul, responsible for refugees.  He also placed Jimmy 
Langley in MI9, who had been recruited to SIS on his successful escape and return to 
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the UK, as the main interface between the two organisations.  SIS, effectively, had 
control of MI9’s escape lines in Western Europe and how they operated.  Langley, later 
joined by Neave, was effectively SIS’s Trojan horse inside MI9, although it never quite 
worked out in that way.  Langley later recalled his view of Dansey, that he needed 
courage to face up to Dansey as he always reduced him to ‘a petrified jelly’.334  That 
was quite an admission from a man who had escaped from a hospital in Dunkirk with a 
suppurating amputation wound and had successfully escaped through France to 
Marseilles and then back to London.  Langley also recognised that, ‘as a late arrival in 
the intelligence community ....... escape and evasion was very much at the tail end of 
queue’.  It was necessary to find men and women who could move around in France to 
help get the escapers and evaders to safety.  SIS was firmly resolved that their agents 
would not be involved and were equally resolved that they would ensure that they were 
in a position to control all the main escape routes.   
         SIS was not, however, the only branch of Government service which wanted to 
control MI9.  In 1943 the Air Ministry proposed that Crockatt be replaced by a senior 
RAF officer and that all MI9’s responsibilities should be placed under their jurisdiction.  
It was rumoured that the debate went to the highest levels of the War Cabinet and that 
Churchill himself ruled that MI9 should remain under WO control.
335
  The fact that 
there were competing players seeking to control MI9 probably made it doubly difficult 
for SIS ever to mount a successful take-over.  It must also have made life for Crockatt 
far from comfortable, working daily in the knowledge that others were seeking to exert 
influence and control over his every move.  Dansey determined that SIS’s valuable 
agents should never be used on what he regarded as ‘a thoroughly unproductive 
clandestine pastime’ or that nothing should ever be allowed to interfere with SIS’s work 
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to collect intelligence information ‘from all possible sources, by every feasible means, 
the world over’.336  The fact that MI9 was also producing valuable intelligence must 
have rankled with SIS and was certainly not something which SIS was ever ready 
openly to acknowledge.  When the history of British intelligence during World War II 
came to be written by Hinsley and others in a ten year period from 1979, it was written 
very much from SIS’s perspective, and made very little mention of MI9, its role or 
contribution, throughout the five volumes.
337
  Although Hinsley and his collaborators 
did make some limited mention of SIS’s relationship with SOE, there is no mention of 
SIS’s view of MI9, and yet, as this research has shown, MI9 was a source of extremely 
valuable intelligence and could get answers to some vexing operational questions.  SIS 
was on standard distribution for the receipt of all such reports emanating from this 
source, and yet that fact is not even hinted at in Hinsley’s ‘official’ and very detailed 
review of the story of British intelligence in World War II.  It was as if there was a 
conscious decision to write the fledgling escape and evasion organisation out of the 
history books.  The record was certainly corrected by Foot and Langley when they 
wrote the book which has come to be regarded as the definitive history of MI9 and in 
which Crockatt’s personal leadership role and the challenges he faced are openly 
discussed and acknowledged.
338
  Their book was published in the same year that the 
first volume of Hinsley’s history appeared.  
          Neave shared a view of SIS similar to Langley’s.  He clearly disliked Dansey’s 
behaviour towards MI9, spoke of the ‘battles with Uncle Claude’ and described 
Crockatt as a remarkable man.
339
  It is telling that Crockatt chose to retire to private life 
very soon after the cessation of hostilities and left the winding down of MI9 to Sam 
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Derry, the organiser of one of the escape lines (from Italy).  However, as a way of 
keeping in touch with those who had worked in MI9 or MI19, Crockatt did establish the 
919 dining club, in much the same way that SOE established the Special Forces Club.
340
  
Sadly, Crockatt’s club folded soon after his death in 1956, whereas SOE’s club survives 
in London to this day.   
          Despite detailed and lengthy searches through the records, the date of the formal 
closure of MI9 has not been identified, although there is every indication that it started 
as early as July 1945 and its officers were demobilised in 1946.
341
  Certainly, the 
Branch remained active long enough to ensure that the many prisoners of war returning 
from the camps in both Europe and Asia were required to complete a short 
questionnaire in an attempt to learn lessons about escape experiences which might prove 
valuable in any future war and to identify any collaborators for possible prosecution.  It 
also organised a lengthy exercise to get aid in the form of food to those who had helped 
on the escape routes and to identify those who should receive honours for the support 
they had given to escapers and evaders, recognising the extent to which they had placed 
their own lives in mortal peril.   The task was eventually completed by the Air Ministry 
and they decided to fund the RAF Escaping Society, which continued in existence into 
the 1990s, ensuring that those who been directly involved with MI9, their families, 
dependents and descendants, received the support they needed long after the war had 
ended.    
          Contacts with other secret departments, such as SOE, were arguably not made 
early enough, although a useful and mutually beneficial relationship was eventually 
                                                             
340
 MI19 was originally part of MI9 and responsible for German prisoners of war.  It 
became a separate intelligence branch during the war.   
341
 Langley. Fight Another Day. Chapter 16.   
206 
 
created.
342
  Neave provided very specific evidence of this when he described MI9’s 
support to Operation Frankton (popularly known as the Cockleshell Heroes), SOE’s 
daring Commando raid on German shipping on the River Gironde in Bordeaux in 
December 1942.  He indicated that, after the success of the raid, two of the survivors 
made for Ruffec and the escape route which had been pre-planned with MI9: 
With the aid of special maps and compasses with which they 
had been supplied by MI9 they continued marching until, at 
dawn on December 18
th, 
weak and hungry, they reached 
Ruffec.  They had walked nearly a hundred miles.
343
 
          In his own end-of-war summary, Crockatt indicated his own awareness of the 
sensitivity which attached to MI9’s relationship with SIS.344  He knew that SIS senior 
officers hated SOE since the turmoil and unrest fomented by SOE made life for SIS 
agents in area ‘awkward’.  Whether or not SIS was aware of MI9’s support for SOE is 
not known, but had they done so, it would likely have confirmed their worst fears.  
Similarly escapers, evaders and their local helpers were ‘anathema to SIS officers of the 
old school’.  Potentially MI9 might disrupt their work of obtaining intelligence.  The 
fact that the simmering internecine hostilities which existed between SIS and MI9 never 
actually broke out into open warfare was almost certainly due to Crockatt’s low-key 
behaviour.  There appeared to be no structures in place, however, to minimise the 
tribalism and perhaps frictions were inevitable.  It is certain that personalities also 
played a part, as highlighted by both Neave and Langley in the case of Dansey.  In the 
Conclusion to his postgraduate thesis, Thomas Keene made some very pertinent 
remarks about the lamentable frictions which existed between SOE and SIS.
345
  He has 
                                                             
342
 TNA: WO 208/3242, p.79. 
343
 Neave. Saturday at MI9, p.199. 
344
 TNA: WO 208/3242, p.42 and p.95.   
345
 Keene, Thomas Edward.  ‘Beset By Secrecy and Beleaguered by Rivals: the 
 Special Operations Executive and Military Operations in Western Europe 
1940-1942 with special reference to Operation Frankton’, unpublished University of  
Plymouth PhD thesis, 2011.   
207 
 
also highlighted the extent to which the clash of interests and lack of clarity in the 
demarcation between the two organisations was never resolved, as it should have been.  
The same situation was also commented on by Leo Marks who indicated the extent to 
which SIS resented SOE since it threatened its monopoly: he described the mutual 
antipathy as having ‘the growth potential of an obsession’.346  Those same views can be 
applied to SIS and MI9 as precisely the same situation undoubtedly also existed 
between those two organisations.    Since there was never any overall control of the two 
organisations by a single Minister of Cabinet rank, only Churchill could have resolved 
the matter.  It is clear that Churchill had a particular interest in the work of MI9, 
reflected in the personal letter sent to the prisoners of war, hidden inside cigars, a letter 
clearly designed to help sustain morale in the camps.
347
  The extent to which the Prime 
Minister’s personal support, in the same way he supported the role of Bletchley Park, 
could have proved to be Crockatt’s saviour is not known and does not appear to be 
reflected in the records.  It might have made Crockatt’s task the easier, had the Prime 
Minister sought rather to ensure that inter-departmental conflict was stopped by clearer 
means of demarcation.  In the final analysis, the various secret organisations should 
have been demonstrating a vested, joint and coordinated national interest in winning the 
war, rather than in fighting internal battles, which they clearly were. 
Did MI9 meet its remit? 
Any judgement of MI9’s success, or failure, needs to be set against this background in 
which it was forced to operate.  In seeking to make a judgement, it is fair to be reminded 
of the principal objectives with which they had been charged in 1939 and which have 
been described in detail in Chapter 1.  They fell under three broad headings, namely 
morale of prisoners of war, the acquisition of intelligence, and escape and evasion.    
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          In terms of morale, certainly the all-pervading philosophy of escape-mindedness 
which Crockatt and his staff tried to inculcate seemed to have improved the morale of 
the prisoners of war.  The camp histories make much of the extent to which the 
involvement of the camps in the activity of planning escapes contributed to the 
maintenance of a mood of optimism.
348
  The time spent in planning and executing 
escapes kept the prisoners of war occupied through the many days, months and, in some 
cases, years of captivity.  They felt that, despite their captivity, they were still actively 
contributing to the war effort.  Many prisoners of war were aware that their camp was in 
covert contact with the War Office, although how and when communications occurred 
was known only to the relatively few coded letter writers or to those using the radios.  
News sent via the coded letters and, later on in the war, via the wireless contacts, 
encouraged them in their endeavours.  They received news of what was happening, 
especially after the Allies had landed in Normandy, and started to push back the 
German front.   
          Those at home had their morale boosted with the return of the successful escapers 
and evaders.  This was expressed by Neave in his Introduction to Langley’s book: 
It was the sudden reappearance of airmen reported lost, at 
RAF Stations, that had so deep an impact.  When the great 
raids on Germany began, and losses began to mount, these 
miraculous returns from the unknown encouraged the 
whole RAF.  They knew that, even if wounded, they had a 
chance of avoiding capture.  The lectures and escape aids 
of MI9 increased their confidence.  More than once we 
took an airman back to his Station...........the joy with 
which he was greeted made all our efforts worth while.
349
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Similarly, the families of the captured military personnel, both officers and other ranks, 
were alerted by MI9 to the extent to which their sons were able to continue to contribute 
to the war effort despite their incarceration behind barbed wire.   
          Another key responsibility given to MI9 from the beginning was to collect 
information from British prisoners of war through maintaining contact with them during 
captivity and after successful repatriation, and disseminate the intelligence obtained to 
all three Services and appropriate Government Departments.  Perhaps one of the most 
surprising aspects of this research has been the discovery of the extent to which MI9 
was able to establish coded contact with the camps and use it, not only as a crucial link 
in supporting escape activity, but also as the means to encourage the camps to provide 
whatever intelligence they could to support the war effort.  The coded letter system was 
often used to seek answers to some very specific enquiries about Allied losses and the 
state of the German war machine.  The camps proved to be a remarkable fifth column 
and one which, to date, has received little or no recognition in the published literature. 
 
          In terms of the escape and evasion activity itself, the sheer output of the 
production of escape aids, leaving aside the mapping programme for the moment, was 
impressive.  Between 1
st
 January 1942 and 25
th 
August 1945, MI9 apparently arranged 
for the production and despatch of 423,075 escape packs, 275,407 purses, over 
1,700,000 compasses and related devices, and 434,104 miscellaneous items, including 
such items as gramophone records and other leisure items, all previously described in 
Chapter 3.
350
  The list is impressive enough and becomes even more so if the whole of 
the escape and evasion mapping programme, totalling in excess of two million maps by 
the end of the war, is added to it.  
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The success of MI9’s mapping programme 
 A core objective of the research reported in this thesis was to investigate as fully as 
possible the escape and evasion mapping programme undertaken by MI9.  Until now, a 
thorough exploration of the maps that were made, how they were produced, and the 
quantities that were printed, has been lacking.  It is now possible, for the first time, to 
reveal an estimate of the numbers of escape and evasion maps which MI9 actually 
produced.  A conservative figure would be that 234 individual items were produced and 
in excess of two million copies were printed.
351
  Approximately half of the two million 
copies produced were of three of the sheets [Series 43] covering Western Europe which 
it is believed were printed as operational cover prior to the D-Day landings.  Despite 
this, a cautious assessment of the total printed for escape and evasion purposes would 
still be in excess of one million copies.  (As already noted previously, full details of the 
scope, variety and numbers of the mapping programme are contained in the 
appendices.) 
          A critically important further finding revealed in this research has been the sheer 
scale of the covert involvement of commercial companies by MI9 in order to mount 
such levels of cartographic production in a wartime situation.  By any measure, this 
appears to have been a quite remarkable effort, the more so when one takes account of 
the self-inflicted production challenges which resulted from Hutton’s own insularity and 
lack of cartographic awareness, experience or training.  If numbers are an indicator of 
success, then certainly the programme can be deemed to have been successful.  Whilst a 
significant proportion of the print volume took place after D.Survey became involved, 
and probably reflected an awareness of the value of fabric maps in an operational 
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situation, it is by any standard an impressive record of map production.  It is also 
worthwhile considering the numbers of escapers and evaders who managed to return to 
the UK before victory was declared.  Over 35,000 are reported to have returned, 
numbers which equate to the size of three Army divisions.
352
    
Epitaph 
Despite the scale of activity, Langley indicated that the only epitaph he could find for 
the work of Crockatt, Neave, Darling and himself was that ‘it was too little, too late’.353   
Whilst arguably he should have known from his own experience just how true, or not, 
that description was, there is much to indicate that his judgement was far from balanced.  
Perhaps he was too close to offer an objective and dispassionate judgement.  As an 
escaper himself, he identified very closely with the fate of those who were required to 
spend months and often years of their young lives as guests of the Third Reich.  His 
judgement was probably also being coloured by his understandable desire to help as 
many as possible to freedom.  He confessed that he blamed no-one for the shortcomings 
of MI9 and certainly not ‘Uncle Claude’ and SIS.  He felt that the fault, such as it was, 
lay ‘in the inability of anyone to see that the apparently impossible was possible.’354  
For Langley, it was the lack of foresight and even of imagination, which resulted in the 
failure to grasp the considerable potential of organised escape and evasion which he 
personally regarded as so self-evident. He believed that, had MI9 been granted the same 
freedoms and status as SOE, much more could have been achieved.  It is clear that he 
experienced anger and frustration at what he regarded as MI9’s failures.  Much of his 
                                                             
352 
TNA: WO 208/3242, Appendix K lists the numbers of successful escapers & evaders 
in Western Europe to 30th June 1945 as 28,349 British & Commonwealth + 7498 
Americans = total of 35,847.  AIR 20/6805, sheet 4 shows the number of successful 
escapes in Europe as a total of British + US + Dominion = 35, 606.  The two figures are 
remarkably similar. 
353 
Langley. Fight Another Day, p.252. 
354
 Langley. Fight Another Day, p.252. 
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thinking appeared, however, to reflect the loss of life on the escape lines of those 
members of the French, Belgian and Dutch resistance who were captured and executed 
by the Gestapo or who died in the concentration camps.     
          Crockatt himself wrote an interesting epitaph of his own in the historical record of 
MI9’s work which he penned.  His short section on ‘lessons learned’ spoke volumes of 
his own view about the task MI9 had been set and the extent to which its personnel had 
had to deal with unexpected obstacles.  He set out the ways in which any future escape 
and evasion organisation might benefit from MI9’s experience with the very particular 
recommendation that ‘an adequate staff for planning purposes of obtaining information 
likely to help escapers and evaders is allowed at the outset.’355  It was acknowledged by 
all three Services and the USA that MI9 had made ‘an important contribution to the war 
effort.’356  Many owed their life and liberty to equipment devised and issued by Section 
Z.  What had really been needed, and it is acknowledged in the record, is that experts 
and its own workshop to experiment in devising and making new equipment would 
have proved a valuable addition to the organisation.    
          A recurring aspect of the research which underpins this thesis is the continuing 
search for files in The National Archives.  Foot and Langley were afforded special 
access in the late 1970s to produce their seminal work.  Foot anticipated, in the author’s 
discussion with him in 2012, that many of the previously closed files would by now be 
open.  Certainly many more than he was able to access are now available.  However, 
identifying the files can often be testing since they are not all amongst the War Office 
files, especially WO 208, which was where Foot anticipated they would be, and some 
carry titles and descriptions which do not readily indicate that they relate to the work of 
MI9.  Such shortcomings in cataloguing may well result from the dispersal of files at 
                                                             
355
 TNA: WO 208/3242, Section X, p.80. 
356
 TNA: WO 208/3242, Section 9, p.94. 
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the time MI9 was being wound up at the end of the war.    Even now, the researcher is 
still faced with closed files.  This researcher’s experience of just one request under the 
Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation for the opening of a file led to a wait of over 
three months because the request reportedly raised ‘complex public interest 
considerations’.  Government departments generally respond to FOI requests within 4 
weeks (20 working days).  This particular FOI request was made on 8
th
 May 2013 and 
the file was only finally opened on 15
th
 August 2013, a period of over 3 months.  
Moreover, significant segments of the released file had been redacted and the closure 
dates of some of the redactions had been further extended to 2030.  The imagination can 
run amok, thinking about what possible secrets need to be with-held for 85 years after 
the end of World War II.  
          This research has uncovered not only an immensely significant episode in the 
history of British military mapping, but has also shed light on a hitherto largely 
unacknowledged aspect of British intelligence activity in World War II.  The thesis has 
detailed for the first time a remarkable chapter in the production, use and application of 
military mapping on silk (and other fabrics) and, moreover, it has shown the extent to 
which the maps contributed to the mission of aiding escapers and evaders upon which 
MI9 embarked in 1939.  To make this contribution to the history of twentieth century 
cartography, it has been necessary to look closely at MI9 and its role, and to understand 
the dynamics of escape from prisoner of war camps.  It is for others to progress the 
story through wars which have occurred since 1945, as further files in The National 
Archives become available, and possibly through the systematic exploration of the 
extent to which the Germans were aware of, and sought to counteract, the programme.  
History exists only in retrospect and can be written from different perspectives in 
different contexts at different times.  It needs to be written with an objective and 
dispassionate view which, arguably only comes with the benefit of hindsight and access 
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to evidence. In the case of MI9 and its mapping programme, this thesis has sought to 
reveal its history as comprehensively and as accurately as possible, but it is of course 
acknowledged that other scholars who follow may in future uncover new details and 
insights that add further to what is known about the subject.   
          In the final analysis, the manner in which MI9 executed its escape and evasion 
mapping programme, for the benefit of those thousands of men captured and imprisoned 
by Hitler’s regime, has proved to be a quite outstanding cartographic feat and one which 
needed to be told.  It has proved to be one of the unrecognised triumphs both of this 
nation’s military mapping history and its military intelligence capability operating in a 
wartime scenario.  Who knows what further triumphs might have been accomplished 
had Crockatt and his team been allowed to proceed unhindered by inter-departmental 
politics, adequately staffed and funded, and directly supported by the undoubted 
experience and expertise of the nation’s military mapping organisation.    
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Introduction to Appendices 1-9 
A detailed description of each of the various escape and evasion series/groups of maps produced by MI9 in the period 1939-45 is contained in Chapter 
2.  The following appendices have been compiled to identify the individual sheets in each series.  Each appendix lists the sheets identified from the 
various historical records investigated and from archives around the country which have been visited in the course of the research.  Bibliographic 
details are provided for each sheet.  Production details are included wherever possible and the various collections holding extant copies of the sheets 
are identified.  Brief and tailored introductions are provided at the beginning of each appendix.  The detail provided in the individual introductions is a 
condensed version of the detail contained in Chapter 2 of the main body of the thesis.  This approach will allow the appendices to stand alone as a 
ready reference and valuable aid for researchers and map librarians/archivists in the future.   
In all, a total of 227 individual maps have been identified in 8 publicly accessible record repositories and museums and 4 private collections, and it is 
estimated that over 1,800,000 copies were printed in the five years from the early months of 1940 until production was halted in 1945.  The total 
number of printed copies was clearly boosted by the large numbers of Series 43 (in excess of one million) which were apparently printed for 
operational rather than escape and evasion purposes in the run-up to D-Day.  Notwithstanding that, it is clear than in excess of three quarters of a 
million copies of the MI9 maps were apparently produced for escape and evasion purposes.   
The orthography of the original maps is retained in the bibliographical entries which follow.  
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Introduction to Appendix 1 
Fabric maps based on Bartholomew originals + maps with similar numbering system: extant copies identified 
The maps listed in Appendix 1 are an amalgam of those escape and evasion maps which are believed to have been based directly on the maps of John 
Bartholomew & Son Limited of Edinburgh, together with some maps which utilised a similar numbering system but which are clearly not based on 
Bartholomew maps.  They have been combined in one appendix for ease of reference.  Part 1 of the appendix contains a detailed geographical 
description of each map.  The entries are tabulated under the column headings, sheet number, geographical co-ordinates, date, geographical coverage, 
scale, dimensions ( length x width), detail (of colours),  and notes.  Where an entry appears in square brackets, such as the title of sheet A4 [Danzig], 
this indicates that the entry does not appear on the map itself, but has been derived from an alternative source, such as the print record.  The few dates 
which appear have been taken from the date of the boundary information in the map legend: in general, however, the escape and evasion maps not 
dated and do not carry their own production details. 
Part 2 of the appendix contains details of the production information.  The first column shows the sheet number and indicates whether it was produced 
singly or in combination with another sheet.  The second column indicates the medium on which the map was printed.  The first part of the entry 
denotes the actual medium of the extant copies, tissue, silk or MMF (man-made fibre): this has been ascertained by viewing the extant copies.  The 
second part of the entry denotes the information derived from the print record, paper or fabric.  The third column indicates the size of the print run and 
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the fourth column indicates the print or despatch date.  In all cases, this detail has been derived from the print record.  The final column indicates the 
location of extant copies of the sheet.  The codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail about the maps is contained at Chapter 
2 of the main body of the thesis. 
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APPENDIX 1
Fabric maps based on Bartholomew originals + maps with similar numbering system: identifiedsimilar numbering system: extant copies d ntified
Part 1: geographical description of the maps
Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
A 5°40'-17°+E Germany, Poland, Austria, 1:2M 516mm x 479mm black + red roads + Bartholomew print 
46°30'-55°+N Czechoslovakia + parts of 20" x 19" green international number 311 appears
Switzerland,Italy,Yugoslavia, boundaries: in SW corner of some
Denmark,Sweden,Holland, some copies have copies.  Some copies
Belgium & France. blue water plate. have no sheet number.
A1 German-Swiss frontier area, 2.5" = 5 miles 250mm x 190mm black detail,red
section of the Schaffhausen (c.1:126,720) 10" x 7.5" boundary + pylons
salient in the region of green woods,
     Schleitheim. blue water.
A2 Denmark & Baltic seaboard to 1:4M 255mm x 255mm 3 colours: black,
Swiss border +Holland/ 10" x 10" red.grey/green.
Belgium/France borders +
parts of Austria, Poland &
Czechoslovakia.
A4 Port of Danzig at mouth (c.1:16,000) black detail & blue Known also to exist at 
of River Vistula. water plate. larger scale with no
sheet number.
A6 June German-Swiss frontier & 3" = 10 miles 380mm x 310mm black detail, blue Contains 2 ground
1943 eastern end of Lake (c.1:210,000) 15" x 12" water, red roads, photos and a 
Konstanz, mouth of Rhine + green boundary & sketch map.
Liechenstein. woods.
m 
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
BL2  6° - 7°50' E SE Holland, E Belgium + 1:600,000 215mm x 255mm 3 colours: black,
(also marked B2 in 50°35' - 51°40'N adjacent parts of Germany. 8.5" x  10" red, grey/green.
top margin)
BL3 7°40' - 9°55'E Area of Germany centred 1:600,000 215mm x 255mm 3 colours: black,
50°40' - 51°45'N on Kassel. 8.5" x 10" red, grey/green.
C    + 4°W - 8°+E          France north of Loire, 1:2M 435mm x 537mm black detail + red
47°30' - 54° +N Luxembourg,Belgium, 17" x 21" roads + green 
Holland & W Germany: no international
detail over GB except extreme boundaries.
SE.
(as C above but no (sheet is almost identical to C above, but detail is shown over GB to N & W extent of sheet)
sheet number)
D 3°W - 8°+E France south of the 1:2M 434mm x 523mm 4 colours:-
42° - 47°+N Loire and east to 17" x 21" black detail + red
Switzerland. roads + blue lakes +
yellow international
boundaries.
F    - 4°- 36°+E (1939 & Northern part of 1:3M 485mm x 589mm 3 colours: black, Bartholomew's print
  -60°70°+N 1940) Scandinavia + inset of (also produced at 19" x 23" red, green. number A40 appears
North Sea Connections. 1:2M with smaller in NW corner of 
geographical coverage). some copies.
G    - 6°-30°+E (1939 & Southern part of Scandinavia 1:3M (and 1:2M) 485mm x 589mm 3 colours: black, Bartholomew's print
    - 54°- 60°+N 1940) & the Baltic Sea. 19" x 23" red, green. number 392 in SW
corner of some
copies.
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
H    + 9°W - 3°+E SW France, Portugal, most 1:2,571,000 504mm x 578mm 3 colours: black,
   - 35° - 42°+N of Spain, part of Balearics + 20" x 23" red, green.
adjacent N.Africa. Inset of 
Balearics & Canary Islands.
H2    + 8°W - 9°+E Iberian peninsula, S.France, 1:3M 399mm x 599mm 3 colours: black,
   - 36° - 44°+N NW Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, 16" x 24" red, green.
Balearics + adjacent part of 
N. Africa.  
J3 7° - 15° +E N. Italy + larger scale 1:1,378,000 628mm x 521mm 4 colours: red,blue, J3 &J4 also known to 
40° - 46° +N inset of Swiss frontier & 25" x 21" black, green.  Not exist with geographical
inset of Rome. Bart's specification. areas reversed, scale
Based on native reduced to 1:1,500,000
Italian maps. & different insets i.e.
J4 13° - 18°+E S.Italy with same scale inset 1:1,378,000 394mm x 482mm Italian, French & J3 with insets of Sicilia
37° - 42° +N of Sicily. 16" x 19" English language & Sardegna, J4 with 
legend. inset of part of Corsica.
J5 14°30'-16°15'E NW part of Sardinia. 1:275,000 517mm x 570mm Not Bart's
39° - 40°10' N 20.25" x 22.5" specification. Full
topography with 
contour plate. 
J6 8°6' - 9°52'E Sardinia, Gulf of Polesto & 1:275,000 517mm x 570mm English language
40°- 44°10'N area south of Naples. 20.25" x 22.5" legend.
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
J7 2°15' - 2°55'E Sicily, area of Mt. Etna. 1:110,000 510mm x 615mm Not Bart's
37°45' - 38°10'+N 20" x 24.25" specification.  Full
based on Rome meridian, 12° topography with
27'7-1" East of GreenwichGreenwich. contour plate. Red,
J8 1°28' - 2°15'E Sicily. 1:110,000 510mm x 615mm black, blue colours.
37°40' - 38°05' +N 20" x 24.25" English legend.
based on Rome meridian.
K 19° - 33°E Cyrenaica & Crete (no 1:1,657,000 502mm x 587mm 3 colours: black, 
28°- 36°N coverage of Cyprus). 20" x 23" red, grey/green.
K1 details identical in all respects to K above.  
K2    - 0° - 24°+E partial overlap with K/K1, c 1:6M 491mm x 551mm 3 colours: black,
12° - 37° +N extending W & S. 20" x 22" red, green.
K3   + 20°W - 4°+E Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 1:6M 526mm x 469mm 3 colours: black,
12° - 36° +N Italian Libya, & Spanish Rio 21" x 19" red, green.
do Oro.  Partial overlap with
K2, extending W to Atlantic
Ocean with Canary &
Madeira Islands.
K4   + 15°W - 5°+E Partial overlap with K3, 1:5M 526mm x 465mm469 3 colours: black, 
   - 0° - 15°+N extending S to Gulf of Guinea. 21" x 19" red, green.
K5    - 0°- 15°+E Partial N/S overlap with K2 1:5M 593mm x 465mm 3 colours: black, relief shown by
   - 0°- 20°+N extending S + partial E/W 24" x 19" red, brown. hachures.
overlap with K4 extending E.
K6 8° - 28° +E Overlaps with K5, 1:4M 593mm x 465mm 3 colours:black,
   + 8°S - 6°+N extending south. 24" x 19" red, grey/green.
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Sheet number Geographical Date Geographical coverage Scale Dimensions Details Notes
co-ordinates (length x width)
ME/01/F   - 34°- 54°+E E Mediterranean east to Iran + 1:4,500,000 443mm x 505mm 6 colours: black, relief shown
28° - 42°N N Persian Gulf north to Black 18" x 20" red, green, orange, by layers.
& Caspian Seas. blue, purple.
MP1 96° - 110°E Laos, Cambodia, S Thailand, 1:4M 638mmx 513mm 3 colours:black,
  - 2° - 20°N Malay Peninsula & N. 26" x 21" red, green.
Sumatra.
N   - 36°- 43°+E Eritrea extending E across Red 1:2M 465mm x 471mm 2 colours:black, 
12° - 18° +N Sea to Yemen. 19" x 19" red.
O   - 35°- 42°E Abyssinia. 1:2M 550mm x 466mm 2 colours: black,
4° - 12° N 22" x 19" red.
P 42° - 51° +E Somaliland. 1:2M 476mm x 583mm 2 colours: black,
4° - 12° N 19" x 23" red.
Q   - 38°- 47°+E Kenya Colony & Juba River. 1:2M 476mm x 583mm 2 colours: black,
2°S - 3° +N 19" x 23" red.
R 20° - 31° E (1938 - Balkans & adjacent areas. 1:2M 607mm x 454mm 3 colours: black,
  - 39°- 48°+N 1940) 24" x 18" red, green
R1 identical in all respects to R above.
R2    - 26°- 38°+E W USSR & adjacent parts of 1:3M 589mm x 501mm 3 colours: black,
    - 46°- 60°+N E Europe N to Leningrad & 24" x 20" red, green.
Gulf of Finland.
R3 1939- 3 maps:- 1:3M 589mm x 501mm 3 colours: black,
1940 1. Denmark & S.Sweden. 24" x 20" red, green.
2. Baltic States, Poland
Czechoslovakia, adjacent areas.
3. N.Norway, N.Sweden,
Finland, part of USSR, Baltic
States.
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
S1 14° - 22° +E 1938- S Italy, NW Greece, Albania, 1:2M 602mm x 460mm 3 colours: black,
40° - 48° +N 1940 Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, 24" x 18" red, green.
& parts of Rumania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia.
S2 19° - 29° +E 1938 - Greece, Albania + parts of 1:1,750,000 530mm x 622mm 3 colours: black,
35° - 42° +N 1940 Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey. 21" x 25" red, green.
Inset of Crete at same scale.
S3 10° - 30° +E Sicily, Italy, Greece, Crete, 1:3M 530mm x 622mm 3 colours: black,
36° - 48° +N Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 21" x 25" red, grey/green.
Albania + parts of Rumania, 
Austria, Hungary, Switzerland.
T1 26° - 36° +E W part of Black Sea, S to 1:3M 605mm x 455mm 3 colours: black,
34° - 48° +N Asiatic Turkey & Cyprus + 24" x 18" red, green
parts of Rumania, Sea of 
Marmara, E.Aegean, & E.
Crete.
T2 42° - 60° E Caspian Sea and 1:3,200,000
38° - 48° +N surrounding area.
T3 28° - 46° +EE E Mediterranean, east to cover 1:3M 463mm x 611mm 3 colours: black,
28° - 38°+N Syria & Iraq + parts of Egypt 19" x 24" red, green.
& Cyprus.
T4 44° - 62° E Iran N of Bushire & adjacent 1:3M 463mm x 611mm 3 colours: black,
28° - 38° +N border areas. 19" x 24" red, green.
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
T7 no known details
T8 no known details
U6 no known details
U7 no known details
U8 no known details
W    - 32°- 44°+E Egypt, Cyprus, Asiatic Turkey, 1:3M 533mm x 600mm 3 colours: black,
     28° - 38°+N Syria, Transjordan, Iraq + 21" x 24" red, green.
parts of Iran & Arabia.
W1 identical in all respects to W above.
W2   - 46°- 62 +E Arabia, Iraq, Persian Gulf, 1:3,750,000 518mm x 585mm 3 colours: black,
   - 26°- 38°+N Iran, Afghanistan, S.W. USSR. 21" x 23" red, grey/green.
X Map from Spittal in Austria 1:100,000 560mm x 524mm 4 colours: black, Contains detailed
to Mojstrana in Jugoslavia. 22" x 21" red, green, blue. goings information
Inset of whole route from 1:1,350,000 to guide escapers
Oflag VIIc in Salzburg to across border into
Mojstrana. Jugoslavia.
Y Map of Schaffhausen Canton 1:100,000 Contains detailed
with goings information to aid goings information
PoWs escaping to Switzerland to guide escapers 
from Germany. across the border
into Switzerland.
Y2 2 maps:- 3 colours.
1. Schaffhausen & S.Germany. 1:350,000
2. S.Germany.
Y3 no known details
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Sheet Number Geographical Date Geographical Coverage Scale Dimensions Detail Notes
Co-ordinates Length x Width
Z 12° - 19° +E N.Germany, N.Poland, 1:1M 470mm x 504mm 3 colours.
53° - 57° +N Bornholm, E.Denmark, S. 19" x 20"
Sweden.
(no sheet number N. area on one side + S.area 1:633,600 440mm x 552mm 4 colours: blue,
shown) on reverse. 18" x 22" black, red and
General Map of orange for 
Ireland boundaries of 6
Ulster counties.
Total = 58 sheets
(15 of which are not Bartholomew's specification). 
227 
 
 
 
 
Part 2: production details and location of extant copies
Produced singly/combination Print medium Print runs Print/despatch date Location of extant copies
A tissue 1,5
silk fabric 10,000 15.7.42 1,5*
A1 tissue 5
A2 tissue 7
A4 silk fabric 150 5.10.42 4
paper 150 5.10.42
A6 tissue 5
A/C fabric 20,000 30.6.42
fabric 550 1.12.42
fabric 1000 21.12.42
tissue 5
MMF
A/G
BL2 tissue 7
BL3 tissue 7
C tissue 3,5
silk fabric 10,000 8.7.42 5
C/D MMF 25,000 21.8.42 5
C/H2 10,000 21.8.42
D tissue 10,000 17/20.7.42 5
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Produced singly/combination Print medium Print runs Print/despatch date Location of extant copies
D/H2 MMF 7,500 24.7.42 1,4,5
10,000 21.8.42
25,000 20.5.43
10,000 21.6.43
10,000 6.7.43
5,000 29.7.43
5,000 9.8.43
F tissue 3
F/G MMF fabric 5000 7.10.42 1,5
H tissue 1,5
silk 1
H2 tissue paper/fabric 2,000 15.7.42 1,5
H2/K2 MMF fabric 2500 12.11.42
H2/K3 5,000 31.7.42
MMF fabric      22,330 7.9.42 5
15,000 27.4.43
J3 tissue paper 2000 7.1.42 5
MMF fabric 5000 7.1.42 4
J3/J4 MMF fabric 8000 7.1.42 1,5,6
fabric 10,000 23.6.42
5,000 2.6.43
J4 fabric 5000 7.1.42 1,4,5
paper 2000 7.1.42
J4/K1 MMF 5
J5/J6 MMF 350 11.6.43 1,4
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Produced singly/combination Print medium Print runs Print/despatch date Location of extant copies
J7/J8 MMF 350 8.6.43 1,4
K
K/W MMF
K/W1 MMF 1,5
K1 tissue paper 1,000 23.6.42
MMF fabric 1,000        "
K1/K2 MMF fabric 10,000 1.7.42 1,4,5,6
fabric 22,500 7.9.42
fabric 500 8.10.42
15,000 20.5.43
K2 tissue paper 1,000 23.6.42 1,5,6
MMF fabric 1,000        "
K3 paper 1000 8.7.42
MMF fabric 1000 15.7.42
K3/H2 MMF 15,000 27.4.43 1,4
K3/K4 MMF 1,4
K5/K6 MMF 1,4,5
K6 MMF 1
ME/01/F silk 6.10.42 1
MP1 silk 1,5
N tissue paper/fabric 1,000 24.7.42
MMF paper/fabric 1,000        "
N/O MMF
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Produced singly/combination Print medium Print runs Print/despatch date Location of extant copies
O tissue paper/fabric 2,000 24.7.42 1,5
MMF " 2,000        " 1
P tissue paper/fabric 2,000 23.6.42
MMF " 2,000
P/Q MMF fabric 1,5
Q tissue paper/fabric 2,000 23.6.42
tissue " 2,000 "
R tissue
R1 tissue paper/fabric 2,000 23.6.42 1,5
MMF " 2,000        "
R1/S1 MMF 1,5
R2/R3 MMF 1,4,5
R3 silk
S1 tissue paper/fabric 2,000 23.6.42 1,5
S2 tissue
S2/S3 MMF 1,500 2.9.42 1,4,5
10,000 27.4.43
T1 tissue paper 100 29.1.43
MMF fabric 45 29.1.43
T1/T2T1/T2 MMF
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Produced singly/combination Print medium Print runs Print/despatch date Location of extant copies
T1/T3 MMF 1,4,5
T2 paper 1000 23.3.42
fabric 1000 23.6.42
T2/T4 5
T3 tissue paper 100 29.1.43
MMF fabric 45 29.1.43
T3/T4 MMF 1,5
T4 silk paper/fabric 145 23.6.42 4
tissue
MMF
T7 fabric 50 22.1.43
T8 fabric 50 22.1.43
U6 fabric 50 22.1.43
U7 fabric 50 22.1.43
U8 fabric 50 22.1.43
W silk 1,5
W1/W2 MMF 1,5
W2 silk 1,5
X silk 1,3
Y silk 3
Y2/9Y3Y2/9Y3 ^^ MMF 1,5
paper 3
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Introduction to Appendix 2 
These are maps which are assumed to have been produced based on Bartholomew maps but for which neither extant copies nor related records have 
ever been found.  They represent either gaps in a sequential numbering system, sheets which are mentioned on adjacent sheet diagrams or, in one case, 
a sheet which was seen at an Antiques Fair but details were not noted.  In cases where the sheet number has the prefix 9 followed by an alphabet letter, 
it could be that these are identical or similar to sheets which carry simply the alphabet letter and are listed at Appendix 1.  It has not, however, proved 
possible to prove this hypothesis to date.   
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APPENDIX 2
Fabric maps presumed to be based on Bartholomew originals: no extant copies identified
Sheet number Known details
E Europe 1/2M
H3 none
J believed to cover Italy
L1 none "
M covers Darfur
T7 none
T8 none
U6 none
U7 none
U8 none
Y3 none
9B 1/2,350,000 Germany *
9C 1/2,350,000 France *
9D 1/2,350,000 France (SECRET) *
9F/G 20miles/1" = 1/1,267,200 Norway/Sweden *
9H 20 miles/1" = 1/1,267,200 Spain/Portugal *
Total = 16 sheets
" reported as sighted at map fair but no other details noted
* probably minor variants of sheets listed under only alphabet letter at Appendix 1alphabet le ter at ppendix 1.
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Introduction to Appendix 3  
Fabric Maps based on Series GSGS 3982 originals 
[Europe Air] 1:500,000 GSGS 3982 [Fabric] 
Escape and evasion versions were produced of 73 sheets in the Europe Air, 1:250,000 scale, series GSGS 3982.  They were, however, reduced to 
1:500,000 scale and were, therefore only one quarter the sheet size of the original series: as such, they were often referred to as ‘miniatures’ or 
‘handkerchief maps’.  With the exception of the scale factor, no other details were changed.  As a result, the font size of place and feature names 
appears very small, although still legible, and the detail is dense.  The sheets were produced sometimes singly and sometimes in combination, but it has 
not proved possible to identify the various combinations.  Additionally, one sheet, N33/9, was produced at 1:375,000 scale.  Four irregular sheets were 
also produced at the scale of 1:420,000 in a block centred on Arnhem: these do not carry sheet numbers but are rather marked as sections 1-4.   
The following Appendix provides the individual sheet details including sheet number, sheet title, geographical extent, some limited information on 
compilation dates, print runs and print dates.  The final column indicates the location of the extant copies of the sheets which have been found.  The 
codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
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3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections.  
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail of this series is contained at Chapter 2 
in the main body of the thesis.   
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APPENDIX 3
Fabric Maps based on Series GSGS 3982 originals
[Europe Air]  1:500,000  Series GSGS 3982 [Fabric]
Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office extant copies
K32/3 Florence 10-12°E/43-44°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 20.10.42
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
K33/1 Ancona 12-14°E/43-44°N 45 Fabric + 100 paper 9.10.42
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
K33/4 Terni 12-14°E/42-43°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 16.10.42
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.7.43
K33/8 Fóggia 14-16°E/41-42°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 16.10.42
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
K33/11 Naples 14-16°E/40-41°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 20.10.42 3
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
K33/12 Táranto 16-18°E/40-41°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 20.10.42
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.7.43
L32/1 Basle 6-8°E/47-48°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42 4,9
"      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
L32/2 Konstanz 8-10°E/47-48°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 24.7.42 9
    "     "                 " 100 paper 24.3.43
    "     "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "     "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office  extant copies
L32/3 Innsbruck 10-12°E/47-48°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.8.42 9
    "     " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "     "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
L32/5 St Gotthard 8-10°E/46-47°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.7.42 3,4,5,9
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
    "     "                 " 50 paper 27.7.43
    "     "                 " 500 fabric 4.10.43
    "     "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
L32/6 Bolzano 10-12°E/46-47°N 1940 45 fabric + 100 paper 24.10.42 4,5,9
    "     "                 " 100 paper 30.4.43
    "     "                 " 6.5.43
    "     "                 " 4.10.43
    "     "                 " 1.3.44
L32/7 Turin 6-8°E/45-46°N 1939 21.10.42 4,5,9
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.7.43
    "     "                 " 500 fabric 4.10.43
L32/8 Milan 8-10°E/45-46°N 1938 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.10.42 4,9
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
    "     "                  " 50 paper 27.7.43
    "     "                 " 500 fabric 4.10.43
L32/9 Verona 10-12°E/45-46°N 550 fabric 22.10.43
L32/10 Cúneo 6-8°E/44-45°N 1939 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.10.42 4,5,9
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
    "     "                 " 500 fabric 4.10.43
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
 extent in the War Office extant copies
L32/11 Genoa 8-10°E/44-45°N 1939 45 fabric + 100 paper 9.10.42 4
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.5.43
    "     "                 " 500 fabric 4.10.43
L32/12 Bologna 10-12°E/44-45°N 550 fabric 22.10.43
L33/1 Salzburg 12-14°E/47-48°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 25.9.42
    "     " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "     "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
L33/2 Graz 14-16°E/47-48°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
L33/3 Sopron 16-18°E/47-48°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44 3
L33/4 Údine 12-14°E/46-47°N 1939 45 fabric + 100 paper 30.9.42 4
    "     "                 " 100 fabric (1 side only) 6.7.43
    "     "                 " 550 fabric 15.10.43
    "     "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
L33/5 Klagenfurt 14-16°E/46-47°N 1939 45 fabric + 100 paper 6.10.42 4
    "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
L33/7 Venice 12-14°E/45-46°N 100 fabric (1 side only) 29.4.43
     "        " 550 fabric 20.10.43
L33/10 Ravenna 12-14°E/44-45°N 550 fabric 22.10.43
M31/3 Antwerp 4-6°E/51-52°N 100 fabric + 200 paper 29.10.42
M31/6 Brussels 4-6°E/50-51°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42
    "     " " 100 paper 24.3.43
     "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M32/1 Essen 6-8°E/51-52°N 1936 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42 4,9
    "     "                 " 100 paper 8/9.9.43
    "     "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "     "                 " 200 MLS 8.1.44
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office extant copies
M32/2 Kassel 8-10°E/51-52°N 1936 45 fabric + 100 paper 31.7.42 4,9
    "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "      "                 " 200 MLS 8.1.44
M32/3 Halle 10-12°E/51-52°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.8.42
    "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
    "      "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
M32/4 Cologne 6-8°E/50-51°N 1936 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42 4,9
    "       "                 " 100 paper 30.4.43
    "       "                 " 100 fabric 4.10.43
     "       "                 " 200 MLS 8.1.44
M32/5 Frankfurt 8-10°E/50-51°N 1936 100 fabric + 200 paper 29.10.42
     "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M32/6 Erfurt 10-12°E/50-51°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
M32/7 Saarbrücken 6-8°E/49-50°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42 4,9
     "       "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
     "       "                 " 200 paper MLS 8.1.44
M32/8 Mannheim 8-10°E/49-50°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
M32/9 Nürnberg 10-12°E/49-50°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
M32/10 Strasbourg 6-8°E/48-49°N 1937 45 fabric + 100 paper 10.7.42 4,9
      "       "              " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M32/11 Stuttgart 8-10°E/48-49°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
M32/12 Munich 10-12°E/48-49°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 29.12.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M33/1 Leipzig 12-14°E/51-52°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 31.7.42 9
      "       "                 " 500 paper 7.9.42
      "       "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office extant copies
M33/2 Görlitz 14-16°E/51-52°N 150 fabric (1 side only) 29.10.42 1
      "       "                 " 150 paper 29.10.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M33/3 Breslau 16-18°E/51-52°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 25.9.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.19.43
      "       "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
M33/4 Chemnitz 12-14°E/50-51°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 25.9.42
     "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M33/5 Prague 14-16°E/50-51°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 11.8.42 9
     "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M33/6 Schweidnitz 16-18°E/50-51°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 25.9.42
     "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M33/7 Plzeň 12-14°E/49-50°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
M33/8 Jihlava 14-16°E/49-50°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
M33/9 Brno 16-18°E/49-50°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
M33/10 Passau 12-14°E/48-49°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
M33/11 Linz 14-16°E/48-49°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44 3
M33/12 Vienna 16-18°E/48-49°N 500 M of S tissue 7/8.44
M34/1 Lódź 18-20°E/51-52°N 1941 45 fabric + 100 paper 14.8.42 4, 9
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
M34/4 Gleiwitz 18-20°E/50-51°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N32/5 Flensburg 8-10°E/54-55°N  500 ML tissue 3.44 3
N32/6 Kiel 10-12°E/54-55°N 500 ML tissue 3.44 3
N32/7 Groningen 6-8°E/53-54°N 1936 45 fabric + 100 paper 11.8.42 4, 9
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled and drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office extant copies
N32/8 Hamburg 8-10°E/53-54°N 1936 45 fabric + 100 paper 21.8.42 4, 9
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
N32/9 Lübeck 10-12°E/53-54°N 100 fabric + 200 paper 22.10.42
      "       "                 " 50 paper 27.7.43
      "       "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
      "       "                 " 200 tissue MLS 8.1.44
N32/10 Osnabruck 6-8°E/52-53°N 1936 100 fabric + 200 paper 22.10.42 4
      "       "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
N32/11 Hanover 8-10°E/52-53°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N32/12 Magdeburg 10-12°E/52-53°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N33/4 Stralsund 12-14°E/54-55°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 20.9.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
N33/5 Kolberg 14-16°E/54-55°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 30.9.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
N33/6 Stolp 16-18°E/54-55°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 30.9.42
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
N33/7 Neustrelitz 12-14°E/53-54°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N33/8 Stettin 14-16°E/53-54°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 11.8.42 9
      "       "                 " 1000 paper 8.10.42
      "       "                 " 50 paper 27.7.43
      "       "                 " 100 paper 8/9.9.43
      "       "                 " 100 tissue 13.10.43
      "       "                 " 500 paper 1.3.44
N33/9# Schneidemühl 16-18°15'E/53-54°10'N [paper] 3
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical Compiled & drawn Print runs Print dates Location of
extent in the War Office extant copies
N33/10 Berlin 12-14°E/52-53°N 1938 45 fabric + 100 paper 31.7.42 4, 9
      "       " 100 tissue 13.10.43
      "       " " 200 paper MLS 8.1.44
N33/11 Landsberg 14-16°E/52-53°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N33/12 Poznań (Posen) 16-18°E/52-53°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N34/4 Danzig 18-20°E/54-55°N 1938 45 fabric + 100 paper 31.7.42 1, 4, 9
      "       "                 " 100 paper 8/9.9.43
      "       " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
      "       "                 " 200 MLS 8.1.44
N34/5 Konigsberg 20-22°E/54-55°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N34/7 Marienwerder 18-20°E/53-54°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N34/10 Plock 18-20°E/52-53°N 500 ML tissue 3.44
N34/11 Warsaw 20-22°E/52-53°N 45 fabric + 100 paper 14.8.42 9
      "      " " 100 tissue 13.10.43
# sheet N33/9 is identical in specification to sheets in GSGS 3982 but does not carry the series number.  Its scale is 1:375,000 and it is of marginally greater
geographical extent than the other sheets in this series.  
Total number of map sheets = 734
Total number of copies printed = 35,100
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Geographical Print runs Print dates Location of
extent extant copies
Dutch Girl Section 1,2,3,4 4400 6.42
scale 1"= 6.56 miles (approximately 1:420,000)
1 4°5'-7°E/51°21'-52°40'N 985 2.43 - 8.44 4
2 4°5'-6°50'E/50°-51°21'N 794 2.43 - 8.44 4
3 6°40'-9°40'E/51°20'-52°40'N 1050 2.43 - 8.44 4
4 6°50'-9°40'E/50°-51°20'N 992 2.43 - 8.44 4
ML tissue = Mulberry Leaf paper MLS = Mulberry Leaf Substitute RL = Rag Litho
Total number of copies printed = 8221
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Introduction to Appendix 4 
Fabric Maps of Norway 1:100,000 based on the pre-war GSGS Series 4090 
Escape and evasion versions of 33 sheets of Norway, 1:100,000 scale, series GSGS 4090, were produced on silk.  Thirty one sheets were monochrome 
and two were printed in four colours.  The original maps were based on the Oslo meridian and the conversion factor to Greenwich was, therefore added 
to the operational series.  The sheets are in a block to the north of Oslo and adjacent to the Swedish border.  They are all single-sided: none appears to 
have been produced in combination.  The following Appendix provides individual sheet details, sheet number, sheet title, geographical extent, date of 
the original Norwegian map, print date of the GSGS paper series and sheet dimensions.  The final column indicates the location of the extant copies of 
the sheets which have been found. No details of the volume of the print runs have ever been discovered. The codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
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7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main 
body of the thesis.   
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Sheet number Sheet title Geographical values Date of original Print date of GSGS Dimensions Location of 
(based on Oslo meridian Norwegian map 4090 paper series (length x width) extant copies
F32 East Nordre Land 0°30'-1°W/60°40'-61°N 1930 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F32 West Aurdal 1°-1°30'W/60°40'-61°N 1930 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F33 East Sperillen 0°30'-1°W/60°20'-60°40'N 1918 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F33 West Flaa 1°-1°30'W/60°20'-60°40'N 1918 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F34 East Tyristrand 0°30'-1°W/60°-60°20'N 1919 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F34 West Sigdal 1°-1°30'W/60°-60°20'N 1935 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F35 East Eiker 0°30'-1°W/59°40'-60°N 1919 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
F35 West Flesburg 1°-1°30'W/59°40'-60°N 1935 1940 490 x 335mm/20 x 13" 1,5
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Introduction to Appendix 5 
Escape and Evasion maps produced on fabric in 1943 [Series 43] 
Like many other escape and evasion series produced by MI9, this series carried no title or individual sheet names.  Whilst based on the existing maps 
of the International Map of the World (IMW) of the European area, the ten basic sheets were all produced by panelling together sections of existing 
IMW sheets to produce irregular size sheets, all of which were printed on man-made fibre. The sheets are all at 1:1,000,000 scale, with 3 of them 
carrying larger scale insets of border areas.  The sheets are all prefixed 43, followed by an alphabet letter.  The following Appendix provides details of 
the sheets, scale, geographical coverage, dimensions, the combinations produced, the size of the print runs, the print dates and the production 
suspension dates.  This was the first series which appears to have been printed in substantial numbers, probably for operational use as well as for 
escape and evasion purposes.  The final column indicates the location of the extant copies of the sheets which have been found.  The codes for the 
various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
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5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main 
body of the thesis. 
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APPENDIX 5    
Escape and Evasion maps produced on fabric in 1943 [Series 43]
Sheet number Scale Geographical coverage Dimensions (length x width)
43 A 1:1 000 000 NW France, W & C Belgium, part of Holland + 734 x 736mm/29 x 29"
insets 1:500 000 2 insets of Pyrenees
43 B 1:1 000 000 SW France, N Spain + 734 x 736mm/29 x 29"
inset 1:300 000 inset of German-Swiss frontier
43 C 1:1 000 000 Holland, C & E Belgium, NE France, W & C Germany 732 x 739mm/29 x 29"
43 D 1:1 000 000 SE France, SW Germany, NW Italy, Switzerland 732 x 739mm/29 x 29"
1:250 000 Belgium/German frontier area
43 E 1:1 000 000 N Germany, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Poland, 779 x 875mm/31 x 35"
N Hungary
43 F 1:1 000 000 W & C Croatia, W Montenegro, S Slovakia, 779 x 875mm/31 x 35"
S Germany, N & C Italy, E Switzerland
43 G 1:1 000 000 S Slovakia, S Poland, SE Hungary, Romania, Serbia, 761 x 917mm/30 x 37"
NC & E Bulgaria, E Croatia, E Montenegro,
N Albania
43 H 1:1 000 000 Greece, Albania, S Bulgaria, parts of Turkey + 761 x 917mm/30 x 37"
inset of Crete
43 K East 1:1 000 000 SW France, NE Spain 522 x 605mm/21 x 24"
43 K West 1:1 000 000 N Portugal, NW Spain 522 x 605mm/21 x 24"
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Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Production suspended Location of extant copies
43 A/B 350,000 1943, 1944 25.4.45 1,5
43 C/D 300,000 1943, 1944 11.5.45 1,5,6
43 C/E 60,000 1944. 1945 25.4.45 5
43 D/F 10,000 1
43 E 4,500
43 E/F 35,000 1943, 1944 11.5.45 1,3,5
43 F/G 15,000 11.5.45 1,5
43 G/H 35,000 1943, 1944 25.4.45 1,3,5
43 K E/W                     350,000 1943, 1944 11.5.45 1
Total number of sheets produced = 10 Total number of copies printed = 1,159,500
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Introduction to Appendix 6 
Escape and Evasion maps produced on fabric in 1944 [Series 44] 
Identical in specification to [Series 43] were the 18 sheets, produced in 9 set combinations, of the Far East area.  Again they were based on the existing 
IMW sheets, were small scale and all were produced on man-made fibre.  They appear also to have been produced for both escape and evasion and 
operational purposes.  The sheets are all prefixed 44, followed by an alphabet letter.   The following Appendix provides details of the sheets, scale, 
geographical coverage, dimensions, the 9 set combinations, the size of the print runs, print dates and production suspension dates.  The final column 
indicates the location of the extant copies of the sheets which have been found.  The codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
254 
 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main 
body of the thesis.  
While a detailed investigation into the actual employment of this particular group of maps lies beyond the scope of the present enquiry, future research 
on the practical uses made of them by the South East Asian Command in its campaigns against Japan might prove to be a highly worthwhile 
undertaking.   
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APPENDIX 6  Escape and Evasion maps produced on fabric in 1944  [Series 44]
Sheet number Scale Geographical coverage Dimensions (length x width)
44A 1:1,000,000 NW Burma + part of India 975 x 623mm/39 x 25"
44B 1:1,000,000 NE Burma & N Siam + parts of French Indo-China &China 975 x 623mm/39 x 25"
44C 1:1,000,000 S Burma, W&C Siam + part of Frenmch Indo-China 619 x 970mm/25 x 39"
44D 1:1,000,000 S Burma + S Siam 970 x 619mm/39 x 25"
44E 1:1,000,000 N Sumatra + part of Siam 980 x 633mm/39 x 25"
44F 1:1,000,000 Part of Siam, Malaya & E Sumatra 980 x 633mm/39 x 25"
44G 1:1,000,000 S Sumatra + NW Java 627 x 967mm/25 x 39"
44H 1:1,000,000 3 insets: 1)SW Borneo 2) E Java 3) W Java 627 x 967mm/25 x 39"
44J 1:1,000,000 C French Indo-China + E Siam 634 x 987mm/25 x 39"
44K 1:1,000,000 S French Indo-China, part of Thailand + inset in SE 634 x 987mm/25 x 39"
corner to complete coverage of land area
44L 1:1,000,000 Parts of S China and NE French Indo-China 971 x 621mm/39 x 25"
44M 1:1,000,000 Part of SW China + N French Indo-China 971 x 621mm/39 x 25"
44N 1:1,000,000 Part of mainland China + Hong Kong & Taiwan 851 x 1081mm/34 x 43"
44O 1:1,000,000 Part of C mainland China 851 x 1081mm/34 x 43"
44R 1:1,000,000 Part of mainland China 839 x 1039mm/34 x 42"
44S 1:1,000,000 Korea 1039 x 839mm/42 x 34"
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44T these two sheets were apparently in production in 1945 but were)
44U cancelled at proof stage and not printed )
44V 1:1,000,000 S Japan + insets A & B to complete coverage of land areas 853 x 1028mm/34 x 41"
44W 1:1,000,000 N Japan + inset to complete coverage of land area 853 x 1028mm/34 x 41"
Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Production suspended Location of extant copies
44A/44B 60,000 21.4.44 21.8.45 1,5
44C/44D 10,000 13.3.44 1,5,6
20,000 ?.6.44 21.8.45
44E/44F 15,000 17.3.44 21.8.45 1,5,6
44G/44H 20,000 11.7.44 31.8.45 1,5
44J/44K 20,000 7.6.44 21.8.45 1,5
44L/44M 10,000 7.6.44 1,5
44N/44O 20,000 25.4.45 1,5,6
44R/44S 5068 22.9.45 1,5,6
44V/44W 5000 4.10.45 1,5
Total number of sheets produced = 18 Total number of copies produced = 185,000+
                (in 9 set combinations)
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Introduction to Appendix 7   
Escape and Evasion maps on fabric of northern Europe and Scandinavia [Series FGS]  
This series comprises 5 sheets, produced singly and in various combinations, and again based on the existing IMW series at small scale, either 
1:1,000,000 or 1:1,250,000.  All were produced on man-made fibre.  The sheets are all prefixed FGS, followed by an alphabet letter.  The significance 
of FGS is not known.  The following Appendix provides details of the sheets, scale, geographical coverage, the 9 combinations produced, the size of 
the print runs, which vary considerably from as small as 250 copies to as many as 15,400, and the print dates.   .  The final column indicates the 
location of the extant copies of the sheets which have been found.  The codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
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8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main 
body of the thesis.  
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APPENDIX 7  Escape and Evasion maps on fabric of northern Europe and Scandinavia [Series FGS]
Sheet number Scale Geographical coverage
FGS A 1:1,000,000 Inset 1: S.Norway & adjacent Sweden
1:1,000,000 Inset 2: C.Norway & adjacent Sweden
FGS B 1:1,000,000 S.Norway & adjacent Sweden
FGS C 1:1,250,000 N.Sweden,N.Finland,adjacent USSR
FGS D 1:1,250,000 C.& N.Norway + adjacent Sweden
FGS E 1:1,000,000 Inset 1: N.Norway & adjacent Sweden,
Finland, USSR.
1:1,000,000 Inset 2: S.Sweden,Denmark, N.seaboard 
of Germany.
Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Location of extant copies
FGS A 250 Fabric 16.11.42
FGS A/B 250 Paper 16.11.42
6,500 Fabric 21.12.42 4,5
10,000 Fabric 24.2.43
10,000 unspecified 29.5.43
6,000 unspecified 29.7.43
FGS A/E 15,400 Fabric 1,3,5
10,000 unspecified 21.4.44
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Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Location of extant copies
FGS B 250 Paper 16.11.42
FGS C 250 Paper 1.12.42
FGS D 250 Paper 1.12.42
FGS C/D 6,750 Fabric 23.12.42 4,5
250 Fabric 1.12.42
10,000 Fabric 24.2.43
10,000 unspecified 29.5.43
FGS E 1,000 unspecified 13.4.43 4
FGS E/9CA* 15,000 rayon fabric 25.4.43 5
3,000 ?.4.43
* refer to Appendix 8 for details of sheet 9CA
Total number of sheets produced = 5 Total number of copies produced = 105,150
Total number of combinations identified = 9
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Introduction to Appendix 8 
Miscellaneous Maps 
This Appendix comprises a group of 16 miscellaneous maps which have been identified, either through mention in the records or by discovering extant 
copies.  In some cases, it is clear that these were produced, initially at least, for inclusion in MI9’s Bulletin as well as for further operational purposes.  
The following Appendix lists the sheets and shows, at Part 1, the often limited details which are known of them in terms of sheet number or title, scale, 
geographical coverage, dates, dimensions or other identifying detail.  Part 2 shows production details, specifically whether they were produced singly 
or in combination, the print runs and print dates.  The final column indicates the location of the extant copies of the sheets which have been found.  The 
codes for the various repositories are: 
1.  Defence Geographic Centre (DGC): this is the nation’s record collection of military maps and is destined for deposit in The National Archives. 
2. The National Archives (TNA). 
3.  British Library Map Library (BL). 
4. Intelligence Corps Museum (ICM). 
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum. 
6. Macclesfield Silk Museum. 
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7. Cumberland Pencil Museum. 
8. National Library of Scotland. 
9. Private collections. 
For reasons of confidentiality and security, no detail about private collections has been disclosed.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main 
body of the thesis.   
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APPENDIX 8                  Miscellaneous Maps
Part 1
Sheet number/title Scale Geographical coverage Date Dimensions Notes
AL1
AL2
AL3
CD/A
CD/B
CD/C
CD/D
9CA
9J3 0.5" = 10 miles Title = Northern Italy. Extends N to Magnetic variation at505mm x 590mm Monochrome map
Switzerland & E to Yugoslavia. 1941 20" x 23.25 marked ADI (Maps)
Air Ministry No.7331
9J4 1:2,250,000 Title = Southern Italy. Extends to cover Magnetic variation at505mm x 590mm Monochrome map
Sicily plus inset of Sardinia at same scale. 1941 20" x 23.25 marked ADI (Maps)
Air Ministry No.7332
9S 0.5" = 10 miles Title = Greece Magnetic variation at610mm x 480mm Monochrome map
1941 24" x 19" marked ADI (Maps)
Air Ministry No.7334
9T 1:2,000,000 Title = Bulgaria - Roumania 610mm x 480mm Monochrome map
24" x 19" marked ADI (Maps)
Air Ministry No.7317
264 
 
 
Sheet number/title Scale Geographical coverage Date Dimensions Notes
9U 1:3,000,000 Covers Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Legend shows 380mm x 480mm Monochrome map
Switzwerland, Austria, Poland, Hungary, boundaries at 1939 15" x 19" marked ADI (Maps)
E to Russian border & N to Copenhagen & 1941 Air Ministry No.7330
9V 1" = 47 miles Title = Stalag locations in northern France 310mm x 305mm Monochrome map
12.25" x 12" marked MI9B and
SECRET.
Norway 1" = 30 miles Legend indicates map shows in red east 410mm x 310mm Marked Appendix A
& west zones garrisoned by German troops 16.25" x 12.25" & AD Maps AM No.
414/2A
Zones of France
Part 2
Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Location of extant copies
A.L.1 100 tissue 12.4.42
100 .4.43
200 MLS 15.12.43
A.L.2 100 tissue 12.4.42
100 .4.43
200 MLS 15.12.43
A.L.3 100 tissue 12.4.42
100 4.43
200 MLS 15.12.43
CD/A not known 22.7.43
CD/B      "      "
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Combinations produced Print runs Print dates Location of extant copies
CD/C not known 22.7.43
CD/D " "
9J3 100 tissue 1.2.43
9J4 100 tissue 1.2.43
9J3/9J4 silk 1
9S/9T 10,000 fabric 12.4.43
2000 fabric 21.5.43
silk 1
9U silk 1,6
9V silk 1
Norway silk 1
Zones of France 550 bank paper 14.1.42
550 fabric 14.1.42
550 bank paper 23.1.43
9CA/9U 5000 fabric 9.4.43
 
Total number of sheets identified = 16 Total number of copies produced = 20,050
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Introduction to Appendix 9 
Maps produced for the Bulletin  
The final Appendix comprises a group of 8 maps which were initially produced for inclusion in the Bulletin and, as such, were printed on standard 
printing paper.  It is believed that the maps were subsequently re-produced on silk or tissue for use in escape and evasion.  However, there are known 
to be some key differences, not least in the sheet numbering.  At least one of the maps in the Bulletin carries the same number as a very different map 
produced for escape and evasion.  Additionally, there are maps in the Bulletin for which extant copies of the escape and evasion versions have not been 
identified, although there is ample evidence to confirm that they were produced.  It is, therefore useful to cross compare entries in this Appendix with 
the same sheet numbers in Appendix 1 or the same sheet titles in Appendix 8.  Further detail is contained at Chapter 2 of the main body of the thesis.  
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APPENDIX 9
Maps produced for the Bulletin
Sheet Sheet title Scale Geographical coverage Dimensions Detail Notes Bulletin details
number (length x width)
A1 Schaffhausen Salient 1:100,000 German/Swiss border area in 147 x 175mm/ Red frontier & pylons, blackIdentical in all Map No.4 ChapterChapter 
(West) region of Schleitheim. 6" x 7" black railways, blue respects to A1 at 15 Germany.
water, green woods, Appendix 1.
hachures relief.
A2 Schaffhausen Salient 1:100,000 German/Swiss border area in 200 x 147mm/ Red frontier & pylons, Not same map as Map No.5 Chapter
(East) region of Ramsen & Engen. 7.75 x 5.75" black railways, blue A2 at Appendix 1. 15 Germany.
water, green woods, Ground photo also
hachures relief. shown.
A3 Danzig Docks (c 1:20,000) Port of Danzig at mouth of 172 x 380mm/ Black detail, Similar to A4 at Plan No.1 Chapter
River Vistula. 7 x 15" blue water. Appendix 1 but less 15 Germany. 
detail & smaller scale.
A10 Gdynia Docks n/s Docks at Gdynia. 175 x 205mm/ Monochrome.  Black rail, roads,N  similar map Plan 2 Chapter 15
7 x 8" paths, tree symbols.  identified as E & E Germany.
version.
Stettin 1:25,000 Stettin & adjacent area with 395 x 280mm/ Extract of native No similar map Plan No.3 Chapter
insets of Freihaven and location 15.5 x 11" large scale map with identified as E & E 15 Germany.
map of area. red numbers added version.
to key.
Lübeck n/s Lübeck and adjacent area. 217 x 270mm/ Extract of native No similar map Plan No.4 Chapter
8.5 x 10.5" large scale map. identified as E & E 15 Germany.
version.  
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Sheet Sheet title Scale Geographical coverage Dimensions Detail Notes Bulletin details
number (length x width)
Norway Military (c 1:2,000,000) Norway south of Trondheim to 330 x 250mm/ Black & red detail. Similar to Norway at Marked SECRET
Zones Swedish border showing E & W 13 x 9.75" Dated March 1943. Appendix 8. Appendix C
Military Zones. Map B.
Northern Norway 1:600,000 Norway north of Trondheim in 2 430 x 465mm/ Black & red detail. No similar map Marked SECRET
sections, central & north. 17 x 18.5" Dated March 1943. identified as E & E Appendix C
version. Map C.
Total number of maps = 8
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